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This thesis took an educational neuroscience approach to investigate the cognitive 
and neural bases of science and maths reasoning in adolescence. The studies investigated 
the cognitive skills required to reason effectively in science and maths, and in particular 
about counterintuitive concepts, where misconceptions may be held. Misconceptions 
remain throughout schooling, likely interfering with academic success, and often 
persisting into adulthood. The specific roles of inhibitory control and relational reasoning 
were examined. Inhibitory control, the ability to suppress a prepotent response, is thought 
to enable the inhibition of intuitive concepts, while relational reasoning, the ability to 
detect patterns, is thought to allow the extension of conceptual understanding to different 
domains. All studies focussed on adolescence, when these skills are still developing, and 
when science and maths reasoning are essential for compulsory school exams. The first 
behavioural study showed that both response and semantic inhibition predicted variance 
in counterintuitive reasoning specifically, when controlling for general cognitive ability. 
Two classroom studies that were designed with teachers did not find that inhibitory 
control associated with misconception presence, before or after a lesson on a specific 
counterintuitive concept. The first analysis of brain data from a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging study showed that brain activations associated with both response and 
semantic inhibition overlapped with those recruited when adolescents reasoned about 
science and maths misconceptions. The second analysis of these brain data indicated that 
verbal analogical reasoning predicted unique variance in science performance and neural 
activation in maths, while non-verbal relational reasoning was associated with neural 
activation in science. Finally, the second behavioural study showed verbal analogical and 
non-verbal relational reasoning to relate to general science and maths performance but 
also specifically to counterintuitive reasoning. Overall, the results indicate that inhibitory 
control and relational reasoning are two skills associated with success in school-related 





Table of contents 
Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 13 
List of figures ..................................................................................................................... 15 
List of tables ....................................................................................................................... 18 
Chapter 1 Introduction.................................................................................................... 21 
1.1 Educational neuroscience ............................................................................................. 21 
1.2 Science and maths ........................................................................................................ 24 
1.2.1 Development of science and maths skills .......................................................... 25 
1.2.1.1 Science ........................................................................................................ 25 
1.2.1.2 Maths........................................................................................................... 27 
1.2.2 Neural correlates of science and maths ............................................................. 29 
1.2.2.1 Science ........................................................................................................ 29 
1.2.2.2 Maths........................................................................................................... 31 
1.2.3 Misconceptions in science and maths ................................................................ 34 
1.3 Executive functions ...................................................................................................... 36 
1.4 Inhibitory control ......................................................................................................... 37 
1.4.1 Behavioural development of inhibitory control ................................................. 41 
1.4.1.1 Early development ...................................................................................... 41 
1.4.1.2 Response inhibition ..................................................................................... 42 
1.4.1.3 Semantic inhibition ..................................................................................... 44 
1.4.1.4 Comparing response and semantic inhibition ............................................. 45 
1.4.2 Neural correlates of developing inhibitory control ............................................ 46 
1.4.2.1 Response inhibition ..................................................................................... 47 
1.4.2.2 Semantic inhibition ..................................................................................... 48 
1.4.2.3 Issues in investigating the neural mechanisms of inhibitory control .......... 48 
1.4.3 Inhibitory control in science and maths ............................................................. 49 
1.4.3.1 Science ........................................................................................................ 50 
1.4.3.2 Maths........................................................................................................... 51 
1.4.3.3 Counterintuitive reasoning .......................................................................... 52 
1.5 Relational reasoning..................................................................................................... 54 
1.5.1 Development of relational reasoning skills ....................................................... 55 
1.5.2 Relational reasoning and executive functions ................................................... 58 
6 
 
1.5.3 Relational reasoning in science and maths ........................................................ 60 
1.5.3.1 Science ........................................................................................................ 60 
1.5.3.2 Maths........................................................................................................... 61 
1.5.3.3 Education .................................................................................................... 62 
1.6 Thesis overview ........................................................................................................... 63 
1.6.1 Research approach ............................................................................................. 63 
1.6.2 Chapter summaries ............................................................................................ 64 
Chapter 2 Methods .......................................................................................................... 66 
2.1 Ethics and school selection .......................................................................................... 66 
2.2 Science and maths misconceptions task ...................................................................... 67 
2.3 Inhibitory control tasks ................................................................................................ 74 
2.3.1 Response inhibition ........................................................................................... 75 
2.3.2 Semantic inhibition ............................................................................................ 77 
2.4 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) ......................................................... 79 
2.4.1 Principles of BOLD fMRI ................................................................................. 79 
2.4.2 Experimental design using fMRI ....................................................................... 80 
2.4.3 Analysis of BOLD fMRI data ........................................................................... 81 
2.4.4 FMRI with young participants ........................................................................... 82 
Chapter 3 Behavioural study 1: Inhibitory control in science and maths .................. 84 
3.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 84 
3.2 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 84 
3.3 Methods........................................................................................................................ 86 
3.3.1 Participants ........................................................................................................ 86 
3.3.2 Tasks .................................................................................................................. 86 
3.3.2.1 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) ................................. 86 
3.3.2.2 Science and maths misconceptions ............................................................. 87 
3.3.2.3 Inhibitory control ........................................................................................ 87 
3.3.3 Procedure ........................................................................................................... 87 
3.3.4 Statistical analysis.............................................................................................. 88 
3.4 Results .......................................................................................................................... 90 
3.4.1 Science and maths misconceptions .................................................................... 90 
3.4.2 Inhibitory control ............................................................................................... 93 
7 
 
3.4.3 Regression analyses ........................................................................................... 94 
3.5 Discussion .................................................................................................................... 99 
Chapter 4 Classroom studies: Inhibitory control in science and maths learning .... 103 
4.1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 103 
4.2 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 103 
4.3 Study A: Physics ........................................................................................................ 105 
4.3.1 Methods ........................................................................................................... 105 
4.3.1.1 Participants ................................................................................................ 105 
4.3.1.2 Physics lessons .......................................................................................... 106 
4.3.1.3 Measures ................................................................................................... 106 
4.3.1.3.1 Physics tests........................................................................................ 106 
4.3.1.3.2 Executive function tasks..................................................................... 108 
4.3.1.4 Procedure .................................................................................................. 109 
4.3.1.5 Statistical analysis ..................................................................................... 109 
4.3.1.5.1 Physics tests........................................................................................ 109 
4.3.1.5.2 Executive function tasks..................................................................... 109 
4.3.1.5.3 Association between executive functions and physics ....................... 110 
4.3.2 Results ............................................................................................................. 110 
4.3.2.1 Physics tests .............................................................................................. 110 
4.3.2.2 Executive function tasks ........................................................................... 111 
4.3.2.3 Association between executive functions and physics ............................. 112 
4.3.3 Study A Discussion ......................................................................................... 113 
4.4 Study B: Maths .......................................................................................................... 115 
4.4.1 Methods ........................................................................................................... 116 
4.4.1.1 Participants ................................................................................................ 116 
4.4.1.2 Maths lessons ............................................................................................ 116 
4.4.1.3 Measures ................................................................................................... 116 
4.4.1.3.1 Maths tests .......................................................................................... 116 
4.4.1.3.2 Executive function tasks..................................................................... 117 
4.4.1.4 Procedure .................................................................................................. 117 
4.4.1.5 Statistical analysis ..................................................................................... 117 
4.4.1.5.1 Maths tests .......................................................................................... 117 
4.4.1.5.2 Executive function tasks..................................................................... 117 
8 
 
4.4.1.5.3 Association between executive functions and maths ......................... 118 
4.4.2 Results ............................................................................................................. 118 
4.4.2.1 Maths tests ................................................................................................ 118 
4.4.2.2 Executive function tasks ........................................................................... 119 
4.4.2.3 Association between executive functions and physics ............................. 120 
4.4.3 Study B Discussion .......................................................................................... 121 
4.5 General Discussion .................................................................................................... 122 
Chapter 5 FMRI analysis 1: Neural correlates of inhibitory control and science and 
maths reasoning ............................................................................................................. 125 
5.1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 125 
5.2 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 125 
5.3 Methods...................................................................................................................... 127 
5.3.1 Participants ...................................................................................................... 127 
5.3.2 Tasks ................................................................................................................ 127 
5.3.2.1 Science and maths misconceptions ........................................................... 127 
5.3.2.2 Inhibitory control ...................................................................................... 128 
5.3.3 Procedure ......................................................................................................... 128 
5.3.4 Behavioural data analysis ................................................................................ 128 
5.3.5 MRI data acquisition and preprocessing ......................................................... 129 
5.3.6 FMRI data analysis .......................................................................................... 130 
5.4 Results ........................................................................................................................ 131 
5.4.1 Behavioural results .......................................................................................... 131 
5.4.1.1 Science and maths misconceptions ........................................................... 131 
5.4.1.2 Inhibitory control ...................................................................................... 133 
5.4.1.3 Regression analyses .................................................................................. 134 
5.4.1.4 Summary of behavioural results ............................................................... 135 
5.4.2 Neuroimaging results ....................................................................................... 135 
5.4.2.1 Science and maths misconceptions ........................................................... 135 
5.4.2.2 Inhibitory control ...................................................................................... 137 
5.4.2.3 Overlapping activation .............................................................................. 140 
5.4.2.4 Exploratory correlations............................................................................ 141 
5.5 Discussion .................................................................................................................. 142 
9 
 
Chapter 6 FMRI analysis 2: Relational reasoning and the neural correlates of 
science and maths reasoning ......................................................................................... 145 
6.1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 145 
6.2 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 145 
6.3 Methods...................................................................................................................... 147 
6.3.1 Participants ...................................................................................................... 147 
6.3.2 Tasks ................................................................................................................ 147 
6.3.2.1 Science and maths misconceptions ........................................................... 147 
6.3.2.2 Inhibitory control ...................................................................................... 148 
6.3.2.3 Analogical reasoning ................................................................................ 148 
6.3.2.4 WASI ........................................................................................................ 148 
6.3.2.5 Working memory ...................................................................................... 151 
6.3.3 Procedure ......................................................................................................... 151 
6.3.4 Statistical analysis............................................................................................ 151 
6.3.4.1 Overall science and maths reasoning ........................................................ 151 
6.3.4.1.1 Behavioural analysis .......................................................................... 151 
6.3.4.1.2 FMRI analysis .................................................................................... 152 
6.3.4.2 Counterintuitive science and maths reasoning .......................................... 152 
6.4 Results ........................................................................................................................ 153 
6.4.1 Overall science and maths reasoning............................................................... 153 
6.4.1.1 Behavioural results.................................................................................... 153 
6.4.1.2 FMRI results ............................................................................................. 157 
6.4.2 Counterintuitive science and maths reasoning ................................................ 161 
6.4.2.1 Behavioural results.................................................................................... 161 
6.5 Discussion .................................................................................................................. 163 
Chapter 7 Behavioural study 2: Relational reasoning and inhibitory control in 
science and maths ........................................................................................................... 166 
7.1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 166 
7.2 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 166 
7.3 Methods...................................................................................................................... 168 
7.3.1 Participants ...................................................................................................... 168 
7.3.2 Tasks ................................................................................................................ 169 
10 
 
7.3.2.1 Science and maths misconceptions ........................................................... 169 
7.3.2.2 Inhibitory control ...................................................................................... 169 
7.3.2.3 Relational reasoning.................................................................................. 170 
7.3.2.4 Working memory ...................................................................................... 171 
7.3.3 Procedure ......................................................................................................... 171 
7.3.4 Statistical analysis............................................................................................ 171 
7.3.4.1 Science and maths misconceptions ........................................................... 171 
7.3.4.2 Inhibitory control ...................................................................................... 171 
7.3.4.3 Relational reasoning.................................................................................. 172 
7.3.4.4 Working memory ...................................................................................... 172 
7.3.4.5 Regression analyses .................................................................................. 172 
7.3.4.5.1 Overall science and maths reasoning ................................................. 172 
7.3.4.5.2 Counterintuitive science and maths reasoning ................................... 173 
7.3.4.5.3 Exploratory regressions ...................................................................... 173 
7.4 Results ........................................................................................................................ 174 
7.4.1 Science and maths misconceptions .................................................................. 174 
7.4.2 Inhibitory control ............................................................................................. 176 
7.4.3 Relational reasoning ........................................................................................ 177 
7.4.3.1 Overall science and maths reasoning ........................................................ 177 
7.4.4 Regression analyses ......................................................................................... 178 
7.4.4.1 Overall science and maths reasoning ........................................................ 178 
7.4.4.2 Counterintuitive science and maths reasoning .......................................... 181 
7.4.4.3 Exploratory regressions ............................................................................ 185 
7.5 Discussion .................................................................................................................. 185 
7.5.1 Inhibitory control and science and maths ........................................................ 186 
7.5.2 Relational reasoning and science and maths ................................................... 188 
Chapter 8 Discussion ..................................................................................................... 191 
8.1 Summary and discussion of findings ......................................................................... 192 
8.1.1 Inhibitory control and science and maths ........................................................ 192 
8.1.2 Relational reasoning and science and maths ................................................... 199 
8.2 Reflection on educational neuroscience approach ..................................................... 202 
8.3 Future research ........................................................................................................... 205 
8.4 Educational implications ............................................................................................ 209 
11 
 








The work presented in this thesis was supported by an ESRC studentship, grant number 
ES/ J500021/1. 
 
The work presented in Chapter 3 was published in the following paper: 
Brookman-Byrne, A., Mareschal, D., Tolmie, A. K., & Dumontheil, I. (2018). Inhibitory 







AAL  Automatic Anatomical Labeling 
ACC  anterior cingulate cortex 
ADHD  attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
AG  angular gyrus 
AI/FO  anterior insula and frontal operculum 
ANOVA analysis of variance 
ANS  approximate number sense 
BA  Brodmann area 
BOLD  blood oxygenation level-dependent 
CCF  Cattell Culture Fair 
CMRR  Centre for Magnetic Resonance Research 
DLPFC dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
EEG  electroencephalography 
EPI  echo-planar imaging 
FD  framewise displacement 
fMRI  functional magnetic resonance imaging 
FWE  family-wise error 
GLM  general linear model 
GRAPPA generalised autocalibrating partial parallel acquisition 
HRF  haemodynamic response function 
IFG  inferior frontal gyrus 
IFS  inferior frontal sulcus 
IPL  inferior parietal lobule 
IPS  intraparietal sulcus 
ISI  interstimulus interval 
L  left hemisphere 
LNAT  Law National Aptitude Test 
LSAT  Law School Admission Test 
M  mean 
MD  multiple-demand 
MNI  Montreal Neurological Institute 
MPRAGE magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo 
MRI  magnetic resonance imaging 
14 
 
n.s.  not significant 
PFC  prefrontal cortex 
PTRT  primary task reaction time 
R  right hemisphere 
Re-Cat  Re-Categorisation task 
RF  radiofrequency 
RT  reaction time 
SAT  Scholastic Assessment Test 
SD  standard deviation 
SE  standard error 
SLA  Science Learning Assessment  
SMA  supplementary motor area 
SPL  superior parietal lobule 
SPM  statistical parametric mapping 
SP-Ver Sentence-Picture Verification task  
SSRT  stop signal reaction time 
TARC  Test of Analogical Reasoning in Children 
TE  echo time 
TORR  Test of Relational Reasoning 
TR  repetition time 
UK  United Kingdom 
USA  United States of America 
VLPFC ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
VS-WM visuospatial working memory 
VWM  verbal working memory 




List of figures 
 
Figure 1.1. Different disciplines that contribute to educational neuroscience, and how 
they can inform our understanding of processes involved in learning. ............................. 22 
Figure 1.2. Example of possible steps taken between new neuroscience findings and 
recommendations for teachers. Note the bidirectional arrows indicating many steps and a 
non-linear process, with no particular starting point. ........................................................ 23 
Figure 1.3. Example intuitive rules leading to misconceptions (adapted from Stavy & 
Tirosh, 2000). (a) More A—More B. An intuitive reasoning is that angle x is larger than 
angle w because angle x’s arc is longer. (b) Same A—Same B. An intuitive reasoning is 
that shapes y and z have equal perimeters because their areas are equal. (c) Everything 
Can Be Divided. An intuitive reasoning is that a piece of paper can be cut in half 
infinitely. ............................................................................................................................ 35 
Figure 1.4. Example stimuli for (a) response and (b) semantic inhibition tasks. .............. 40 
Figure 2.1. Stimuli presented inside the fMRI scanner for (a) the electric circuit study 
(Masson et al., 2014) and (b) the mechanics study (Brault Foisy et al., 2015). Electric 
circuit stimuli were still images, and mechanics stimuli were short videos showing the 
balls falling. Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by John Wiley and 
Sons, and Elsevier respectively.......................................................................................... 69 
Figure 2.2. Example (a) science and (b) maths problem-sets. Note that text and image 
size has been increased to enhance legibility here. ............................................................ 71 
Figure 2.3. Example science problem with red border to prompt participants to answer as 
quickly as possible, which appeared when there were just 3 s remaining. ........................ 73 
Figure 3.1. Histogram of mean accuracy in the 96 science and maths misconception 
problems. ............................................................................................................................ 90 
Figure 3.2. Accuracy estimated marginal means in science and maths trials by age. Dark 
bars represent science, light bars represent maths. *,** indicate p < .05 and p < .01 
respectively. ....................................................................................................................... 92 
Figure 4.1. Questions in the physics test addressing the (a) gravity and (b) pressure 
misconceptions. ................................................................................................................ 107 
Figure 4.2. Presence of a misconception in response to the (a) gravity and (b) pressure 
questions. ......................................................................................................................... 111 
Figure 4.3. Example (a) misconception and (b) control questions in the maths test. 
Misconception questions provide the final value following a percentage change, while 
control questions provide the original value before the percentage change. ................... 115 
16 
 
Figure 4.4. Estimated marginal mean number of correct responses (± SE) in control and 
misconception maths questions at each time point. ......................................................... 119 
Figure 5.1. Accuracy as a function of age in the science and maths misconceptions task. 
Scatterplots displaying correlation between age and percentage accuracy in (a) control 
trials and (b) misconception trials. ................................................................................... 133 
Figure 5.2. (a) Regions of increased BOLD signal in the right and left hemispheres in the 
Misconception > Control contrast of the science and maths task. (b) Mean parameter 
estimates (± SE) in misconception and control trials for the six main clusters (see Table 
5.4). Zero represents the implicit baseline of the model, which include the fixation phases. 
R: right; L: left; SMG: supramarginal gyrus; SFG: superior frontal gyrus; MFG: middle 
frontal gyrus; IFG: inferior frontal gyrus; contrasts puncorr < .001 at the voxel level and 
pFWE < .05 at the cluster level. ......................................................................................... 137 
Figure 5.3. Regions of increased BOLD signal in the right and left hemispheres in (a) the 
complex Go/No-Go blocks > Go blocks contrast of the Go/No-Go task and (b) the Mixed 
blocks > Congruent blocks contrast of the numerical Stroop task. For both contrasts puncorr 
< .001 at the voxel level and pFWE < .05 at the cluster level. ........................................... 139 
Figure 5.4. Overlapping activation between the science and maths and inhibitory control 
tasks contrasts. BOLD signal in Misconception > Control and (a) Complex Go/No-Go > 
Go and (b) Mixed > Congruent in the numerical Stroop. Inhibitory control task contrasts 
are shown in blue, while the science and maths Misconception > Control contrast is 
shown in red, and regions of overlap are shown in purple. Note that the slices shown are 
the same in (a) and (b) to enable comparison between images, and the z-coordinate is 
indicated in the bottom left corner. Black circles highlight regions of overlap between the 
two contrasts, while white circles highlight regions common to all three contrasts. 
Contrasts are overlaid using MRIcron onto an image of the mean normalised structural 
brain image of the 34 participants created using ImCalc in SPM.................................... 141 
Figure 6.1. Regions of increased BOLD signal in the Science > Arrows contrast from the 
one sample t-test with no covariates added. Contrasts puncorr < .001 at the voxel level and 
pFWE < .05 at the cluster level. Images are rendered on the canonical brain in SPM, 
showing from left to right: the lateral view of the left hemisphere, and medial and lateral 
views of the right hemisphere. ......................................................................................... 157 
Figure 6.2. Regions of increased BOLD signal in the Maths > Arrows contrast from the 
one sample t-test with no covariates added. Contrasts puncorr < .001 at the voxel level and 
pFWE < .05 at the cluster level. Images are rendered on the canonical brain in SPM, 
17 
 
showing from left to right: the lateral view of the left hemisphere, and medial and lateral 
views of the right hemisphere. ......................................................................................... 158 
Figure 6.3. Brain regions where BOLD signal during science or maths reasoning 
positively correlated with behavioural relational reasoning performance, z-coordinates are 
indicated in the bottom left corner. Clusters are plotted on six horizontal slices of the 
average normalised structural image of the 34 participants............................................. 159 
Figure 6.4. Average parameter estimates plotted against relational reasoning accuracy for 
the four significant clusters. Science > Arrows covaried with WASI Matrix Reasoning in 
clusters that have their peak in (a) the parahippocampal gyrus, (b) the paracentral lobule, 
and (c) crus I of cerebellar hemisphere; (d) Maths > Arrows covaried with analogical 




List of tables 
 
Table 1.1. Summary of commonly used inhibitory control tasks. .................................... 38 
Table 3.1. Participant characteristics. Age groups did not differ in WASI Vocabulary, p’s 
> .2. .................................................................................................................................... 86 
Table 3.2. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the science and maths 
misconceptions task. .......................................................................................................... 91 
Table 3.3. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the inhibitory control tasks. 
Note that RTs are for correct trials only, therefore there are no RTs for No-Go trials. ..... 94 
Table 3.4. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths 
combined. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations are highlighted in bold; a,b,c 
indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively. ............................................................ 95 
Table 3.5. Regression models for science and maths overall performance. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. ...................... 96 
Table 3.6. Regression models for science and maths misconceptions. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. ...................... 97 
Table 3.7. Regression models for science and maths misconceptions separately. 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. .... 98 
Table 4.1. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the inhibitory control tasks. 112 
Table 4.2. Mean, standard deviation and range in VS-WM, attention in lessons, average 
correct in other physics test questions, average physics test score and end of year physics 
exam score. ...................................................................................................................... 112 
Table 4.3. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the inhibitory control tasks. 120 
Table 4.4. Mean, standard deviation and range in VS-WM, attention in lessons, overall 
correct in maths control questions, average maths test score and end of year maths exam 
score. ................................................................................................................................ 120 
Table 5.1. Participant characteristics of final sample, N = 34. There was no correlation 
between age in months and standardised WASI scores (Wechsler, 2011), p’s > .2, and no 
gender difference in mean age, p = .8. ............................................................................. 127 
Table 5.2. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the science and maths 
misconceptions task. ........................................................................................................ 132 
Table 5.3. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the inhibitory control tasks. 134 
Table 5.4. Regression models for science and maths misconception accuracy and RT. 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. .. 135 
19 
 
Table 5.5. Brain activation in science and maths misconception trials compared to control 
trials. a,b indicate pFWE < .05 at the voxel level, and pFWE < .05 at the cluster level (cluster 
defining threshold: puncorr < .001), respectively; L, R indicate left and right hemispheres 
respectively. ..................................................................................................................... 136 
Table 5.6. Brain activation in the complex Go/No-Go. a,b indicate pFWE < .05 at the voxel 
level, and pFWE < .05 at the cluster level (cluster defining threshold: puncorr < .001), 
respectively; L, R indicate left and right hemispheres respectively. ............................... 138 
Table 5.7. Brain activation in numerical Stroop. a,b indicate pFWE < .05 at the voxel level, 
and pFWE < .05 at the cluster level (cluster defining threshold: puncorr < .001), respectively; 
L, R indicate left and right hemispheres respectively. ..................................................... 139 
Table 5.8. Overlapping activation between the inhibitory control tasks contrasts and the 
science and maths task Misconception > Control contrast. Coordinates are the centre of 
mass of each cluster as calculated by MarsBaR. L, R, indicate left and right hemispheres 
respectively. ..................................................................................................................... 140 
Table 6.1. Questions in the verbal analogical reasoning task. Response options appeared 
in fixed order. P = practice item. Correct responses are in bold. ..................................... 149 
Table 6.2. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths 
by discipline. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations are highlighted in bold, a,b,c 
indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively. .......................................................... 154 
Table 6.3. Regression models for overall science and maths accuracy by discipline. 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. .. 155 
Table 6.4. Regression models for overall science and maths RTs by discipline. 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. .. 156 
Table 6.5. Regions where BOLD signal during science or maths reasoning versus the 
arrows task positively correlates with relational reasoning, apFWE < .05 at the voxel level, 
bpFWE < .05 at the cluster level (cluster defining threshold: puncorr < .001). ..................... 158 
Table 6.6. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths 
misconceptions. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations are highlighted in bold, 
a,b,c indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively. .................................................... 162 
Table 7.1. Participant characteristics. There was no gender difference in mean age, p = 
.644................................................................................................................................... 168 
Table 7.2. Example sentences missing their last word in the Hayling sentence completion 
test, taken from Burgess and Shallice (1996). ................................................................. 170 
Table 7.3. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the science and maths 
misconceptions task. ........................................................................................................ 174 
20 
 
Table 7.4. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the complex Go/No-Go and 
numerical Stroop. ............................................................................................................. 176 
Table 7.5. Estimated marginal means and range in the CCF, analogical reasoning, and 
VWM by age. a indicates the subsample size that refers only to VWM. ......................... 177 
Table 7.6. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths 
by discipline. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations are highlighted in bold, a,b,c  
indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively, d,e denote subsamples of participants 
where n = 76 and n = 75 respectively. ............................................................................. 179 
Table 7.7. Regression models for science and maths accuracy and RT. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. .................... 180 
Table 7.8. Regression models for science and maths accuracy by discipline. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. .................... 181 
Table 7.9. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths 
split by misconception and control trials. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations 
are highlighted in bold, a,b,c  indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively, d,e denote 
subsamples of participants where n = 76 and n = 75 respectively. .................................. 182 
Table 7.10. Regression models for science and maths misconception accuracy and RT. 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. .. 183 
Table 7.11. Regression models for science and maths misconception accuracy by 
discipline. Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised 
coefficients. ...................................................................................................................... 184 
Table 7.12. Regression models for science and maths misconception RT by discipline. 




Chapter 1 Introduction 
Science and maths reasoning are important skills that children and adolescents 
must develop in order to understand the world and make informed decisions. As such, 
they are core components of the school curriculum (Department for Education, 2013a, 
2013b), and compulsory exams are taken in these disciplines during adolescence. The 
material that is taught during this period of life is increasingly complex, and sometimes 
counterintuitive. Science and maths are also considered particularly difficult disciplines to 
learn (Lortie-Forgues, Tian, & Siegler, 2015; Zaitchik, Iqbal, & Carey, 2014). While the 
development of science and maths reasoning skills are typically studied separately, the 
mechanisms driving success appear to be similar. This may be especially true in the 
context of counterintuitive reasoning (Mareschal, 2016), which may require a specific set 
of cognitive skills to overcome misconceptions. Two candidate abilities which may 
enable successful science and maths reasoning, are inhibitory control and relational 
reasoning. These are domain-general skills that continue to develop through adolescence 
(Jablansky, Alexander, Dumas, & Compton, 2015; Leon-Carrion, García-Orza, & Pérez-
Santamaría, 2004), and yet their role in reasoning about science and maths concepts 
during adolescence is not well understood. Establishing the cognitive and neural 
associations between these skills may lead to recommendations for education. 
The aim of this PhD was to take an educational neuroscience approach to explore 
the cognitive and neural bases of science and maths reasoning in adolescence. In this 
introductory chapter, I first define educational neuroscience and consider how this 
scientific approach might inform teaching and learning. Second, I review the literature 
relating to the development of science and maths reasoning skills, starting with general 
science and maths and then considering misconceptions in these disciplines. Third, I 
review the measurement and development of inhibitory control, with an initial focus on 
this ability in isolation, and then in relation to counterintuitive science and maths 
reasoning. Fourth, I examine the development of relational reasoning skills, making links 
to executive functions and science and maths. Fifth, I outline the educational 
neuroscience approach taken throughout the PhD, and sixth, I summarise the aims of each 
following chapter. 
 
1.1 Educational neuroscience 
Educational neuroscience is a relatively young field that brings together 
psychology, neuroscience, and education (and any other discipline related to learning) 
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(Figure 1.1), with the aim of understanding more about learning, and with the ultimate 
goal of bringing scientific insights to the classroom to improve teaching and learning 
(Butterworth & Tolmie, 2014). As opposed to a new discipline, educational neuroscience 
can be considered a new approach to research and teaching. Researchers work with 
teachers to design studies of relevance for education in addition to answering important 
scientific questions. Newly acquired scientific knowledge is then fed back to teachers to 
inform their practices in the classroom. 
 
 
The emergence of educational neuroscience is linked to the rise of sophisticated 
technologies to image the human brain (The Royal Society, 2011). These technologies, 
such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography 
(EEG), are ever-advancing, and revealing more and more about the underlying cognitive 
and neural mechanisms of learning and reasoning through development. The challenge 
lies in translating this research to the classroom (Simmonds, 2014). There are many steps 
between initial lab studies and educational recommendations for teachers, learners, and 
schools. The process is likely to be lengthy, with many different studies leading towards 
one or two particular recommendations for teachers (Figure 1.2). It may also be that new 
findings simply confirm what teachers already thought: that a certain technique is 
effective in the classroom. Some research aims to investigate why the practices that are 
known to be effective work. Even when translation of something new is ready, a language 
barrier between teachers and researchers remains, whereby teachers and researchers may 
not necessarily have a common lexicon, sometimes using the same words to mean 
different things. Scientists may not have the necessary knowledge of the classroom to 
share their findings in a manner that is useful for teachers. Similarly, teachers may lack 
the resources, in terms of time and sufficient background knowledge, to assess and 
Figure 1.1. Different disciplines that contribute to educational neuroscience, and how they can 
inform our understanding of processes involved in learning. 
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implement new findings adequately (Simmonds, 2014). Nonetheless, it is essential that 
teachers are part of the translation process, since they will be best placed to fit the 
research into the realities of school life. 
 
 
Communication and collaboration are key tenets of educational neuroscience, and 
conversations between researchers and teachers must be two-way, rather than scientists 
simply imparting their knowledge (Ansari & Coch, 2006). Researchers can also gain from 
listening to what teachers have to say. Discussions between educators and researchers 
will lead to scientific research that addresses questions of importance and interest to 
teachers. Where neuroscience and psychology lead to specific predictions about what 
might work in education, teachers will be able to provide important perspectives on the 
feasibility of these ideas. Being prescriptive will interfere with a teacher’s professional 
autonomy, while providing new tools and information drawn from scientific research will 
enable teachers to choose the most appropriate method for a given scenario in their own 
classroom, as in the medical profession (Goldacre, 2013). Ideally, the involvement of 
teachers early on in the research process will mean that each programme of research can 
be shaped by the needs of educators.  
Figure 1.2. Example of possible steps taken between new neuroscience findings and 
recommendations for teachers. Note the bidirectional arrows indicating many steps and a non-
linear process, with no particular starting point. 
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There remains debate concerning whether or not educational neuroscience is a 
worthwhile endeavour. Criticisms of the field tend to draw on either scientific concerns 
(about methods, data, and theory) or pragmatic concerns (about costs, timing, and 
payoffs) (Varma, McCandliss, & Schwartz, 2008). For example, Bruer (1997) famously 
argued that the link between neuroscience and education is a bridge too far, and that 
cognitive psychology is instead where to look for educational guidance. While this 
argument is still repeated (Bowers, 2016), it does not take account of the current 
landscape of educational neuroscience research, which does indeed consider cognitive 
psychology, in addition to any other related disciplines. A common pragmatic concern is 
the high cost associated with some educational neuroscience research, with Bishop (2014) 
arguing that the payoff for such expensive neuroimaging research is not great enough. 
Bishop’s position is that discovering neural underpinnings of learning processes cannot 
be of use to teachers. While there may be no direct link from neuroimaging findings to 
education, they can inform psychological theories and as such tell us more about learning 
than behavioural data on its own (Howard-Jones et al., 2016). Educational neuroscience is 
a long-term endeavour (Howard-Jones et al., 2016), and as such, no quick fixes are 
expected from carrying out neuroimaging research. While pragmatic concerns are perhaps 
easier to sympathise with, many of the criticisms of the field do not reflect the reality of 
educational neuroscience which is already making strides in linking neuroscience and 
education, through the convergence of many different disciplines.  
The remainder of the Introduction of this thesis takes an educational neuroscience 
approach in considering different levels of explanation and bringing together research 
from psychology, neuroscience, and education. By taking this approach to the literature 
review, the resulting research presented in this thesis was in a position to scientifically 
investigate reasoning and learning during adolescence in a holistic manner: drawing from 
a range of relevant literatures, using psychology and neuroscience methods, and with 
relevance to education a key consideration throughout. 
 
1.2 Science and maths 
Science and maths are core components of the curriculum at both primary and 
secondary school and are essential if children and adolescents are to understand the world 
around them. Thinking scientifically and mathematically allows individuals to make 
informed judgments about important current issues (for instance, relating to health or the 
environment), and has a positive contribution to wealth in society (The Royal Society, 
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2014). The National Curriculum for England determines the content of taught science and 
maths at school, expecting pupils to improve in these core disciplines throughout the 
school years, solving increasingly challenging problems (e.g. Department for Education, 
2013b, 2013a). The development of science and maths skills through childhood and 
adolescence has been studied extensively, but there remain unknowns in terms of how 
individual differences in science and maths relate to the development of other cognitive 
skills, and in terms of how different aspects of science and maths skills relate to each 
other.  
 
1.2.1 Development of science and maths skills 
The development of science and maths skills have typically been studied 
separately, and as such they are presented here in turn. 
 
1.2.1.1 Science 
 Within the discipline of science, the focus has been broad, with studies 
investigating the generation of hypotheses, the design of experiments, experimentation 
itself, the evaluation of evidence, and conceptual change. At present there is no consensus 
as to how best to define and categorise science skills, and consequently, different studies 
have taken different approaches in establishing science abilities across development.  
The Science Learning Assessment (SLA) is a 24-item test that has been 
administered to young children to establish their understanding of the scientific inquiry 
process and of life sciences (Samarapungavan, Mantzicopoulos, Patrick, & French, 2009). 
One hundred 5-year-olds were tested on the SLA after 65 of the children had received 
science teaching in the SLA topics, while 35 of them received no science teaching. The 
group who had received science instruction performed better on items measuring both the 
scientific inquiry process and life sciences understanding, with a greater advantage on 
items relating to scientific inquiry (Samarapungavan et al., 2009). Overall the results 
indicate that children are able to reason effectively about science processes and scientific 
concepts from an early age, if they are given adequate support. They also indicate that 
skills relating to scientific inquiry are less likely to emerge without explicit teaching, 
perhaps because they are less likely to be spoken about casually at home and in school 
than scientific concepts. 
A study of 1,581 8-, 9-, and 10-year-olds used 66 story problems to examine five 
components of science: goals of science, theories and interpretative frameworks, 
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experimentation strategies, experimental designs, and data interpretation (Koerber, 
Mayer, Osterhaus, Schwippert, & Sodian, 2015). Performance in all five components 
improved with age, and analyses supported a model whereby science skills formed one 
single unitary construct, as opposed to being separable by the different components: there 
were no developmental stages according to components. Conversely, a study of 223 
children aged 4 to 13 years found that three components of science reasoning followed 
different developmental patterns (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). The earliest component to 
emerge was the ability to evaluate evidence that either covaried perfectly or imperfectly, 
which improved steadily with age. Next to develop was an understanding of 
experimentation, which required children to engage in hypothesis testing. This component 
also saw a gradual improvement, but with a pronounced shift in performance from age 7 
to 9. The final component was hypothesis generation in the face of accumulating 
evidence, which proved to be much harder overall but nonetheless showed improvement 
with age and a large shift between ages 5 and 7 (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). These findings 
showed that different components of science reasoning develop at different stages, in 
contrast to the findings from Koerber and colleagues (2015). This might be due to the 
larger age range, as within 8- to 10-year-olds it would be surprising to find hugely 
different developmental trends. It could also be down to the types of tasks administered: 
the study from Koerber and colleagues (2015) only used story problems, all of which 
might require similar types of reasoning skills. Working through 66 story problems likely 
relies on language ability, and the large number of problems might also require a high 
level of motivation. The study from Piekny and Maehler (2013) used one-to-one testing 
sessions that were more active in nature, requiring physical demonstration of different 
skills. This might have led to greater differentiation between problem types, since reading 
was not important and the experimenter likely helped to keep motivation high. 
These studies reflect the wider literature on science skills that show differing 
associations with age across components of science that are tested and defined 
inconsistently. Tolmie, Ghazali, and Morris (2016) attempted to clarify this muddled 
picture and recently proposed a simplified new account of three core science skills: 
prediction, the anticipation of scientific events; description, the ability to reason about 
causal connections in observed events; and explanation, knowledge of the mechanisms 
that explain causal connections. In this analysis, explanation was linked specifically to 
concepts and given a central place in explicit understanding of science (Tolmie et al., 
2016). The authors argued that these three skills together may form the foundation for 
effective science reasoning, but that detailed analysis is needed to establish the 
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development of association between these skills. Zimmerman (2000) argued that science 
reasoning is a core academic skill that should be recognised alongside reading, writing, 
and arithmetic, as opposed to purely a content-based discipline, which is perhaps how it is 
often still considered despite the evidence that processes are important too. 
 
1.2.1.2 Maths 
The picture is somewhat clearer in the field of maths, where there is a 
longstanding body of research into the development of key skills (Butterworth & Varma, 
2013). Mathematical thinking is thought to rely on the integration of linguistic processes 
and visuospatial representations (Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, & Tsivkin, 1999). 
Here I present a brief overview of the extensive literature into maths development, 
covering illustrative examples that demonstrate the developmental trajectory of core 
skills. There is evidence of an understanding of basic number even in infancy. An early 
study used a dishabituation paradigm to show that 72 22-week-olds were able to 
distinguish two dots from three dots, which the authors argued demonstrated the ability of 
infants to subitize, i.e. to recognise how many items are present without counting (Starkey 
& Cooper, 1980). Further research indicated that subitizing ability increases until 
approximately 5 years of age, where sets of five items can be subitized, and that this 
ability matches the capacity of adults (Starkey & Cooper, 1995). This number ability 
therefore emerges early in development and rapidly matures. 
The ongoing development of arithmetic skills is thought to be supported by innate 
approximate representations of numbers (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004), called an 
approximate number sense (ANS), which would explain how infants are able to 
discriminate small numbers. Feigenson and colleagues (2004) presented a large body of 
evidence to argue that the ANS is one of two core systems that underlie the ability to 
reason about numbers from infancy and throughout childhood to adulthood, with 
precision of the ANS improving through childhood and adolescence. The second core 
system they posit is the tracking and precise representation of small numbers of distinct 
items (Feigenson et al., 2004). According to this view, the same core systems are 
involved in number throughout life, forming the foundations for sophisticated maths. 
Spelke and Kinzler (2007) later argued that there is a single innate core number system, 
as evidenced by the infant data and cross-cultural data showing the same number 
representations independent of education. According to Spelke and Kinzler (2007), the 




A longitudinal study emphasised the role of digit knowledge in arithmetic 
abilities, indicating that the role of the ANS is perhaps not as crucial as others have 
argued (Göbel, Watson, Lervåg, & Hulme, 2014). One hundred and sixty-five 6-year-olds 
were tested at baseline and ANS was not a unique predictor of arithmetic after 11 months, 
indicating that individual differences in the ANS are less of a constraint than previously 
imagined. Instead, knowledge of Arabic digits was associated with arithmetic growth. 
The authors argued that digit knowledge is therefore a key foundation of maths skills, just 
as letter knowledge is a key foundation of reading skills (Göbel et al., 2014). Nonetheless, 
there was a strong correlation between ANS and arithmetic, and it is possible that the 
ANS variance was shared with other control variables, such as earlier arithmetic skills.  
Another longitudinal study, this time of 182 children, investigated the 
development of different maths skills in 4- to 7-year-olds (LeFevre et al., 2010). 
Modelling revealed three different pathways of skills that led to maths competence. 
Linguistic skills were specifically related to Arabic digit naming, supporting Göbel and 
colleagues’ (2014) suggestion that Arabic digit knowledge in maths is analogous to letter 
knowledge in reading. Subitizing latency was related to nonlinguistic arithmetic ability. 
Finally, spatial attention was related to digit knowledge and numerical magnitude 
processing. Overall, the findings indicate that maturing maths ability relies on the 
development of multiple separable components (LeFevre et al., 2010). Cragg and Gilmore 
(2014) argued that this pathway approach is a good start but does not go far enough; that 
more work needs to be done to explore skills in factual, procedural, and conceptual 
knowledge in maths separately, as they likely require different demands that vary with 
age. Despite the relatively advanced literature on the emergence of maths skills, evidence 
relating to changing associations between components of maths and their underlying 
demands across development is still in its infancy, in part because standardised tests 
group these components together (Cragg & Gilmore, 2014). Factual maths (knowledge of 
number facts), procedural maths (applying a strategy) and conceptual maths 
(understanding mathematical rules) are dissociable (Cragg & Gilmore, 2014), and thus 
require in depth exploration. 
Academic difficulties are more readily recognised in maths than science, with 
dyscalculia being diagnosed as a result of poor maths ability in the absence of a known 
cause such as low intelligence (Butterworth & Varma, 2013). Since the core skills in 
science are still under investigation there is no corresponding diagnosis in science, which 
is demonstrative of the difference in understanding between the two disciplines. While 
Tolmie and colleagues (2016) posited three core science skills, these have not been 
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examined across development. Age-specific norms would be required in order to establish 
what might constitute a diagnosable scientific difficulty.  
Despite the varied literature, it is clear that abilities in both science and maths 
begin to emerge from a young age (from infancy in maths), and continue to develop 
throughout the school years. In both disciplines there are suggested core skills which are 
fundamental to ongoing development, but with no clear categories established yet. In 
science, there is a suggested distinction between processes and concepts 
(Samarapungavan et al., 2009); a five component model (Koerber et al., 2015); and 
Tolmie and colleagues’ (2016) three core skills (prediction, description, and explanation). 
Maths research has led to the proposal of a two skill model consisting of ANS and 
tracking/representation (Feigenson et al., 2004); a single core number system (Spelke & 
Kinzler, 2007); digit knowledge as a foundational skill (Göbel et al., 2014; LeFevre et al., 
2010); and the distinction between facts, procedures, and concepts (Cragg & Gilmore, 
2014). The suggested core skills across science and maths show little overlap, although 
there is some similarity in the proposal that procedures and concepts are both important 
features. There remains debate about the precise nature of these skills in both disciplines, 
and their importance as applied to school-related outcomes.  
 
1.2.2 Neural correlates of science and maths 
Examination of the underlying neural correlates of science and maths may reveal 
more about the mechanisms through which success is reached. Again, science and maths 
have been considered separately so will be examined in turn here. In science, the 
neuroimaging data is limited but focusses on fMRI. In maths, there is a larger body of 
literature, with fMRI the most commonly used neuroimaging method. This section will 
therefore focus on what fMRI data have uncovered about the brain regions involved in 
science and maths, which will also be particularly useful in situating the thesis (which 
uses fMRI as a method) within the existing literature. 
 
1.2.2.1 Science 
Work investigating the neural correlates of science is as fragmented as the 
behavioural research. Neuroimaging research has been conducted on adults and has 
focussed on the domain of physics. Nine young adults aged 19 to 25, who were majoring 
in physics or engineering, were shown 30 physics terms relating to a range of topics while 
inside an fMRI scanner (Mason & Just, 2016). The participants were tasked with thinking 
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about each concept and its properties when shown the term. Factor analysis of activation 
data identified four physics factors: causality (e.g. gravity, potential energy), periodicity 
(e.g. wavelength, diffraction), equation representation (e.g. velocity, acceleration), and 
energy flow (e.g. electric field, heat transfer). There was also a final non-physics factor 
associated with word length. Each factor was associated with distinct neural correlates, 
which were common across participants (Mason & Just, 2016). While the networks were 
distinct, they each covered frontal and parietal regions, with different factors located 
adjacently, and the majority of the activation was left-lateralised. Regions included parts 
of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), intraparietal sulcus (IPS), the postcentral sulcus, 
superior temporal sulcus, and the superior frontal gyrus. The authors argued that each 
factor included regions associated with executive functions, spatial processing, and 
linguistic processing, indicating that despite their specificity they reflect domain-general 
skills (Mason & Just, 2016). These results are compelling in showing distinct neural 
representations for different types of physics concepts, but the study is limited in only 
examining relative experts, and using a task that engages thinking skills as opposed to 
reasoning skills. The very small sample size is also a major limitation, although the 
consistent recruitment of the same regions across participants is persuasive. 
An fMRI study of 20 young adults with a mean age of 24 involved the observation 
of moving balls and judgment of their physical causality (Blos, Chatterjee, Kircher, & 
Straube, 2012). Physical causality judgments were associated with activation in the 
insulae (Brodmann Area (BA) 47), right angular gyrus (AG) (BA 39), right IFG (BA 44), 
and bilateral supplementary motor area (SMA) (BA 8). These neural correlates were 
thought to reflect visual perceptual processing, moving objects processing, and higher 
order processing (Blos et al., 2012). These regions showed some overlap with those 
reported by Mason and Just (2016) when physics students thought about causality 
concepts (BA 7/8/27/39). Common regions of activation were the AG, which may relate 
to spatial manipulations, and the SMA which is thought to play a role in time perception 
(Blos et al., 2012). The recruitment of similar regions suggests that thinking about causal 
processes and observing causal events may be supported by similar cognitive 
mechanisms. 
Finally, the tracking of moving balls over moving three-dimensional floor planes 
was examined in 21 adults with a mean age of 25 years (Jahn, Wendt, Lotze, Papenmeier, 
& Huff, 2012). Tracking of the balls was associated with broad bilateral activation in the 
superior parietal lobule (SPL) (BA 7/40), IPS (BA 5/7/19), precuneus (BA 5), frontal eye 
fields (BA 6), SMA (BA 6), inferior precentral sulcus (BA 6), insula (BA 48/25), lateral 
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occipital cortex (BA 37), and subcortical regions (including BA 37). These activations 
were taken to reflect spatial memory and imagery (Jahn et al., 2012). The task was similar 
to the task involving observation of moving balls (Blos et al., 2012), and yet a much 
broader brain network was implicated with no noticeable overlap. This is surprising 
because such similar tasks would be expected to lead to activation of some common 
regions. This may be due to the control condition used by Jahn and colleagues (2012), 
which required passive observation of the same stimuli, but without any need to actively 
track to complete the task. In contrast, the study by Blos and colleagues (2012) had a 
control condition with the same stimuli but they were ‘social’ in the sense that the balls 
were named and participants were instructed to think of their movements as social 
interactions. This condition still required participants to consider the movements of the 
balls and their positions in relation to one another, which may have led to less of a 
contrast between the experimental and control conditions. These differences indicate that 
the control conditions of the different studies which seem similar visually were in fact 
calling on different cognitive processes. Much more research is needed to clarify the role 
of different brain regions in observing and thinking about physics concepts and events, 
perhaps with control stimuli that show non-physical events. 
Within the discipline of science there is a lack of research into the development of 
brain regions supporting science through childhood and adolescence. The studies so far 
also focus on a narrow interpretation of science, only addressing physics concepts and not 
covering the posited core skills in science.  
 
1.2.2.2 Maths 
As in the behavioural studies, the literature pertaining to maths is more developed, 
although the focus has been on arithmetic, with little reference to other types of 
mathematical reasoning, such as geometry or probability, and a lack of focus on concepts. 
Nonetheless, there are three consistently observed parietal regions considered key for 
number and arithmetic. The IPS is activated bilaterally during magnitude representation, 
and as such has been shown to be involved in most tasks that require numbers 
(Butterworth & Varma, 2013). Left-lateralised AG supports the retrieval of number facts, 
and the posterior SPL is recruited when relating numbers to space (Butterworth & Varma, 
2013). While these brain regions are commonly observed in adult samples, some studies 
suggest changes in brain regions from childhood to adulthood. Developmental fMRI 
studies will now be considered. 
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 A meta-analysis of seven neuroimaging maths studies which included 88 
participants in total reported a shift from recruitment of the frontal cortex in childhood to 
parietal regions in adulthood (Houdé, Rossi, Lubin, & Joliot, 2010). This finding 
corroborates a similar conclusion from a study of 8- to 19-year-olds that was not included 
in the meta-analysis. Seventeen participants were shown arithmetic equations and were 
required to judge whether or not they were correct (Rivera, Reiss, Eckert, & Menon, 
2005). With increasing age there was decreased activation in frontal regions (BA 
8/9/11/24/32/46/47), basal ganglia, left medial temporal lobe, brainstem, and left anterior 
insula. There was increased activation with age in inferior and middle temporal gyri (BA 
21/37), middle and inferior occipital gyri (BA 21/37), left supramarginal gyrus (BA 40), 
and left IPS (BA 7) (Rivera et al., 2005). Overall, there was a large shift across a range of 
brain regions, mainly characterised by less recruitment of frontal regions and greater 
recruitment of temporal, parietal, and occipital regions. These findings appear to 
demonstrate a reduction in the recruitment of cognitive control processes during 
arithmetic with age, alongside increased reliance on declarative and procedural memory.  
 A more recent review of 38 studies of arithmetic in the developing brain 
suggested that the decrease in prefrontal cortex (PFC) and increase in posterior parietal 
cortex reflect a change in strategy from calculation to fact retrieval (Peters & De Smedt, 
2018). The review also suggested that maths training leads to a shift in parietal activation 
from the IPS to the AG, which might suggest increased used of retrieval strategies and 
reduced use of backup strategies (Peters & De Smedt, 2018). Backup strategies might 
include counting or decomposition, whereby a problem is broken down into smaller parts. 
A meta-analysis of children’s number and calculations highlighted the potential 
importance of deeper brain regions that are rarely considered (Arsalidou, Pawliw-Levac, 
Sadeghi, & Pascual-Leone, 2018). The authors suggested that for children under 14 years 
the insula might have a particular role in intrinsically motivated behaviour within maths, 
while the claustrum might particularly support cross-modal integration of top-down and 
bottom-up processes (Arsalidou et al., 2018). Additionally, within this age range, the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL, BA 40) appeared to serve different functions in the right 
versus the left hemisphere. The right IPL was more involved in number tasks with no 
calculation (such as comparing arrays of digits or dots) while the left IPL was recruited 
for calculation tasks, demonstrating increased hemispheric specialisation for different 
aspects of maths (Arsalidou et al., 2018). 
 Fifteen professional mathematicians and 15 non-mathematicians (who were of 
equal academic standing in humanities) listened to maths statements relating to analysis, 
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algebra, topology, and geometry, and non-maths control statements, and judged whether 
they were true or false (Amalric & Dehaene, 2016). In terms of behavioural data, both 
groups performed equally well on the non-maths statements (above chance), while 
mathematicians performed above chance on maths statements, and non-mathematicians 
performed close to chance level on maths statements (Amalric & Dehaene, 2016). 
Mathematicians recruited a consistent network of bilateral intraparietal, inferior temporal, 
and dorsal prefrontal regions that supported all types of maths thinking but not thinking 
about non-mathematical statements. Since accuracy between trial types was the same for 
mathematicians, the recruitment of this network cannot be attributable to a performance-
related process such as error-monitoring. In addition, participants observed a range of 
images including formulae and numbers, and non-maths items like faces and houses. 
There was selective recruitment of the inferior temporal gyrus to numbers, consistent with 
previous work indicating that this site is involved in processing visual number form. The 
authors argued that the recruitment of dorsal prefrontal and intraparietal regions reflect a 
complex integration of many requirements, including numerical, ordinal, logical, and 
spatial reasoning (Amalric & Dehaene, 2016). It is interesting to compare these results 
with those from the study of different physics concepts, which found distinct neural 
correlates for different aspects of physics in scientists (Mason & Just, 2016). This may 
indicate that at the expert level, science draws on more domain-specific skills that are 
relevant to individual topics, whereas maths requires more domain-general skills that are 
applied more broadly. 
 There is a clear gap in the literature for research into regions associated with 
educationally-relevant science reasoning in childhood and adolescence. While there have 
been investigations into the developing brain regions underlying maths reasoning, these 
have typically focussed on number and basic arithmetic, and there remains a lack of 
broader investigations into school-related stimuli, particularly as related to the wide range 
of topics covered in secondary school. Nonetheless, these investigations have been 
fruitful and revealed increasing automaticity and learning of number facts with age. A 
better understanding of the neural underpinnings of science and maths through 
development might help the emergence of a clearer picture of the cognitive mechanisms 
involved. In turn this would lead to a better understanding of the skills that should be 




1.2.3 Misconceptions in science and maths 
 While science and maths are typically studied separately, a common thread that 
pulls them together is the presence of counterintuitive concepts that lead to 
misconceptions. A wide body of research has shown that misconceptions are prevalent in 
science and maths in all learners (not just those who struggle), and research has shown 
them to persist into adulthood, even when the correct concepts have been taught in 
school. Stavy and Tirosh (2000) brought the evidence relating to science and maths 
misconceptions together, and observed that many similar responses are present in 
incorrect reasoning about counterintuitive concepts. They proposed a theory of three 
intuitive rules that are common to science and maths and lead to misconceptions 
throughout the life course. 
 The first of these rules they labelled ‘More A—More B’. This refers to the 
intuition that more of one substance corresponds to more of the other. In Figure 1.3a, an 
intuitive response to the stimuli is that angle x is larger than angle w, when in fact they are 
the same size. Stavy and Tirosh (2000) suggest that this arises because the quantity of one 
item (in this case, the arc) is incorrectly assumed to relate to the quantity of another (here, 
the size of the angle). The second intuitive rule, called ‘Same A—Same B’, is a similar 
intuition regarding the quantity of a substance or dimension, this time that when two 
quantities are the same in one manner, they are the same in another. This rule is 
exemplified by Figure 1.3b, where an intuitive response to the stimuli is to reason that 
shapes y and z have the same perimeter, because their areas are the same, when in fact 
shape y has a larger perimeter. The final intuitive rule is termed ‘Everything Can Be 
Divided’. Figure 1.3c demonstrates an example of an incorrectly applied understanding 
of infinity; the intuitive response here is to think that a piece of paper can infinitely be 
divided in half, when this would not be possible. This framework is a useful way of 







The origins of these intuitive rules may lie in previous encounters with the world. 
For example, it is increasingly argued that misconceptions arise through misleading 
perceptual information, experiences that appear to contradict scientific reality, or through 
simplified ideas that are taught at an early age but are later superseded by more detailed 
concepts (Dunbar, Fugelsang, & Stein, 2007; Houdé, 2000; Mareschal, 2016). Figures 
1.3a and b are examples of misleading perceptual cues, whereby the visual information 
provided gives an impression that is contrary to reality. Experiences that appear to 
contradict scientific reality include the fact that the Earth revolves around the Sun, and 
yet it appears as though the Sun revolves around the Earth, ‘rising’ and ‘setting’ every 
day. Even the language used to describe our view of the Sun is misleading. In other cases, 
school pupils may be taught a simplified theory that constitutes an early introduction to a 
challenging and complicated topic. A few years later, a more accurate version of events 
may be taught, perhaps contradicting the original information. One example is that at an 
early age, we are taught that the number 2 is smaller than the number 4; 2 is always less 
than 4. However, when we start learning about fractions, ½ is larger than ¼; now the 
number containing a 4 is smaller than the number that contains a 2. All of these factors 
can make reasoning and learning new information in science and maths challenging. 
 Key Stage 3 curricula for science and maths in England (for 11- to 14-year-olds) 
acknowledge the presence of misconceptions but provide little information regarding the 
source of misconceptions and no examples of commonly held misconceptions 
(Department for Education, 2013b, 2013a). Both curricula encourage teachers to use 
discussion to probe and remedy misconceptions, with no reference to the best way to 
tackle them. A recent hypothesis considers that one way of overcoming misconceptions is 
through the use of inhibitory control; an executive function that enables the suppression 
Figure 1.3. Example intuitive rules leading to misconceptions (adapted from Stavy & Tirosh, 
2000). (a) More A—More B. An intuitive reasoning is that angle x is larger than angle w 
because angle x’s arc is longer. (b) Same A—Same B. An intuitive reasoning is that shapes y 
and z have equal perimeters because their areas are equal. (c) Everything Can Be Divided. An 
intuitive reasoning is that a piece of paper can be cut in half infinitely. 
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of irrelevant ideas or information. The following sections will briefly introduce executive 
functions, before specifically focussing on inhibitory control, its behavioural and neural 
development, and its proposed link to science and maths. 
 
1.3 Executive functions 
Executive functions (sometimes referred to as cognitive control or executive 
control) are a set of effortful, top-down processes that enable purposeful behaviours. They 
are required when concentration and attention are necessary (Diamond, 2013), and in the 
formation of goals, the preparation for action, and the verification that plans have been 
adequately implemented (Anderson, 2002). The study of executive functions was 
historically focussed on patients with frontal lobe damage, who showed impairment on 
complex ‘frontal lobe’ tasks that heavily taxed executive functions (Miyake et al., 2000). 
More recently, research is also concerned with individual differences in executive 
functions in typical and atypical populations through development, as they are considered 
to be important across many aspects of life. Executive functions are thought to be 
essential for mental health, physical health, and quality of life, as well as school readiness 
and school success (Diamond, 2013). While executive functions are typically 
conceptualised as separable, they operate in a highly integrative manner, and are inter-
related and inter-dependent (Anderson, 2002). Measuring executive functions is therefore 
a challenge, as it is difficult to tease apart the influence of different skills on test 
performance. An additional challenge of investigating executive functions is the 
malleability that these skills appear to possess, as demonstrated by their trainability 
(Blair, 2016). 
Executive functions are affected by a range of additional factors, including stress, 
loneliness, lack of sleep and lack of exercise, each of which impair executive function 
(Diamond, 2013). Finally, executive functions appear to be a key contributor to the 
poverty-related gap in school success (Blair, 2016). Further establishing links between 
individual differences in executive functions and school-relevant measures may lead to 
practical suggestions for teaching and learning that encourage executive function 
development for school success. These investigations are especially appealing given that 
executive function training seems to be of particular benefit to those who start from a 




1.4 Inhibitory control 
Inhibitory control, or inhibition, refers to the aspect of executive functioning that 
enables suppression of a prepotent response. Within the dominant model of executive 
functioning, inhibitory control is one of three separable executive functions; the second is 
shifting or flexibility (the switching between tasks or mental sets), and the third is 
working memory (the updating and monitoring of information in mind) (Diamond, 2013; 
Miyake et al., 2000). These three functions contribute to different degrees on complex 
tasks, but there is a moderate correlation between them (Miyake et al., 2000), showing 
that they are not entirely independent processes. Executive functions enable higher order 
cognitive skills, including problem-solving, planning, and reasoning (Diamond, 2013). 
While the three-factor model is dominant, developmental research indicates that the 
factors may be less differentiated early in childhood, and separate with development (Lee, 
Bull, & Ho, 2013). Preschool children appear to exhibit a single executive function factor, 
with protracted specialisation and differentiation until early adolescence where the three-
factor model best describes performance (Lee et al., 2013). A less recent model of 
executive function proposed a four-factor model that includes attentional control 
(inhibitory control falls within this factor), cognitive flexibility, goal setting, and 
information processing (Anderson, 2002). Again, within this model, the factors are 
considered discrete but related. It is more common for planning to be categorised as a 
higher order skill (Diamond, 2013), and to consider information processing (including 
processing speed) a separate factor that contributes to all executive functions (Lee et al., 
2013). 
This thesis therefore conceptualises executive function according to the dominant 
three-factor model, which considers inhibitory control one component of three separate 
but related factors. Inhibitory control is given particular priority within the thesis, since it 
is thought to have a specific role in science and maths reasoning in relation to 
misconceptions, or reasoning about counterintuitive concepts (see section 1.3.3.3). 
Inhibitory control is not generally considered a unitary executive function. Nigg 
(2000) outlined eight kinds of inhibition, which were split into three categories: executive 
inhibition, motivational inhibition, and automatic inhibition of attention. More commonly 
though, inhibitory control is grouped into two categories (Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2004). The first of the commonly used two categories is behavioural, or 
response inhibition, which is the suppression of a motor response. Simple response 
inhibition tasks aim to measure pure motor suppression, while complex response 
inhibition tasks aim to capture motor suppression in the context of a small cognitive load, 
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thus requiring working memory (the ability to hold and manipulate information in mind). 
The second type of inhibitory control is interference control, or semantic inhibition, 
which refers to the suppression of meaning in the face of conflict. Many different types of 
task are used to measure these two types of inhibition through development (Table 1.1, 
Figure 1.4). A key debate considers the extent to which different inhibitory control tasks 
measure the same underlying construct; there is currently no consensus on this point 
(Khng & Lee, 2014; Verbruggen et al., 2004). 
 
Table 1.1. Summary of commonly used inhibitory control tasks. 
Task Description Dependent 
variables 
Example 
Response inhibition tasks (see Figure 1.4a) 
Stop signal The ‘primary task’ 
requires rapid response 
to stimuli, and 
infrequent non-response 
when a signal is given 
shortly after a stimulus 
(typically in another 
modality). 
Stop signal RT 
(SSRT) which is 
estimated based 
on RT to the 
primary task 




Left or right arrows appear on 
the screen, and the 
corresponding left or right key 
must be pressed in response 
(primary task). No response 
should be made when a beep 
sounds after an arrow is 
displayed (stop signal).  
Simple 
Go/No-Go 
Rapid response to 
frequent ‘Go’ stimuli 
(typically 75% of trials), 
and non-response to 
infrequent ‘No-Go’ 




to No-Go trials), 
omission errors 
(non-response to 
Go trials), and 
RT on correct Go 
trials. 
Green squares appear on the left 
or right of the screen, and the 
corresponding left or right key 
must be pressed in response 
(Go trials). No response should 




As above, with a 1-back 
component so that ‘No-
Go’ stimuli depend on 
both the current and 
previous trial. 
As above. Blue and yellow squares appear 
on the left or right of the screen, 
and the corresponding key must 
be pressed in response (Go 
trials). No response should be 
made to blue squares that 






An eye-tracking task, 
where the aim is to look 





the stimulus is 
looked at) and 
RT of anti-
saccades. 
Initially a fixation cross appears 
in the centre of the screen, and 
should be focussed on. A dot 
appears on the left or right of 
the screen, and the correct 
response is to look to the 
opposite side of the screen.  
Semantic inhibition tasks (see Figure 1.4b) 
Stroop Two competing 
representations are 
associated with a single 
stimulus. Only one of 
these representations is 
relevant for the choice of 
response. The 
representations match in 
congruent trials, and the 
representations do not 









RT cost (equal to 
incongruent RT –
congruent RT, for 
correct trials 
only). 
Colour words appear on the 
screen and the text colour, 
which may conflict with the 
word, should be responded to. 
For example, the word blue 
appears in blue coloured text 
(congruent trial, correct answer 
is blue), or the word red appears 
in yellow coloured text 
(incongruent trial, correct 
answer is yellow).  
Flanker A speeded choice RT 
task to a target, while 
distractors on either side 
of the target either match 
the target (congruent 
trials) or provide 
conflicting information 
(incongruent trials). 
As above. On each trial five left or right 
arrows appear. Participants 
should respond to the central 
arrow with the corresponding 
left or right key. The arrows on 
either side (the flankers), point 
either in the same direction 
(congruent trials) or in the 
opposite direction (incongruent 





 Given the varied tasks used to measure inhibitory control, capturing 
developmental trends is a challenge. The tasks highlighted here are used frequently with 
adolescents and adults, but typically cannot be performed with younger participants as 
they are too difficult and lead to floor effects, where participants consistently perform 
poorly. Conversely, those used with young children are not appropriate for older 
participants because they lead to ceiling effects of very high performance. In cases of 
floor and ceiling effects, individual differences within age ranges are reduced, precluding 
in depth examination of trends and associations. A further challenge is that inhibitory 
control is thought to show heterotypic continuity: the manifestation of inhibitory control 
Figure 1.4. Example stimuli for (a) response and (b) semantic inhibition tasks. 
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may be different in children compared to adults (Petersen, Hoyniak, McQuillan, Bates, & 
Staples, 2016). In practice this means that young children may engage their inhibitory 
control skills in a very different type of scenario to that of an adult: for example a child 
may inhibit the desire to snatch from another child, while an adult may inhibit the desire 
to have another drink with friends. These examples highlight the additional differences in 
inhibitory control manifestation that relate to social factors, which may have particular 
importance during adolescence, a time of social development (Burnett, Bird, Moll, Frith, 
& Blakemore, 2008), than at other ages. The social element of executive skills is 
investigated in tasks that manipulate how ‘hot’ or ‘cool’ a task is, whereby hot tasks 
involve social or reward-focussed motivation and cool tasks have no social factors or 
reward components. However, the role of social factors in inhibitory control is beyond the 
scope of this review and is likely only tangentially related to the overall topic of science 
and maths reasoning. 
 
1.4.1 Behavioural development of inhibitory control 
The exploration of the behavioural development of inhibitory control is embedded 
within a larger body of work that investigates the inhibitory control during overall 
cognitive development. It has been posited that inhibitory control, or ‘resistance to 
interference’, is a major component in cognitive development, influencing performance in 
a wide range of situations (Dempster, 1992). This section will briefly outline early 
development in inhibitory control, then take response and semantic inhibition in turn, 
finally bringing them both together. 
 
1.4.1.1 Early development 
Petersen and colleagues (2016) conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis of 198 
behavioural inhibitory control studies with children under 8 years. To cater for the young 
participants, tasks differed to those described in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.4. For example, 
in a game of Simon Says instructions must only be followed when preceded with the 
words “Simon says…” and otherwise ignored (inhibited). In another example, in the 
Day/Night task, children are instructed to say “day” when they see a sun and “night” 
when they see a moon in congruent trials, and to say “night” when they see a sun and 
“day” when they see a moon in incongruent trials. A total of 14 different inhibitory 
control tasks were included in the meta-analysis. Note that the authors describe all of the 
tasks as complex response inhibition tasks, which is at odds with the definitions of 
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inhibitory control given above. The Day/Night task in particular would be better 
described as a semantic inhibition task, as the participants must suppress the meaning 
associated with the pictures in order to succeed in the task. The tasks also appear to have 
no additional working memory component, so would not be considered complex in the 
same way as the complex Go/No-Go which incorporates a small cognitive load. These 
definitional complications speak to a larger field-wide issue, with terminology varying 
between papers. In part this may be due to the differing age groups, with child, 
adolescent, and adult research being described by researchers in inconsistent ways. 
Definitional problems are cited as one reason for difficulties in advancements in the field 
(Khng & Lee, 2014), making this a non-trivial issue. 
Nonetheless, the findings from the meta-analysis revealed different developmental 
patterns for four different types of inhibitory control tasks in the early years, categorised 
by task demand (Petersen et al., 2016). The earliest development was seen in tasks where 
perceptual information needed to be inhibited, with the greatest change between 1.5 to 3.5 
years of age, followed by development between 2.5 to 6 years in tasks where one 
response had to be inhibited and a different response generated. In terms of response 
versus semantic inhibition, these tasks appear to rely on semantic inhibition skills, where 
meaning needs to be inhibited in the face of conflict. The next to develop was what the 
authors termed performance inhibition, which closely matches a standard response 
inhibition definition, between 3 and 6 years. And finally, performance in motivational 
inhibition tasks, which included a hot component such as a win, developed until age 6.5 
years. According to this extensive review, semantic inhibition skills appear to mature 
earlier than response inhibition.  
 
1.4.1.2 Response inhibition 
A number of response inhibition tasks have been examined through early 
childhood, and into adolescence and adulthood. A study of performance in the stop signal 
task navigated the age issue by modifying the task according to participant age: longer 
presentation times and fewer trials were presented to younger participants in order to 
account for decreased attention and longer RTs (Carver, Livesey, & Charles, 2001). The 
94 participants were separated into four age groups: pre-school children (4- to 5-year-
olds), young primary children (5- to 7-year-olds), mid primary children (7- to 9-year-
olds), and adults (17- to 43-year-olds). The two youngest groups did not perform 
significantly differently from each other, but performance improved with age between the 
other groups, reflected by faster RTs and more correctly inhibited responses (Carver et 
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al., 2001). Other studies of stop signal performance through development, but with no age 
adjustments to the task, included older participants and those in adolescence. Speed of 
stopping improved through childhood and adolescence (6 to 17 years), and then 
diminished through adulthood (18 to 81 years) in a sample of 275 participants (Williams, 
Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999). The same trend was seen in a study of 317 
6- to 82-year-olds, with improved performance through childhood and adolescence, then 
a decrease in adulthood (Bedard et al., 2002). These studies suggest that performance in 
the stop signal does not improve much between the ages of about 4 and 6 years, then gets 
better through the rest of childhood and adolescence before decreasing in adulthood. 
The Go/No-Go response inhibition task differs from the stop signal task in that the 
response to No-Go trials should not even be prepared, as opposed to being prepared and 
subsequently aborted on the signal. Task difficulty in the Go/No-Go was varied in one 
study of 20 6- to 10-year-olds and adults by manipulating the number of Go trials 
preceding No-Go trials (Durston, et al., 2002). The adults were faster and more accurate 
than the children, and the number of commission errors increased with the number of 
preceding Go trials for both age groups (Durston, et al., 2002). Adolescents have also 
been tested on the Go/No-Go, with one study of 90 participants finding lower error rates 
and faster RTs in 15-year-olds compared to 12-year-olds on both the simple and complex 
Go/No-Go, but no difference between 15- and 17-year-olds (Humphrey & Dumontheil, 
2016). A less well powered study of 19 8- to 20-year-olds found high performance overall 
with no accuracy changes according to age, but with faster RTs with increasing age 
(Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002). The lack of accuracy effects may be due to the 50:50 
ratio of Go to No-Go trials, which was used in this neuroimaging study in order to 
increase the frequency of trials requiring inhibition inside the scanner. 
The final commonly used response inhibition task in adolescence is the anti-
saccade task, which differs from the aforementioned response inhibition tasks in requiring 
inhibition of an eye movement, rather than a finger movement. A study of 129 
participants aged 9 to 26 years, with multiple testing sessions (totalling 312 sessions), 
found that behavioural performance increased with age, and rate of improvement 
decelerated with increasing age (Ordaz, Foran, Velanova, & Luna, 2013). A larger study, 
of 245 8- to 30-year-olds, similarly found large improvements from childhood to 
adolescence, followed by a plateau from late adolescence to early adulthood, with adult-
level performance considered reached at 14 to 15 years of age (Luna, Garver, Urban, 
Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004). Overall the behavioural research into response inhibition 
across tasks presents a picture of protracted improvement throughout early childhood and 
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adolescence, with slowed improvement through late adolescence and early adulthood, and 
decreasing performance in late adulthood. 
 
1.4.1.3 Semantic inhibition 
Studies of semantic inhibition have also tracked longer term developmental 
trajectories beyond early childhood. Possibly the most well-known semantic inhibition 
task is the Stroop. A behavioural study of the colour-word Stroop task with 99 6- to 17-
year-olds found that errors and RTs decreased linearly with age, when reading speed was 
held constant (Leon-Carrion et al., 2004). Without controlling for reading speed, 
distractor interference increased between 6 and 8 years of age for RT, and between 6 and 
10 years for errors, before decreasing until the oldest age tested (Leon-Carrion et al., 
2004). This study highlights the importance of skills that are not typically tested when 
measuring inhibitory control, but that may be hugely important in determining the 
patterns observed. In the traditional Stroop task, reading automaticity is clearly a 
moderating factor and so controlling for reading speed enabled a clearer picture of steady 
improvement with age to emerge. An earlier study of 235 7- to 80-year-olds found that 
performance in the Stroop improved through childhood, adolescence, and into adulthood, 
but then got worse in late adulthood (Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1962), mirroring 
findings in older adults with the stop signal. 
A second commonly used semantic inhibition task, the flanker task, has no 
reading requirements and the conflict of information is in the contrast of the target 
stimulus to the surrounding distractors. The flanker task therefore does not have the 
verbal/reading component of the traditional Stroop task. A study of 62 5- to 12-year-olds 
and young adults showed a reduction in errors with age during childhood, but no 
difference in errors between 10- to 12-year-olds and adults (Ridderinkhof & van der 
Molen, 1995). A more recent flanker study of 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults 
showed that interference reduced between 7 and 10 years of age, but that 10-year-olds did 
not differ from adults (Cragg, 2016). Together these studies may indicate that the flanker 
task is not such a sensitive measure of semantic inhibition, as ability appeared to mature 
by the age of 10. Alternatively, this less verbal measure of semantic inhibition may better 
allow younger participants to perform well, unaffected by their still-maturing verbal 
ability. A final possibility is that these studies did not capture improvement that might 




1.4.1.4 Comparing response and semantic inhibition 
Overall, the studies discussed here have shown a relatively consistent picture of 
the development of inhibitory control through childhood and adolescence. Both response 
and semantic inhibition tasks show protracted maturation throughout early childhood and 
into adolescence, typically with a slowing or plateau in adulthood, followed by a 
reduction in ability in late adulthood. Some studies have compared performance on more 
than one inhibitory control task within the same sample in order to establish the degree to 
which these tasks tap the same underlying construct. A comprehensive study of 
adolescent executive function development measured performance on the stop signal task, 
the Stroop, and the flanker in 384 7-, 11-, 15- and 21-year-olds (Huizinga, Dolan, & van 
der Molen, 2006). Performance in both the stop signal and flanker showed improvement 
with age until age 15, while Stroop performance showed more protracted development, 
with improvement continuing up to the oldest group (21 years). A structural equation 
model did not find a common inhibition factor from the three inhibitory control tasks, as 
correlations between the tasks were very low. The authors argued that the lack of 
association between tasks may be due to the different task requirements (Huizinga et al., 
2006), but they did not consider that the tasks may be tapping different types of inhibitory 
control. The use of discrete age groups, with many ages not tested (particularly during 
adolescence) may also mean that developmental trends are not well captured here. 
Nonetheless these results appear to indicate that inhibitory control is not a single factor, 
nor simply two factors that differ according to whether they require suppression of a 
motor response or semantic information. 
The Stroop and Go/No-Go were compared in a study of 108 6- to 14-year-olds 
(Morooka et al., 2012). Performance on both tasks improved with age, but rates of 
maturation differed between tasks. Greater changes in Stroop performance were seen at 
younger ages, while greater Go/No-Go improvements were seen in the older participants. 
Significant correlations were found between different measures of the two tasks, although 
the coefficients were generally low. The authors argued that while there may be 
similarities between the tasks, they primarily capture different processes (Morooka et al., 
2012). Performance in the Stroop and stop signal tasks were compared in a study of 237 
13- to 15-year-olds (Khng & Lee, 2014). The study found minimal association between 
RT measures across tasks, which is noteworthy as we might expect these to be the most 
related factors of the tasks, reflecting an underlying general processing or response speed. 
Across a number of measures in the tasks, only Stroop intrusion errors on incongruent 
trials and SSRT were correlated. The authors argued that while there may be some 
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association between the two tasks, it could be due to non-inhibition processes such as 
proactive, attention-based goal-directed behaviour (Khng & Lee, 2014). An alternative 
explanation not considered by the authors is that these tasks measure two related aspects 
of inhibitory control that develop at different rates, thus not showing much correlation. 
Given the research discussed so far, age effects would be likely in this group of 13- to 15-
year-olds, yet age was not considered as an interacting factor, or even as a main effect, 
within this study. 
To conclude, both response and semantic inhibition show improvement 
behaviourally from early childhood, through late childhood and adolescence, peaking 
around late adolescence or early adulthood, and plateauing before decreasing in late 
adulthood. Attempts to compare behaviour on more than one inhibitory control task have 
shown that there is little association between measures on different tasks. The reason for 
this disconnect remains unclear. The tasks used may require too many other skills to 
adequately tap one pure inhibition skill: for example, requiring working memory, reading, 
or processing speed, or depending on motivation. Alternatively, the tasks may in fact 
capture different aspects of inhibitory control, which seems to not be a single unified 
ability but separated between response and semantic inhibition, or perhaps even more 
subdivisions (for example, Nigg’s (2000) eight types of inhibition). Neuroimaging 
research into inhibitory control is able to uncover more about the mechanisms involved in 
these different tasks.  
 
1.4.2 Neural correlates of developing inhibitory control 
Examining neural correlates may be able to highlight what drives development in 
inhibition, and expose the cognitive processes that underlie performance in different 
tasks. The neural underpinnings of both response and semantic inhibitory control appear 
to develop in line with improved performance. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that the 
PFC, and in particular the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) and IFG, show changes in activation associated with inhibitory control over 
the course of late childhood and adolescence. The remainder of this section will again 
consider response and semantic inhibition in turn, drawing on the relevant fMRI 




1.4.2.1 Response inhibition 
The aforementioned longitudinal study of 123 9- to 26-year-olds examined 
changes in brain activation during the anti-saccade task (Ordaz et al., 2013). Activation in 
the right DLPFC (BA 44) decreased from childhood until adolescence, while error-related 
activation in the dorsal ACC (BA 24) decreased until adulthood and was associated with 
the percentage of inhibition errors. This study suggests that it is a change in error 
processing that is most important in reaching adult performance (Ordaz et al., 2013): the 
decrease in activation with age suggests that automation, increased efficiency, and 
reduced effort occur with improved inhibition performance. While this is the only 
longitudinal study, cross-sectional studies have revealed more about the specific roles of 
different brain regions during developing inhibition. 
Tamm and colleagues (2002) similarly found greater activation in younger 
participants compared to older participants in the left PFC (BA 8) during the Go/No-Go, 
in their sample of 19 participants aged 8 to 20 years. This finding was taken to partly 
reflect the role of working memory, highlighting the difficulty (i.e. reduced automaticity) 
of such requirements for younger participants. Conversely, the study also found an 
increase in left IFG (BA 48) activation with age, thought to show a more specific role for 
this region in effective response inhibition. Frontal cortex activation was overall more 
diffuse in the younger participants, which the authors argued reflects less efficient 
organisation and monitoring, and use of less efficient strategies (Tamm et al., 2002). The 
role of the IFG in response inhibition was further supported in a stop signal task with 26 
10- to 17-year-olds and 21 20- to 42-year-olds (Rubia, Smith, Taylor, & Brammer, 2007). 
The adult group showed increased activation in the right IFG (BA 45) compared to the 
child and adolescent group during successful inhibition; additional evidence that the IFG 
becomes increasingly specialised for response inhibition with age. When inhibition was 
unsuccessful, adults showed greater activation in the ACC (BA 24/32) in comparison to 
the child and adolescent group (Rubia et al., 2007). This further supports the finding from 
Ordaz and colleagues (2013) that ACC involvement in inhibitory control relates to error 
processing, since the activation occurred when adults were likely noticing and reflecting 
on their errors of commission. This may mean that the younger participants were less 
likely to notice their errors than the adults. 
There remains debate surrounding the specific role of the right IFG in response 
inhibition. One hypothesis argues that it is involved in a global stopping system, where a 
signal from the right IFG to the subthalamic nucleus of the basal ganglia suppresses 
thalamocortical output, which prevents a motor response (Banich & Depue, 2015). 
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Although converging evidence from a number of different methods support this view, a 
recent hypothesis suggests that in fact, the right IFG does not have a specific role in 
inhibition, rather it monitors external information from the environment to implement 
goal-related actions (Banich & Depue, 2015). As with all neuroimaging research, 
uncovering the precise role of different brain regions is a challenge. Although it is clear 
that the right IFG plays a role in response inhibition, it remains unclear whether this role 
is as a unifying node for response inhibition. 
 
1.4.2.2 Semantic inhibition 
The neural underpinnings of semantic inhibition are less studied but similarly 
show age-related changes. An fMRI study of 30 participants aged 7 to 22 years 
investigated brain activation during the Stroop task (Adleman et al., 2002). There was a 
positive correlation between age and left-lateralised activation in the ACC (BA 24/32) 
and IPL (BA 31/7), and no reduction in activations with age in any brain region. A larger 
fMRI study of 70 7- to 57-year-olds during the Stroop task found that activation in the 
right PFC (BA 46) increased with age and related to better performance. Conversely, 
activation in the left ACC (BA 24/32) decreased with age, as did activation in the right 
superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) (Marsh et al., 2008). The study found no evidence of a 
more diffuse pattern of activation in younger participants (Marsh et al., 2006). The 
authors acknowledged that reading ability may play a role in these findings, but 
concluded that these results show the brain regions which underlie the transition to better 
inhibition and control. Overall, the pattern of brain activation associated with developing 
semantic inhibition is less clear than with response inhibition. However, similar brain 
regions are at play; in particular the PFC and ACC, indicating that while the 
developmental trajectory of the use of these regions in semantic inhibition are unclear, 
they remain important in the development of inhibitory control. 
 
1.4.2.3 Issues in investigating the neural mechanisms of inhibitory control 
Some of the neuroimaging studies examined here have emphasised the importance 
of other factors in attempting to measure inhibitory control. Inhibition is closely related to 
other cognitive control mechanisms, particularly working memory (Davidson, Amso, 
Anderson, & Diamond, 2006) and attention (Jaeger, 2013), since a rule has to be held in 
mind, and stimuli must be constantly focussed on and processed. Dissociating these 
factors is difficult, particularly when tasks utilise a complex version, aiming to involve a 
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working memory component. It has been argued that simpler forms of inhibitory control 
tasks would help to provide a purer measure of inhibition (Criaud & Boulinguez, 2013). 
However, using complex tasks that require working memory might tell us more about 
real-world abilities, where inhibitory control is likely required in the context of other 
cognitive mechanisms. In science and maths for instance, inhibitory control is not thought 
to be the only executive mechanism involved. Criaud and Boulinguez (2013) also point 
out that within many of these neural investigations, it is assumed that No-Go trials 
uniquely require inhibition, while Go trials do not. In reality, Go trials likely require 
inhibition to some extent, as participants must inhibit the desire to respond immediately, 
before a decision is made. Nonetheless, greater inhibition is necessary for No-Go trials 
than Go trials since responses must be fully suppressed.  
It is worth noting that while these tasks are designed to measure inhibition, the 
processes involved could equally be described as amplifying the intended process, as 
opposed to inhibiting unwanted processes (Aron, 2007). For example, rather than 
inhibition, these tasks may rely on the active process of successful goal activation (Khng 
& Lee, 2014). It seems likely that active and inhibitory processes work together in these 
tasks proactively and reactively (Khng & Lee, 2014). Many of the studies discussed here 
do acknowledge the ambiguity of the term ‘inhibition’ (e.g. Verbruggen et al., 2004), and 
seek to address this through studying associations between inhibitory control measures. 
Neuroimaging studies of inhibitory control have not focussed on the distinction 
between response and semantic inhibition, leaving this an important area of ongoing 
investigation. Response inhibition seems to be studied more than semantic inhibition in 
behavioural and neuroimaging studies, and semantic inhibition tasks are sometimes 
referred to as measuring response inhibition: the literature so far conveys an inconsistent 
picture. This chapter will now move on to reviewing the literature associating inhibitory 
control and science and maths. In considering the extent to which inhibitory control 
associates with other measures, it is important to keep the potential difference between 
response and semantic inhibition in mind. It may help to explain any inconsistent 
findings, and is likely to influence any later recommendations for education. 
 
1.4.3 Inhibitory control in science and maths 
Inhibitory control is thought to be involved in effective science and maths 
reasoning throughout development, in particular to enable the suppression of incorrect 
responses (Mareschal, 2016). The link has been examined using correlational, priming, 
and neuroimaging studies. While most studies have explored this link in either science or 
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maths, one study investigated inhibitory control in a joint science and maths task. One 
hundred and thirty-three participants aged 9 to 11 years were given a computerised task 
called the Re-Categorisation task (Re-Cat), which involved categorising science and 
maths concepts (Vosniadou, Pnevmatikos, Makris, Eikospentaki, & Chountala, 2018). 
Participants were also given the Sentence-Picture Verification task (SP-Ver), which 
involved determining whether a scientific or mathematical statement accompanied by an 
image was true or false. Both semantic inhibitory control and shifting were tested in a 
Stroop-like task, and age and general cognitive ability were controlled for in the analyses. 
Inhibition accuracy only predicted SP-Ver accuracy for inconsistent trials (which required 
rejection of an incorrect concept), while shifting accuracy predicted accuracy in 
consistent SP-Ver trials (which did not require rejection of a concept) and Re-Cat 
accuracy, which also did not require rejection of an incorrect concept. The authors argued 
that this indicates that shifting has a general role in complex science and maths tasks, 
while inhibition has a specific role that is selectively recruited when a conflicting concept 
needs to be rejected (Vosniadou et al., 2018). The study did not consider science and 
maths separately, so it is unclear whether the same process applied to both disciplines. To 
address this question, science and maths studies will next be considered in turn. 
 
1.4.3.1 Science 
Evidence from correlational studies suggests that children with better inhibitory 
control perform better on science problems requiring counterintuitive reasoning. In the 
domain of physics, the tubes task had an experimenter drop a ball down one of three 
opaque tubes that crossed over (Baker, Gjersoe, Sibielska-Woch, Leslie, & Hood, 2011). 
Thirty-six 3- and 4-year-olds were asked to point to the opaque container where the ball 
landed. The most common error was to choose the container directly beneath the opening 
of the tube, suggesting that the toddlers’ gravity theory (that the ball would fall in a 
straight trajectory) was not successfully inhibited in favour of an object solidity theory 
(that the ball would follow the solid tube). Since looking time paradigms reveal an 
understanding of object solidity at this age (Hood, Cole-Davies, & Dias, 2003), the 
authors argued that the task engaged a number of strategies, and that selection of the 
correct strategy depended on the inhibition of incorrect strategies. This interpretation was 
further supported by a positive correlation between tubes task performance and inhibitory 
control as measured by a gift delay task (Baker et al., 2011). This task likely most closely 
reflects response inhibition as the measure records the time before the participant 
physically moves towards the gift. In biology, mature biological understandings of life, 
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death, and bodily functions were predicted in 79 5- to 7-year-olds by an aggregate 
measure of executive function that captured performance on tasks requiring a 
combination of shifting, working memory, and response and semantic inhibition (Zaitchik 
et al., 2014). Although the executive function measure was not purely inhibitory control, 
the authors suggested that inhibitory control is one skill that enabled the suppression of 
naïve biological theories when a mature conceptual understanding was shown.  
The picture is, however, inconsistent, as inhibitory control was not related to 
science performance in other studies. In a study of 155 10-year-olds, scientific reasoning 
was measured through a pencil and paper test which covered the design of experiments, 
interpreting data, scientific theories, and understanding the nature of science (Mayer, 
Sodian, Koerber, & Schwippert, 2014). Performance on the scientific reasoning test was 
not related to performance on a pencil and paper version of the Stroop (Mayer et al., 
2014), although this was an unusual measure of semantic inhibition in that it was not 
computerised so may not have been able to capture inhibition with great enough 
sensitivity. Trial by trial information regarding RT was not captured, and it may be that 
an RT cost measure would better reflect inhibitory control ability. A study of 56 12- to 
13-year-olds specifically considered the learning of biological concepts, as opposed to 
simply reasoning about them, through using a pre- and post-test design (Rhodes et al., 
2014). This differs from the other studies described, in capturing change in performance 
over time following a period of teaching, rather than a single snapshot of performance 
that cannot adequately measure learning. Response inhibition as measured by the stop 
signal did not predict memory for the biological facts taught or understanding of 
information learnt in the practical session. Similarly, stop signal performance in 63 12- to 
13-year-olds did not predict the learning of chemistry or performance in a school science 
exam (Rhodes et al., 2016). The inconsistencies across studies highlight that relatively 
little is currently known about the role of executive functions in science as compared to 
maths or reading (Tolmie et al., 2016). Nonetheless, the limited evidence that exists does 




In the discipline of maths, overlapping strategy use in problem-solving 
demonstrates the maintenance of multiple concepts and theories over the course of 
learning. In depth examinations of strategy-use in 4- and 5-year-olds found that even 
when new, more sophisticated strategies had been learnt, children continued to use old 
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strategies (Siegler, 1998; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989). The concurrent existence of multiple 
strategies suggests that inhibitory control is likely to be involved in maths reasoning from 
a young age, enabling selection of the best strategy through suppression of the 
alternatives.  
There is also more direct evidence for the involvement of inhibitory control skills 
in maths. In a study that measured semantic inhibition through a Stroop task, performance 
in 3- to 6-year-olds was associated with scores on a standardised maths test in a sample of 
58 children, and with magnitude comparison in a separate sample of 48 children 
(Merkley, Thompson, & Scerif, 2016). Similarly, a study of 209 11- to 14-year-olds 
found that maths achievement was correlated with both numerical and non-numerical 
semantic inhibitory control (Gilmore, Keeble, Richardson, & Cragg, 2015). A different 
maths study investigated the role of inhibitory control in the learning of a new algebra 
strategy for solving word problems in 157 14-year-olds (Khng & Lee, 2009). Better 
response (stop signal) and semantic (Stroop) inhibitory control predicted higher accuracy 
as well as fewer intrusions of the previous strategy (Khng & Lee, 2009), indicating that 
inhibitory control was used to suppress the previous strategy in effective maths reasoning. 
As in science, inhibitory control does not always relate to maths performance, as 
evidenced by a study where semantic inhibition as measured by both the Day/Night task 
and the Stroop did not predict school readiness for maths in a sample of 85 5- to 6-year-
olds (Monette, Bigras, & Guay, 2011).  
A meta-analysis of the association between inhibitory control and academic skills 
in 2- to 6-year-olds reported a modest overall association between inhibition and maths, 
and noted that inhibitory control was more associated with maths than literacy (Allan, 
Hume, Allan, Farrington, & Lonigan, 2014). The meta-analysis also highlighted the 
moderating impact of the type of task (the distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cool’) and 
method of assessment (behavioural task or adult report) (Allan et al., 2014). However, the 
meta-analysis did not comment on the distinction between response and semantic 
inhibition. Overall, inhibitory control does seem to relate to maths performance. 
 
1.4.3.3 Counterintuitive reasoning 
Inhibitory control is thought to have a specific role in counterintuitive science and 
maths reasoning, since the intuitive response to a problem needs to be suppressed in order 
to reach the correct answer (Dunbar et al., 2007; Houdé, 2000; Mareschal, 2016). 
Inhibitory control is thought to enable the suppression of any misleading or incorrect 
information that may interfere with the appropriate reasoning. This means that prior 
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knowledge can be a barrier to the acquisition of new knowledge, since it may conflict 
with newly presented concepts or data, and thus influence learning (Heit, 1994). 
A few studies have used priming paradigms to probe the role of inhibitory control 
in counterintuitive maths reasoning. In a study of 40 9-year-olds, participants performed 
better on a counterintuitive number conservation trial if they were primed to inhibit 
through the successful inhibition of an incongruent Stroop trial (Linzarini, Houdé, & 
Borst, 2015). Similarly, in a study of 20 10-year-olds and 20 young adults, participants 
performed better on a number conservation or class inclusion task when primed by a trial 
from the other task requiring the inhibition of a misleading strategy (Borst, Poirel, Pineau, 
Cassotti, & Houdé, 2013). Finally, in a study of 11-year-olds, 14-year-olds, and young 
adults, response times were slower when a probe problem with congruent relational term 
and arithmetic operation (“more than” > addition) followed a prime problem with 
incongruent relational term and arithmetic operation (“more than” > subtraction). This 
negative priming was interpreted as reflecting that successfully solving these arithmetic 
counterintuitive problems required the inhibition of an incorrect strategy (Lubin, Vidal, 
Lanoë, Houdé, & Borst, 2013). 
In addition to the behavioural research linking inhibitory control to science and 
maths reasoning, there have been a number of neuroimaging studies aiming to discover 
more about the specific neural and cognitive processes underlying effective reasoning. 
These studies have generally shown that brain regions involved in inhibitory control are 
also involved in counterintuitive reasoning, although the research so far relates only to 
adults. In two related studies of 23 adults who were classed as either physics experts or 
novices, participants were presented with misconception-related electric circuits (Masson, 
Potvin, Riopel, & Brault Foisy, 2014) and falling objects (Brault Foisy, Potvin, Riopel, & 
Masson, 2015) inside an fMRI scanner. Experts who accurately judged the stimuli to be 
non-scientific showed increased activation in the dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC 
(electric circuits: BA 9/45, falling objects: BA 47/46/10), with additional increased ACC 
(BA 32) and AG (BA 39) activation in the electric circuit study only. Since the PFC and 
ACC are known to be associated with inhibitory control, these activations were taken to 
reflect the experts’ inhibition of misconceptions or naïve responses. In maths, an fMRI 
study of a perimeter misconception with 14 adults showed increased PFC (BA 47) 
activation in incongruent trials that were counterintuitive compared to congruent trials 
that were not counterintuitive (Stavy & Babai, 2010). As in the science studies, this 
suggests that participants may be using inhibitory control brain regions in order to 
suppress the incorrect answer.  
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A limit of these neuroimaging studies is the reliance on reverse inference, 
attributing activation in the PFC and ACC to inhibitory control mechanisms. No research 
has yet compared activation during counterintuitive reasoning to activation during 
inhibitory control within the same participants. This would be a better way of discovering 
whether or not inhibitory control really is contributing. It is also not possible to tell from 
these studies what kind of inhibition might be involved. Comparing neural activation of 
response and semantic inhibition to counterintuitive science and maths reasoning might 
reveal which type of inhibitory control is enabling suppression of incorrect theories. 
Note that these proposed inhibitory mechanisms are not necessarily specific to 
science and maths. It is likely that the same cognitive and neural underpinnings apply to 
reasoning in any discipline that requires learning new knowledge or skills, particularly 
where these may be counterintuitive. Science and maths remain the topic of focus as they 
have been a key focus of the literature so far, and are considered particularly difficult 
subjects to learn (Lortie-Forgues et al., 2015; Zaitchik et al., 2014). 
Overall the evidence suggests that both response and semantic inhibitory control 
contribute to science and maths reasoning, and that they may have a specific role in the 
inhibition of pre-existing beliefs, naïve theories, misleading perceptual-biases, and 
intuitive heuristics during counterintuitive reasoning. This differs from a more traditional 
understanding of learning, which describes the replacement, reorganisation, or 
restructuring of previously held knowledge (e.g. Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 
1982; Vosniadou, 2007). The relative importance of response and semantic inhibition 
remains unknown. Response inhibition may have a role in enabling the physical stopping 
of providing a response, while semantic inhibition may be more related to suppressing a 
theory. There is a clear gap in the literature for research comparing the role of response 
and semantic inhibition in counterintuitive reasoning, and for establishing their shared 
neural underpinnings in adolescence. In addition, while the adult neuroimaging research 
has focussed on the repetition of a small set of problems, within adolescence it would be 
of particular interest to examine school-related problems covering science and maths 
curricula broadly. Focussing on educationally-relevant stimuli would enable greater links 
between research and educational practice. 
 
1.5 Relational reasoning 
The second cognitive ability to be considered in relation to science and maths is 
relational reasoning. Relational reasoning is the ability to consider relations between 
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multiple mental representations (Crone et al., 2009) and to detect meaningful patterns in 
presented information (Alexander, Dumas, Grossnickle, List, & Firetto, 2016). It is 
considered one component of fluid reasoning, the broader cognitive ability to solve 
problems independently of knowledge (Ferrer, O’Hare, & Bunge, 2009). Relational 
reasoning differs from instinctive, spontaneous relational thinking in requiring intentional 
processing over a period of time (Alexander, 2016). There are different domains of 
relational reasoning, the most commonly studied of which is analogical reasoning. 
Analogical reasoning is the ability to observe similarities between items based on shared 
associations, and it is particularly important in the context of education as it is thought to 
underlie knowledge acquisition (Whitaker, Vendetti, Wendelken, & Bunge, 2017). This 
section will first consider the development of relational reasoning skills, then their 
relation to executive functions, next, their potential role in science and maths, and finally, 
links between relational reasoning and education. 
 
1.5.1 Development of relational reasoning skills 
 Non-verbal analogical reasoning tasks are suitable for use with young children as 
simple pictures of familiar objects are typically presented. A series of studies have used 
scene analogy problems with children as young as 3 years (Richland, Morrison, & 
Holyoak, 2006). Within these problems, participants are asked to point to the object in a 
scene picture that is equivalent to the target object in a different scene picture. For 
instance, a scene might show a cat (target) chasing a mouse in one scene, and the second 
scene might show a boy (correct answer) chasing a girl. Within a series of these 
problems, the number of relations is manipulated (e.g. the addition of a dog chasing the 
cat and a woman chasing the boy), as is the presence of a distractor (e.g. a cat in the 
second scene). Performance improved with age across all configurations of the task in a 
sample of 68 3- to 14-year-olds (Richland et al., 2006). The 3- and 4-year-olds were 
strongly influenced by the presence of a distractor and relational complexity, with lowest 
performance where there was a distractor and two relations rather than one. A similar 
pattern was seen in the 6- to 7-year-olds, while the 13- to 14-year-olds were not affected 
by the distractor, but performance was lower with greater relational complexity. In a 
follow up study of 44 3- to 4- and 9- to 11-year-olds, the younger participants were again 
negatively influenced by the distractor and relational complexity, while the older 
participants showed no effect of distractor or relational complexity (Richland et al., 
2006). The authors attributed this difference to either motivational factors, since the 13- 
to 14-year-olds were tested in a group while the 9- to 11-year-olds were tested 
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individually, or to academic differences, since the 9- to 11-year-olds attended a school 
with higher achievement. Nonetheless, the studies showed overall improvement with age.  
 Other non-verbal analogical reasoning tasks have taken an A:B::C:? format. In 
this type of task, participants are usually shown two related pictures such as a dress (A) 
and a wardrobe (B), alongside a third picture such as a milk carton (C) and a question 
mark (e.g. Whitaker et al., 2017). The participant must choose the picture that is 
analogous to the wardrobe – in this case a fridge – that appears alongside a semantic lure 
(here, a cow), a perceptual lure (here, a clock that is similar in colour to the milk carton), 
and an unrelated lure (a tennis racket in this example). Ninety-five participants aged 
between 6 and 18 years completed this task inside an fMRI scanner (Whitaker et al., 
2017). Large improvements in performance were seen between the ages of 6 and 10, with 
continued improvement until the age of 14 years where performance plateaued at almost 
ceiling level. Overall, the same network of frontal, parietal, and temporal regions were 
recruited across ages, indicating shared common processes through development. 
However, there was a positive correlation between age and activation in the left PFC (BA 
47/45), which the authors argued reflected increased controlled semantic retrieval with 
age (Whitaker et al., 2017). This finding highlights that while fluid reasoning is 
considered a knowledge-free ability, analogical reasoning tasks of this kind which purport 
to measure a type of fluid reasoning (Ferrer et al., 2009), rely heavily on semantic 
knowledge since the stimuli used are not abstract. It is also likely that participants use 
inner speech to solve the problems, labelling the stimuli and the relation (e.g. “a dress 
goes in a wardrobe, so a milk carton goes in a fridge”), which would be influenced by 
verbal ability. Nonetheless, relational reasoning tasks that rely on knowledge remain an 
important area of investigation, since real-life problem-solving, for instance in science 
and maths, often requires the retrieval of knowledge. 
 A similar non-verbal analogical reasoning task was performed in an fMRI scanner 
by 33 participants who were grouped into 6- to 13-year-olds and 19- to 26-year-olds 
(Wright, Matlen, Baym, Ferrer, & Bunge, 2008). Children made more errors and had 
longer RTs than adults. Within the group of 6- to 13-year-olds there was greater 
activation of the left RLPFC (BA 10), left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) (BA 
45) and right SPL (BA 7) with age (Wright et al., 2008). There were no differences with 
age in the adult group, indicating that by the age of 19, the brain regions recruited for 
reasoning analogically in this task have matured. It is possible that an examination of 
older participants would have shown a decline, as observed in the inhibitory control 
studies. An interesting timecourse analysis showed that the RLPFC was recruited much 
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later in the child group than the adult group, with children activating that region after 
response selection. The authors argued that this demonstrates more impulsive responding 
in children, as the region was not recruited in time to influence behavioural responses 
(Wright et al., 2008). 
 Further evidence of the role of the left RLPFC in the development of relational 
reasoning skills comes from a study of 37 11- to 30-year-olds, performing a non-verbal 
reasoning task with abstract rather than familiar stimuli (Dumontheil, Houlton, Christoff, 
& Blakemore, 2010). In this task, participants assessed whether items had the same shape 
or texture (1-relational problem, control condition) and whether two pairs of items 
changed along the same dimension (2-relational problem, relational condition). 
Activation in the left RLPFC (BA 46) in the 2-relational condition increased from early- 
to mid-adolescence, then decreased from mid-adolescence to adulthood (Dumontheil et 
al., 2010). This non-linear change in neural activation corroborated the results of their 
behavioural study that showed an increase in RT during mid-adolescence, suggesting that 
RLPFC activation reflects speed of neural processing rather than accuracy (Dumontheil et 
al., 2010). Overall the authors argued that these non-linear findings demonstrate the 
development of a number of different processes, including grey and white matter 
maturation and changing neurocognitive strategies. 
 Alexander and colleagues (Alexander et al., 2016) conceptualised relational 
reasoning in terms of four distinguishable categories based on an extensive analysis of the 
literature and validation through a series of studies. The first category, analogical 
reasoning, refers to similarity of relations, as described above. The second, anomalous 
reasoning, refers to discrepancy between items. Antinomous reasoning, the third category, 
refers to incompatibilities, and finally antithetical reasoning, the fourth category, refers to 
dichotomies. Sixty-one participants ranging from 5 to 17 years of age took part in semi-
structured conversations which required them to reason out loud about different objects 
(Jablansky et al., 2015). All four categories of relational reasoning were observed across 
the age groups, with frequency of reasoning type in the following order: analogical (the 
most used), anomalous, antinomous, and then antithetical (the least used). The oldest 
children displayed antinomous and antithetical reasoning proportionally more than the 
younger children. The authors argued that analogy and antinomy reflect judgements of 
similarity and difference, maturing earlier than antinomy and antithesis which may be 
more complex forms of relational reasoning (Jablansky et al., 2015). This study is 
particularly noteworthy as it demonstrates changing uses of relational reasoning with age 
in a task that is more closely linked to school-based reasoning (since it involved reasoning 
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about objects using vocabulary). However, the authors pointed out that the older children 
who were less likely to verbalise analogical and anomalous reasoning may have been 
using these processes without verbalising them.  
These studies show that children are able to reason about relations from a young 
age. Perceptually and semantically distracting information can hinder reasoning ability, 
with distractors having less influence as participants reach adolescence. The change from 
reasoning based on surface features to reasoning based on relations is sometimes termed a 
relational shift (Gentner, 1988). While relational reasoning is typically considered a 
knowledge-free skill, knowledge is often a constraining factor on tasks that rely on an 
understanding of different items (Goswami, 1992; Leech, Mareschal, & Cooper, 2008), 
particularly in tasks for children that depict real objects rather than abstract stimuli. 
RLPFC appears to play an important role in the development of relational reasoning, 
although it should be noted that the RLPFC supports a range of cognitive processes which 
require retrieval and manipulation of abstract thoughts (Dumontheil, 2014). Relational 
reasoning may therefore rely on executive function skills, enabling the manipulation of 
information in mind, and the suppression of distracting information. 
 
1.5.2 Relational reasoning and executive functions 
 A number of studies have investigated the association between relational 
reasoning abilities and executive functions explicitly. Richland and Burchinal (2013) 
investigated longitudinal associations between the two in a large study of 1,364 
participants. The Day/Night task measured semantic inhibition when participants were 4 
years old, and the Tower of Hanoi was given as a measure of general executive function 
at age 6 to 7 years. A verbal analogical reasoning task was administered at age 15 in the 
A:B::C:? format, for example “dog is to puppy as cat is to… ?”, with pictures to select 
from. Both executive function measures predicted analogical reasoning performance 
when vocabulary, likely an important contributing factor in this verbal task, was 
controlled for (Richland & Burchinal, 2013). The authors do not speculate on the 
mechanism of this association. It is possible that executive functions allowed the 
participants to inhibit any distracting information among the pictures presented, and to 
hold the problem in mind while integrating information. An alternative explanation is that 
better executive function skills helped those children to learn better, and the knowledge 
learnt helped in the analogical reasoning task which drew on semantic knowledge. 
 In a study of 71 young adults, the non-verbal Test of Relational Reasoning 
(TORR), measuring the four components of relational reasoning defined by Alexander 
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and colleagues (Alexander et al., 2016) was administered alongside visuospatial and 
phonological working memory tasks (Grossnickle, Dumas, Alexander, & Baggetta, 
2016). VS-WM, but not phonological working memory, was positively related to all 
subscales of the TORR, most strongly with analogy and anomaly. The results support the 
idea that the ability to hold visual information in mind is important in visual relational 
reasoning tasks. The authors also posited the possibility that those with better relational 
reasoning create better mental models and thus do not need to draw on their working 
memory so much (Grossnickle et al., 2016). According to this argument, the association 
with working memory may be down to shared reliance on mental models, without 
working memory directly influencing relational reasoning capacity. 
 One hundred and twenty-six 5- to 6-year olds were encouraged to look at the A:B 
part of a pictorial A:B::C:? task (Glady, French, & Thibaut, 2017). The aim was to help 
children focus their attention on the part of the task that might be overlooked when 
completing the task, and indeed performance improved when children were supported in 
this manner (Glady et al., 2017). The authors argued that children found it less of a 
struggle to inhibit C when A:B was highlighted. This finding suggests that inhibitory 
control enables suppression of the part of the problem presented that might lead to a 
semantic or surface-feature match rather than a relational match. This is a noteworthy 
addition to the field’s understanding of the role of inhibitory control in relational 
reasoning, since others tend to focus on the need to ignore (or inhibit) distractors in the 
answer set presented (Vendetti, Matlen, Richland, & Bunge, 2015). Glady and colleagues 
(2017) also argued that in scene analogies (as described above), children might struggle to 
find the right answer due to the requirement to inhibit the target scene and focus on the 
initial scene. The authors called this the ‘unbalanced attentional focus hypothesis’. 
Relational reasoning ability appears to be constrained by executive function 
ability. In particular, working memory enables the holding and manipulation of task 
features in mind, while inhibitory control enables distracting information within the 
question and the answer set to be suppressed. Since these executive functions mature 
throughout childhood and adolescence, they likely limit the extent to which individuals 
can reason effectively in relational tasks during development. Given that executive 
functions have a role in science and maths, it is likely that executive functions and 
relational reasoning interact in influencing science and maths performance. While the 
interplay between relational reasoning, executive functions, and science and maths has 





1.5.3 Relational reasoning in science and maths 
Links between relational reasoning and science and maths have been investigated 
separately. As in the other literatures presented in this chapter, studies in maths are more 
developed than those in science. Nonetheless, the research in both science and maths has 
led to particular recommendations for education, which will be discussed at the end of 
this section. First, the association between relational reasoning and science will be 
considered, followed by the association between relational reasoning and maths. 
 
1.5.3.1 Science 
 In science, the association with relational reasoning has primarily been probed 
through attempts at teaching scientific concepts by analogical reasoning. In one example, 
77 9- to 10-year-olds were taught geoscience concepts either by visual analogy or through 
use of a target picture (Matlen, Vosniadou, Jee, & Ptouchkina, 2009). In both cases, the 
children received the same analogy-enhanced text, but the 9-year-old children who were 
shown the visual analogy pictures learnt more than those who were not. While this 
suggests that the visual analogies were an especially helpful aid, the authors 
acknowledged that the increased performance may be down to better image processing 
since more images were seen by the visual analogy group (Matlen et al., 2009). The 10-
year-old children did not show the same effect, which the authors attribute to better 
domain-general skills such as reading. This explanation is plausible, since the older 
children were perhaps more able to access and process the analogy text than the younger 
children. Nonetheless, the age gap between the children was very small, which suggests 
that this effect is not robust. A series of similar studies in adults found that visual 
analogies in geoscience helped learners form accurate conceptual representations (Jee et 
al., 2013). While these studies go some way in highlighting the role of relational 
reasoning in science learning, they are less helpful in determining the extent to which 
individual differences in relational reasoning are related to successful performance in 
science. They also focus on analogical reasoning, revealing less about different kinds of 
relational reasoning that might also play a role.  
 A different line of enquiry has investigated the skills involved in relational 
reasoning within science, which may reveal more about in-the-moment processes, as 
opposed to longer-term learning. Utterances from 18 novice and expert scientists during 
an anomalous meteorology task were compared (Trickett, Trafton, & Schunn, 2009). 
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Expert scientists used conceptual simulations when addressing anomalies, a strategy 
whereby a situation is mentally played out and the implications are considered, and they 
also used pure spatial transformation, whereby a mental image is manipulated to create a 
new one. Novices, on the other hand, used a less sophisticated strategy termed 
‘comparison spatial transformation’, where two images are compared (Trickett et al., 
2009). This research revealed differences between novice and expert scientists, 
suggesting that relational reasoning skills continue to develop through adulthood, 
becoming more specialised through practice. However, this is less useful in considering 
the role of relational reasoning skills in development through childhood and adolescence 
as applied to school. A strength of this research is in considering performance on tasks 
where relational reasoning is embedded within science. 
 
1.5.3.2 Maths 
In maths, studies have sought to look at individual differences. A sample of 26 4- 
and 5-year-olds performed the Test of Analogical Reasoning in Children (TARC), which 
is a non-verbal test in the A:B::C:? format using coloured shapes of different sizes 
(White, Alexander, & Daugherty, 1998). A maths test required sorting sets, counting, 
making comparisons, and extending patterns. Performance on the TARC and maths test 
correlated positively, and 35% of the variance in analogical reasoning was explained by 
maths. The authors argued that maths requires individuals to associate objects and 
symbols to abstract concepts, and to recognise patterns; these skills are considered to 
require analogical reasoning (White et al., 1998). In a different maths study, 92 5- to 8-
year-olds solved addition problems and undertook a range of relational reasoning tasks 
(Farrington-Flint, Canobi, Wood, & Faulkner, 2007). Better performance on the maths 
problems was associated with better relational reasoning in the older children only, 
indicating that early addition skills may be domain-specific, but that as children develop 
reasoning abilities these enhance their addition skills (Farrington-Flint et al., 2007). 
Following the creation of the TORR, Alexander and colleagues (Alexander et al., 2016) 
investigated its association with 13 problems from the maths Scholastic Assessment Test 
(SAT) in 42 adults. Scores on the TORR explained 13.4% of the variance in maths SAT 
scores (Alexander et al., 2016), further evidence that the two types of reasoning have 
common requirements, and indicating that the association holds until adulthood. 
 A study of fluid reasoning more broadly investigated the predictive role of 
reasoning in later maths (Green, Bunge, Briones Chiongbian, Barrow, & Ferrer, 2017). 
Sixty-nine participants aged 6 to 21 years undertook three measures of reasoning that 
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required pattern completion, logic puzzles, and rule identification, combined to form a 
single measure of fluid reasoning. Fluid reasoning predicted performance in standardised 
maths tests one and a half and three years later, and moreover, fluid reasoning was a 
better predictor of maths performance than previous performance on a maths test (Green 
et al., 2017). The study provides support for a link between reasoning skills and maths 
ability throughout development in childhood and adolescence. The authors argued that a 
common factor in fluid reasoning and maths reasoning was relational reasoning, and that 
this ability may be the foundation for maths development (Green et al., 2017). Finally, the 
authors also suggested that while fluid reasoning is likely important for many disciplines, 




The role of relational reasoning within science and maths misconceptions, 
particularly those relating to concepts learnt at school, is unknown, although Vendetti and 
colleagues (2015) argued that extending analogical reasoning in incorrect instances could 
lead to misconceptions. An understanding of the role of relational reasoning in education 
has led to recommendations for teaching and learning. Richland, Zur and Holyoak (2007) 
argued that since maths requires understanding abstract concepts which may be hard to 
comprehend, teaching by analogy (drawing parallels between similar problems) may 
support learning. This would be similar to the approach described in the science studies 
(Jee et al., 2013; Matlen et al., 2009). Vendetti and colleagues (2015) highlighted the 
importance of supporting relational reasoning within science, arguing that explicit 
explanation of comparisons is essential, as teachers may assume that analogous relations 
are obvious, when they are not to learners, as exemplified by studies showing 
improvement in analogy through the school years (Richland et al., 2006). Richland and 
Burchinal (2013) argued that improving executive functions, and inhibitory control in 
particular, might lead to improvements in school related to reasoning, although while 
efforts at executive function training were initially promising (Diamond & Lee, 2011), 
they have so far seen limited success (Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2013). 
Relational reasoning skills develop throughout childhood and adolescence, at a 
time when executive function skills continue to develop and when understanding of 
science and maths content at school is of great importance for compulsory exams. While 
there are associations between these different skills, the precise interplay is unknown. 
Many studies investigating relational reasoning aim to reduce the role of knowledge, but 
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knowledge is undoubtedly an important factor in science and maths reasoning. These are 
knowledge-dependant disciplines, but relational reasoning appears to be an important 
contributing factor. A more comprehensive understanding of the interplay of executive 
functions, relational reasoning, and science and maths reasoning could have important 
implications for learning and development in science and maths. 
 
1.6 Thesis overview 
In this section I will describe the research approach taken throughout the PhD, and 
then summarise each following chapter. 
 
1.6.1 Research approach 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to take an educational neuroscience 
approach to understand more about the cognitive and neural bases of science and maths 
reasoning in adolescence. The key dimensions of this approach were to: 
a. Regularly meet with teachers to continually assess the educational relevance of 
the studies and findings. 
b. Spend a substantial amount of time in school to ensure a rounded understanding of 
the typical science and maths classroom, and the school context more widely. 
c. Use stimuli that are relevant to science and maths content that 11- to 15-year-olds 
frequently encounter and need to understand for exam success. 
d. Adopt a suite of methods to address science and maths reasoning and learning at 
different levels of scientific understanding. 
e. Feed results back to teachers and pupils who took part in the research to ensure 
that their participation saw rewards and that the research had impact. 
Using this approach, and given the literature presented above, the specific aims of 
the research were to investigate the role of inhibitory control and relational reasoning in 
science and maths during adolescence. In particular, the thesis aimed to examine general 
science and maths reasoning, in addition to science and maths reasoning in the context of 
misconceptions, or counterintuitive concepts. Behavioural, classroom-based, and fMRI 
studies were used in order to capture different levels of description, and to link findings to 
real-world settings. The research also aimed to examine specific effects of inhibitory 
control and relational reasoning, by controlling for other contributing factors such as 




1.6.2 Chapter summaries 
 In Chapter 2 I summarise key aspects of the methods used in the experimental 
chapters. First I describe the creation of a novel science and maths misconceptions task 
that was designed specifically for use with 11- to 15-year-olds, drawing on the curricula 
for England. Second, I describe the selection of and experimental detail regarding the 
inhibitory control tasks used throughout the thesis. Third, I review literature pertaining to 
fMRI, briefly describing how it works, with a focus on the benefits and limitations of this 
approach, in particular as applied to young participants.  
 In Chapter 3 I present the results of a first behavioural study, which sought to 
investigate the association between inhibitory control and counterintuitive science and 
maths reasoning. Note that the data was collected for my MSc dissertation, and the results 
presented here constitute a reanalysis of this data, and thus a more nuanced picture is 
presented than in the original analysis. It was hypothesised that adolescents with better 
inhibitory control as measured by response and semantic inhibition tasks would perform 
better on the science and maths misconceptions task, when controlling for age and general 
cognitive ability.  
 In Chapter 4 I describe two classroom-based studies that aimed to establish the 
association between inhibitory control and the learning of new counterintuitive concepts 
in the classroom. Study A investigated the learning of two new physics concepts, and 
study B investigated the learning of a new maths concept. In both cases, the classroom 
teachers taught the new concepts, and learning was tracked one week after the lesson and 
one month later. It was hypothesised that those with better inhibitory control would 
perform better in the tests following the lessons in which they were taught the 
counterintuitive material. 
 In Chapter 5 I present the first behavioural and neuroimaging results of an fMRI 
study. Participants completed the science and maths misconceptions task and two 
inhibitory control tasks (measuring response and semantic inhibition) inside the scanner. 
In contrast to previous research, inhibitory control brain activation was directly compared 
to counterintuitive reasoning brain activation to establish the extent of overlap. It was 
hypothesised that brain regions recruited during inhibitory control would also be recruited 
during counterintuitive concept reasoning. 
In Chapter 6 I examine the data pertaining to relational reasoning from the fMRI 
study. Exploratory analyses aimed to link verbal analogical and non-verbal relational 
reasoning to science and maths behaviour and brain data. It was hypothesised that those 
with better relational reasoning skills would perform better on the science and maths 
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misconceptions task, and that brain activation would correlate with relational reasoning 
ability. 
In Chapter 7 I describe a second behavioural study, which aimed to establish the 
relative importance of inhibitory control and relational reasoning in science and maths 
performance. As in the previous studies, both response and semantic inhibitory control 
were measured, and verbal analogical reasoning was measured, along with a more 
comprehensive measure of relational reasoning. It was hypothesised that inhibitory 
control would explain unique variance in counterintuitive reasoning, and that relational 
reasoning would explain unique variance in general science and maths reasoning. 
In Chapter 8 I discuss the overall findings from each experimental chapter and 
describe what the studies have revealed about the cognitive and neural bases of science 
and maths reasoning in adolescence. I consider the ways in which I was able to meet my 
aims in terms of educational neuroscience approach, evaluating educational neuroscience 
as a discipline based on my experiences, and describing the challenges that I faced along 
the way. I describe the novel contributions of the results to our understanding of science 
and maths reasoning, and finally consider what the findings might mean for education. 
 
The thesis now proceeds with the Methods section, which describes the key tasks 





Chapter 2 Methods 
In this chapter I introduce aspects of the methods in the thesis that are relevant to 
several experimental chapters. First, I describe the ethics procedures and the selection of 
schools who provided participants. Second, I describe the design of a novel computerised 
science and maths task aiming to assess the ability to answer questions related to 
misconceptions. This task was first used for the behavioural study in Chapter 3, then 
modified for the fMRI study presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and modified further for the 
second behavioural study in Chapter 7. Third, I describe the two inhibitory control tasks 
used in all of the studies presented in the thesis to measure response and semantic 
inhibition. Fourth, I briefly present the use of fMRI as a neuroimaging tool able to study 
the developing brain, and discuss study design, analysis pathways, and the strengths and 
limitations of this method.  
 
2.1 Ethics and school selection 
All of the studies presented in this thesis underwent the strict ethical clearance 
procedures required by the local ethics committees (Birkbeck and/or UCL) to ensure the 
safety and wellbeing of participants. All information sheets and consent forms are 
provided in Appendix 1. The behavioural and classroom studies reported in Chapters 3, 
4, and 7, received ethical clearance from Birkbeck. Chapters 3 and 7 were opt-in 
studies, where parents received an information sheet, and provided written informed 
consent if they wished for their child to take part. A condition stated on the information 
sheet was that participants should not have any known neurological or developmental 
disorders. Parents confirmed on their consent form that their child had no known 
neurological or developmental disorders, and this was not formally checked. Participants 
aged 11 or 12 years verbally consented, while 13- to 15-year-olds provided written 
consent. Chapter 4 was an opt-out study, where parents received an information sheet, 
and provided a written opt-out request form if they did not wish for their child to take 
part. There were no exclusionary criteria for this classroom study, since it took place 
during normal school class times and it was considered that nobody should be excluded. 
All participants provided written consent. 
Schools were recruited in a non-systematic manner. Participants from Chapter 3 
were recruited from a school that was approached through networks. Participants from 
Chapter 4 were recruited from a school that was a partner throughout my PhD, and were 
thus happy to be involved in a more intensive classroom study. In this case, the school 
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had been involved in the project since its inception so were not recruited just for this 
study. Half of the participants from Chapter 7 were recruited through the same school as 
in Chapter 3, and the other half were recruited through a personal contact who is a 
teacher at the school. Information relating to each school is reported within the relevant 
chapters.   
The analyses reported in Chapters 5 and 6 refer to a single study that received 
ethical clearance from UCL (due to use of the fMRI scanner on UCL premises). This was 
an opt-in study, where parents received an information sheet, and provided written 
informed consent if they wished for their child to take part. Again, parents confirmed on 
their consent form that their child had no known neurological or developmental disorders. 
To ensure the safety of participants, parents were present for the testing procedure (in a 
nearby room), and provided screening on the day. All participants provided written 
consent. Participants from Chapters 5 and 6 were recruited through opportunity 
sampling and were thus from a range of schools: some participants were from the schools 
described above, others were recruited from schools that were approached due to 
proximity to UCL, and others were friends of those who had already taken part in the 
study. 
 
2.2 Science and maths misconceptions task  
A novel computerised science and maths misconceptions task was designed to 
measure adolescents’ ability to give the correct (although counterintuitive) answer when 
faced with problems known to be associated with misconceptions. The aim was to cover a 
broad set of concepts across science and maths curricula for 11- to 14-year-olds (from 
Key Stage 3 for England, covering school Years 7 to 9) to make the task relevant to 
education. In order to pull together a variety of problems, the literature was searched for 
examples of misconceptions that are present to some extent within this age range. The 
sources of the problems included books that had compiled the scientific literature on this 
topic (Driver, Squires, Rushworth, & Wood-Robinson, 2015; Ryan & Williams, 2007; 
Stavy & Tirosh, 2000), and discussions with teachers. In addition, study guides (Parsons, 
2014; Parsons & Gannon, 2014) and the Key Stage 3 curricula (Department for 
Education, 2013a, 2013b) were consulted to ensure that only misconceptions related to 
these curricula were included. The difficulty of the problems varied in order to ensure that 
younger and older participants would find some problems easy and some challenging; this 
ensured a range in accuracy levels to explore individual differences. The oldest 
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participants in the study were 15-years-old and in Year 10, so should have covered all of 
the topics addressed by the problems at school in Years 7 to 9. While the task was 
designed according to topics from science and maths curricula, it is possible that 
participants in Year 10 may not have covered each problem presented, for example, if 
they had missed school due to illness. Nonetheless, it was expected that they would have 
caught up on any missed material in preparation for exams. It is also possible that 
participants in the same Year group had not covered the same aspects of the curriculum at 
the time of testing. 
The problems found in the literature were modified to fit into the problem-set 
format that was adopted for these studies. The format was adapted from adult 
neuroimaging studies into misconceptions in science (Brault Foisy, Potvin, Riopel, & 
Masson, 2015; Masson, Potvin, Riopel, & Brault Foisy, 2014, see Introduction section 
1.3.3.3 for a summary of their findings). Each of these adult studies focussed on a single 
science misconception. Participants had to judge whether the stimuli were scientific or 
not (Figure 2.1). Some stimuli were scientific, in that they were correct (e.g. showing 
balls of different sizes falling at the same speed), while others were non-scientific, i.e. 
incorrect and in line with the misconception often held by individuals (e.g. showing a 
larger ball falling faster than a smaller ball). The science experts recruited for the study 
judged both scientific and non-scientific stimuli correctly, while the science novices 
judged them incorrectly. There were also control problems, which were non-scientific, 
covering a similar aspect of science, but not related to the misconception (e.g. a smaller 
ball falling faster than a larger ball). Both experts and novices in the studies accurately 





The version of the science and maths misconceptions task developed for the study 
presented in Chapter 3 consisted of 48 problem-sets each addressing different 
misconceptions. This differs from the adult neuroimaging studies, which concerned just 
two misconceptions that were shown repeatedly. It was considered that showing the same 
problems might lead participants to overthink problems and change their response, and 
that findings would not be generalizable to the range of counterintuitive concepts 
encountered at school. Another significant change from the adult work was to include two 
control problems per misconception, so that the control question was not always 
unscientific. This meant that the problem-types (misconception and control) were 
matched, and that there were equal numbers of control problems and misconception 
problems. Control problems controlled for knowledge and interest in the topics, and task-
general factors such as processing speed and attention. Efforts were made to ensure that 
misconception and control problems were matched on statement length, positive versus 
negative wording, and terminology. Each problem-set thus contained a scientific problem 
relating to a misconception (Misconception-True), a non-scientific problem relating to the 
same misconception (Misconception-False), a scientific problem where no 
Figure 2.1. Stimuli presented inside the fMRI scanner for (a) the electric circuit study (Masson et 
al., 2014) and (b) the mechanics study (Brault Foisy et al., 2015). Electric circuit stimuli were 
still images, and mechanics stimuli were short videos showing the balls falling. Permission to 
reproduce these images has been granted by John Wiley and Sons, and Elsevier respectively. 
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counterintuitive reasoning was required (Control-True), and a non-scientific problem 
where no counterintuitive reasoning was required (Control-False) (Figure 2.2). Rather 
than a single image (Masson et al., 2014) or short video (Brault Foisy et al., 2015), here 
participants were shown more varied stimuli including sentences and equations. This 
variety meant that the problems were more similar to those shown at school. For each 
problem, participants were asked to judge whether the stimuli shown were correct (i.e. 
true, scientific) or incorrect (i.e. false, unscientific) by clicking one of two buttons with 
their dominant hand. 
Twenty-six of the 48 problem-sets were science-based. Biology topics included 
living organisms, cells, inheritance, genetics, and plants (8 problem-sets). Chemistry 
topics included pollution, atoms, pure and impure substances, heating, and melting (7 
problem-sets). Physics topics included force, the solar system, electricity, gravity, waves, 
and temperature (11 problem-sets). Maths topics included fractions, decimals, angles, 
algebra, shape, transformations, statistics, probability, and graphs (22 problem-sets). One 
hundred and twenty-six problems were accompanied by images (biology: 28/32; 
chemistry: 18/28; physics: 36/44; maths: 44/88), which were sometimes essential for the 
problem, sometimes provided further explanation, and sometimes simply relevant to keep 
the task engaging. In all cases the Misconception-True/False and Control-True/False 
problems were matched as well as possible in terms of text and images presented, 
ensuring all participants saw similar stimuli across conditions, and allowing the 




With 48 problem-sets each containing four problems, there were a total of 192 
problems. Each participant was shown one misconception problem per set, and one 
control problem per set, totalling 96 problems per participant, with an equal distribution 
Figure 2.2. Example (a) science and (b) maths problem-sets. Note that text and image size has 
been increased to enhance legibility here. 
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of True and False problems. Each participant thus completed 24 of each of the four 
problem types (Misconception-False, Misconception-True, Control-False, Control-True). 
Two sequences of 96 trials were created by randomly distributing problems such that 
each sequence contained one misconception trial and one control trial from each problem-
set. Science, maths, misconception, and control trials were all mixed within the sequence. 
Two further sequences were created by reversing the presentation order of the original 
sequences. Participants were assigned to a sequence pseudo-randomly, ensuring each age 
group contained the range of sequences.  
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible, and stimuli, along 
with Correct and Incorrect ‘buttons’ (Figure 2.2), remained on the screen until a response 
was made. There was no time limit for participants’ responses. The task was programmed 
in Cogent (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_graphics.php) running in MATLAB (The 
MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA). Self-timed breaks were inserted ¼, ½, and ¾ of the way 
through the task. The task lasted approximately 11 min on average.  
Changes were made to the science and maths misconceptions task across the 
different studies. Chapter 3 contains the first iteration of the task, and as such was 
presented exactly as described above. The task was not used in Chapter 4. The task was 
adapted as follows for the fMRI study described in Chapters 5 and 6.  
The problem-sets were changed in some cases, based on discussions with teachers 
about how related the concepts were to school and how clear each problem was: wording 
was tweaked and pictures were made clearer. Some problems were dropped and new ones 
added in order to have an even split between disciplines: there were now 24 science 
problem-sets and 24 maths problem-sets, and within science there were eight biology 
problem-sets, eight chemistry problem-sets, and eight physics problem-sets. Each trial 
now had a grey background rather than white background, so that the screen was not too 
bright in the dark scanner room. The task had an event-related design, and on each trial 
participants again had to judge whether the statement was true or false. This time there 
were four response options that appeared on the screen in the following order: definitely 
true, probably true, probably false, and definitely false (Figure 2.3). It was explained that 
the definitely/probably distinction referred to the participant’s confidence in their 
response. Responses were made through two button boxes, and the index and middle 
fingers of both hands rested on four response buttons. Each participant saw 24 of each of 
the four problem types, as before, with one misconception problem and one control 
problem from each problem-set.  
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Unlike in Chapter 3, a time limit was added to each trial, to constrain the duration 
of each scanning run. Based on the behavioural data from Chapter 3, a maximum of 12 s 
was allowed for a response to be made on each trial, and if a response had not been made 
within 9 s, a red border appeared around the response options on the screen to prompt a 
response (Figure 2.3). Each trial lasted a total of 16 s, and the remaining time following a 
response was filled with a fixation cross on a third of trials or a simple arrows task on two 
thirds of trials. In the arrows task, participants pressed the left or right key with their 
index fingers according to the direction of arrows on the screen. This constituted an active 
baseline, and was used to encourage participants to stop thinking about the science and 













While science and maths stimuli were intermixed in the first version of the task, 
the fMRI task consisted of four runs: two runs of science and two runs of maths, 
alternating, and the starting run was counterbalanced across participants. Science and 
maths were separated to maximise the extent to which science- or maths-related regions 
were engaged during the run as a whole. Each run started with an instruction screen that 
told the participant whether they would be given science or maths questions. A fixation 
cross appeared in the centre of the screen for 10 s at the start and end of each run, and 15 
s in the middle of each run. Eight new fixed trial orders were created, and participants 
were assigned to one of the orders according to their school year group and gender, 
ensuring representation of each order across year groups and genders. Within each run of 
24 trials, each participant saw six problems of each trial type. Short breaks were given 
Figure 2.3. Example science problem with red border to prompt participants to answer as quickly 
as possible, which appeared when there were just 3 s remaining. 
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between each run, so that participants had a chance to relax and to say if they were unsure 
about anything or uncomfortable inside the scanner. The task lasted a total of 
approximately 30 min.  
In Chapter 7, which presents the second behavioural study, the science and maths 
problems were intermixed again and the sequences were prepared as in Chapter 3. The 
problems used were those from Chapters 5 and 6, with further small tweaks to improve 
stimuli, and a 12 s time limit per trial (with red border prompt at 9 s) as in Chapters 5 
and 6 to ensure that the maximum time spent on this task was under 20 min. This was 
important for the study in Chapter 7 because one school that was hosting the research 
imposed a strict time limit for the involvement of each participant in order to reduce 
disruption to the school day. Four response options were given, as in Chapters 5 and 6, 
but there was no arrows task and there were no fixation blocks. Self-timed breaks were 
given at three time points as in Chapter 3. All versions of the stimuli are freely available 
online (osf.io/ytcwk). 
Accuracy and RT were measured in all versions of the task. It was anticipated that 
accuracy would be higher and RTs faster for control trials compared to misconception 
trials. Mean RTs are reported for all trials. While it is typical in cognitive tests to only 
include RTs for correct responses, in this case incorrect trials are of interest since it was 
expected that participants would get many of the misconception problems wrong. 
Although it is possible that on some trials participants may have been distracted and not 
responding to the task as anticipated, RTs for incorrect trials were expected to mostly 
reflect the time spent reasoning about a counterintuitive (or control) concept, even if the 
resulting answer is incorrect. 
 
2.3 Inhibitory control tasks 
Two inhibitory control tasks were selected in order to measure both response and 
semantic inhibition, and were used, in slightly different formats, throughout the PhD. 
From the previous research linking inhibitory control to science and maths, it is unclear 
whether response or semantic inhibition is more important in counterintuitive reasoning, 





2.3.1 Response inhibition 
The Go/No-Go task measured response inhibition, and was adapted from 
Watanabe and colleagues (2002) and Humphrey and Dumontheil (2016). This task was 
chosen in part as is has shown improvement with age from 12 to 15 years (Humphrey & 
Dumontheil, 2016), and as such would be appropriate to investigate age effects in the 11- 
to 15-year-olds studied in these experiments. In addition, the task differs from other 
Go/No-Go tasks in requiring a response choice on Go trials, which makes the task more 
challenging and engaging. It was therefore hoped that participants would remain engaged 
throughout the task. Both simple and complex versions of the task were included to 
investigate the possibility that response inhibition in the context of a higher cognitive 
load, namely a 1-back working memory load, would be more associated with complex 
science and maths reasoning, where information may need to be maintained and 
manipulated while the answer is worked out, compared to inhibitory control within a 
simpler task.  
Familiarisation and practice phases consisted of ten trials for each version of the 
Go/No-Go. In the familiarisation phase, coloured squares (green squares in the simple 
task; yellow or blue squares in the complex task) appeared on the left or right of the 
screen, and participants pressed the corresponding key, using the index or middle finger 
of their dominant hand, to indicate the location of the square. This was repeated until 
participants made two errors or fewer. In the practice phase, No-Go trials, where the 
response must be withheld, were introduced (red squares in the simple task; a blue square 
following a yellow square in the complex task) (Figure 2.4). The practice phase was 
repeated until participants made no more than one No-Go error out of three No-Go trials. 
Test phases followed, and included 80 trials, with 25% No-Go trials, and a self-timed 
break half-way through. The square’s location and fixation duration were pseudo-
randomised so that for every set of ten trials, 50% of stimuli appeared on the left, and 
fixation duration was randomly chosen from a uniform distribution between 600 and 800 
ms. Responses were not recorded for the first 100 ms after stimulus presentation because 
such a quick response would most likely relate to the previous trial. There were never two 
No-Go trials in a row. The task was programmed in Cogent (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent 
_graphics.php) running in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA). The task 
lasted a total of 6 min on average. 
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Figure 2.4. Example time course of events in the (a) simple Go/No-Go, (b) complex Go/No-Go, 
and (c) numerical Stroop. 
 
The Go/No-Go was adapted over time to suit the needs of different studies. In 
Chapter 3, the task was administered as described above, in a one-to-one testing session 
where the experimenter could ensure the participant understood the task. In Chapter 4, 
the task was reprogrammed in PHP and JavaScript, running in an Ubuntu web server. The 
task was administered in a group testing session and so a description of the task was given 
to the group rather than individually (see further information in section 4.3.1.3.2).  
In Chapters 5 and 6, the task was adapted for the fMRI study. The task had a 
block design containing three block types. Go blocks contained only Go trials, where a 
beige square appeared on the left or right of the screen, and participants used their left or 
right index finger on the button boxes to indicate the location of the square. Simple 
Go/No-Go blocks contained 50% Go trials, where participants indicated the location of 
the beige square, and 50% No-Go trials where no response was given to a blue square. 
Complex Go/No-Go blocks contained 50% Go trials and 50% No-Go trials, with a one-
back component to tax working memory. Squares were pink and yellow, and a response 
indicating the square’s position was required when the colour of the square matched the 
previous trial (Go trial). No response was required when the colour of the square did not 
match the previous trial (No-Go trial). The percentage of No-Go trials was increased from 
25 to 50 so as to increase the difference between Go and Go/No-Go blocks, in line with 
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previous research (e.g. Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002). While this optimised the task for 
the scanner, in increasing the inhibitory control required during the block, it made the task 
less optimal for behavioural testing. The task was now easier for participants because No-
Go trials were more common, and thus less difficult to inhibit. It was anticipated that this 
would have an impact on the behavioural results, such that accuracy would be higher. 
Differences in findings across studies might therefore reflect modifications in the task 
rather than genuine differences between participants. The 50% No-Go trials meant that 
two No-Go trials could now appear in succession. Stimuli remained on the screen for 400 
ms, followed by a fixation cross in the centre of the screen, which remained on the screen 
between 600 and 800 ms. A fixation cross appeared in the centre of the screen for 10 s at 
the start and end of each run, and 15 s in the middle of each run. The task was performed 
in a single run, with four repeats of each block type. Each block contained 20 trials, with 
location, interstimulus interval (ISI), and trial type pseudo-randomised per block. Each 
block lasted 22 s and the task lasted approximately 6 min in total. In Chapter 7, for the 
second behavioural study, the Go/No-Go consisted of only the complex version, in order 
to reduce the length of the task, and was administered as in Chapter 3. Accuracy and RT 
were recorded in all iterations. RT analyses in this task considered only correct Go trials, 
since it is the speed of correct responses that is of interest. 
 
2.3.2 Semantic inhibition 
The numerical Stroop task, adapted from Khng and Lee (2014) provided a 
computerised measure of semantic inhibition (Figure 2.4). The Stroop has shown 
improvement with age in the age range of interest here (Comalli et al., 1962; Leon-
Carrion et al., 2004), while the flanker for example, has shown performance to mature by 
age 10 (Cragg, 2016; Ridderinkhof & van der Molen, 1995). The Stroop therefore appears 
to be a more sensitive measure of semantic inhibition. This numerical version of the 
Stroop task allowed a more intuitive mapping between numbers and keys as compared to 
non-ordinal stimuli, such as colours, in the traditional colour-word Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935).  
The aim in this task was to press the key corresponding to the number of elements 
on the screen (between one and four). In the familiarisation phase, the elements were 
asterisks. The four number keys were located in the centre of the keyboard, labelled with 
stickers, and participants were instructed to use the index and middle fingers of their left 
and right hands, such that the fingers corresponded to numbers one to four from left to 
right. The familiarisation phase was repeated until participants responded correctly on 11 
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out of 12 trials. This conservative threshold ensured that mapping between fingers, keys 
and responses had been achieved. In the first practice phase, consisting of 24 trials, the 
stimuli were single digit numbers, and participants continued to respond to the number of 
elements (digits) shown. These were all congruent trials, where the digit matched the 
number of elements (e.g., ‘1’ or ‘3 3 3’), and there was no performance threshold. The 
second practice phase contained only incongruent trials, where the digit did not match the 
number of elements (e.g., ‘4 4’ or ‘1 1 1 1’). The second practice contained just two trials, 
and was repeated (with changing stimuli) until participants got both correct. This ensured 
that participants understood the task but did not get too much practice.  
The test phase contained 50% congruent and 50% incongruent trials presented in 
four blocks of 24 trials. The same pseudo-random trial order was used across participants, 
such that each block contained one of each possible incongruent trial and three of each 
congruent trial. There was a self-timed break between each block. Accuracy and RT were 
recorded, and the task took 4.5 min on average. The task was programmed in Cogent 
(www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_graphics.php) running in MATLAB (The MathWorks, 
Inc., Natick, MA). 
The numerical Stroop was also adapted over time. In Chapter 3, the task was 
administered as described above, with the experimenter administering the task in a one-
to-one testing session. In Chapter 4, as with the Go/No-Go, the task was carried out in a 
group testing session, and so was reprogrammed in PHP and JavaScript, running in an 
Ubuntu web server. In Chapters 5 and 6, the task was adapted for the fMRI study using 
a block design. Congruent blocks contained only congruent trials, and Mixed blocks 
contained 50% congruent trials and 50% incongruent trials. The same four fingers were 
used to respond using the button boxes. Stimuli remained on the screen until a response 
was made or a maximum of 1.1 s had passed. Each trial lasted 1.5 s and the remainder of 
the trial was filled with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen. Blocks alternated and 
there were a total of five blocks of each type, with a fixed trial order across participants. 
Before the start of a block, participants were shown an instruction screen for 2 s 
indicating which block type they would be completing. There was 10 s of fixation at the 
beginning and end of a run, with 15 s fixation roughly in the middle of a run. Accuracy 
and RT were recorded and the task lasted approximately 5 min. In Chapter 7, for the 
second behavioural study, the numerical Stroop was administered as in Chapter 3 but 
with half as many trials (48 trials) presented in two blocks, in order to reduce the length 




2.4 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
 Blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) fMRI was used in Chapters 5 and 6, 
alongside behavioural data, to reveal more about the cognitive and neural underpinnings 
of science and maths reasoning. BOLD fMRI is a non-invasive method of imaging the 
functioning human brain, developed in the 1990s, with very good spatial resolution of a 
few millimetres. Here I will provide a brief overview of how BOLD fMRI works, 
consider experimental design using fMRI, describe analysis pathways, and discuss the 
issues that arise when using fMRI with young participants.  
 
2.4.1 Principles of BOLD fMRI 
 An MRI scanner produces a strong magnetic field, causing some of the protons in 
the brain’s hydrogen atoms to align with the field (Dick, Lloyd-Fox, Blasi, Elwell, & 
Mills, 2013). The protons spin constantly, and at constant speed, but they are not in phase 
with each other. The beaming of a pulse of radiofrequency (RF) causes the protons to all 
spin in phase, pointing in the same direction, perpendicular to the main magnet of the 
scanner (Dick et al., 2013). This causes an electric current in the scanner’s surrounding 
coil of wire which is detected by the scanner. The protons eventually dephase and realign 
with the magnetic field, and so the current reduces and disappears. The speed with which 
the current reduces depends on the chemicals in the surrounding tissues, and this is how 
tissues are differentiated (Dick et al., 2013). The use of three perpendicular magnetic coils 
in the MRI scanner allows spatial information to be recorded so that an image of the brain 
can be created, comprised of many slices. 
BOLD imaging relies on the detection of transient local changes in oxygenated 
haemoglobin in the brain’s blood. During the activation of neurons in a given region, 
there is increased demand of oxygen from the blood, causing an expansion of arterioles 
and capillaries (Turner, 2016). This gives rise to an overall increase in oxygen (despite 
the concurrent consumption of oxygen). Since oxygenated haemoglobin is less magnetic 
than deoxygenated haemoglobin, the proton dephasing process takes longer 
(deoxygenated haemoglobin causes dephasing to happen more quickly). Therefore, when 
there has been increased demand for oxygen, the electric current measured by the scanner 
is slower to reduce, and thus the BOLD signal shows a net increase. The BOLD signal 
reflects changes in both blood volume and oxygen extraction (Turner, 2016), and as such 




2.4.2 Experimental design using fMRI 
 There are two commonly used designs for fMRI, each with associated advantages 
and disadvantages. The first, most used design, is the block design. In a block design, 
there are alternating blocks of experimental conditions. For example, in the numerical 
Stroop (see section 2.2.2) there were blocks of congruent trials only, alternating with 
mixed blocks of congruent and incongruent trials. Within the block design, a subtractive 
method is used in order to isolate activation associated with a specific cognitive function 
(Corr, 2006). In the case of the numerical Stroop, congruent blocks were subtracted from 
mixed blocks, to remove any common activation associated with congruent trials, leaving 
activation that is specific to incongruent trials. The block design is considered to have 
superior statistical power and to be simpler to implement than the alternative (Chee, 
Venkatraman, Westphal, & Siong, 2003). However, the design is also limited because it 
cannot distinguish between trial types within a block, which may be particularly 
important in the context of correct versus incorrect trials (Petersen & Dubis, 2012). 
Where in behavioural data, error trials might be discarded, this is not possible in fMRI 
studies using a block design, although if errors are infrequent an event-related regressor 
can remove brain activity related to errors. In addition, averaging over different trial types 
(such as in the mixed blocks in the numerical Stroop) may result in a cancelling effect 
that does not reflect positive and negative neural responses (Petersen & Dubis, 2012). 
Finally, participant awareness of the block they are currently completing may introduce 
confounds due to predictability (Chee et al., 2003).  
 Event-related designs present mixed trials, allowing random presentation of 
stimuli (Chee et al., 2003). This design was adopted for the science and maths 
misconceptions task (see section 2.1). Misconception and control trials were mixed, 
which meant that participants would less likely be aware of any difference in trial type. A 
strength of this approach more generally is that specific trials can also be sorted or 
selected after the experiment has taken place, allowing trials with error responses to be 
dropped, for instance (Chee et al., 2003). Modelling of individual trials occurs when 
analysing event-related data, using a similar subtractive approach, whereby individual 
trials are subtracted rather than full blocks. This allows for additional specificity, as 
models may include only the time spent on the trial, as opposed to the trial and the inter-
trial duration. For instance, in the science and maths misconceptions task, control trials 
were subtracted from misconception trials, such that activation specific to misconception 
trials was leftover, and only the time spent responding was included in the model. 
However, due to the decreased signal-to-noise ratio, event-related designs are less 
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powerful and less efficient than block designs (Petersen & Dubis, 2012). Null events are 
required even if not modelled explicitly (The FIL methods group, 2015), and the 
inclusion of such events can make the task feel very long and less engaging, which may 
be a particular issue for younger participants.  
 
2.4.3 Analysis of BOLD fMRI data 
 The first stage of analysis for either experimental design is preprocessing, which 
ensures that voxels can be compared over time by reducing variability in the data not 
associated with the task. This occurs in four steps. The first step is realignment, which 
aims to correct for head motion inside the scanner by realigning each scan to a reference 
scan (Friston, 2007) such as the mean image as in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3.5). Since 
motion can still account for much of the variance after realignment, for example because 
movement occurred between slice acquisition (Friston, 2007), the second step in 
preprocessing is adjusting for these movement effects. A composite measure of head 
motion across the six realignment estimates is calculated, giving a framewise 
displacement (FD) estimate (Siegel et al., 2014). Individual scans with a FD estimate 
greater than 0.9 mm are modelled out of the general linear model (GLM) by including a 
regressor of no interest for each censored volume. The third step in preprocessing is 
spatial normalisation, which matches each scan to a common template (such as the 
Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI registered maps used in Chapter 5) of standard 
anatomical space (Friston, 2007). This step is necessary because of the large individual 
differences in brain size and shape. In order to assess effects over groups of participants, 
each brain must be normalised. Note that other approaches can be used, such as in 
retinotopic mapping of visual cortex, where conventional normalisation is considered 
inappropriate because of the particularly large variability in size, shape and position of 
these areas (Henriksson, Karvonen, Salminen-Vaparanta, Railo, & Vanni, 2012). Finally, 
the scans are spatially smoothed. Spatial smoothing reduces spatial precision but makes 
errors more normally distributed, thus ensuring validity of parametric tests (Friston, 
2007). Standard practice smooths images by 8 mm (as in Chapter 5), allowing for group 
averaging and statistics across normalised images (Turner, 2016).    
 Following the preprocessing procedure, there are two further stages, based on the 
GLM, modelled at two levels (The FIL methods group, 2015). The first level implements 
within-participant analyses, by modelling regressors which represent the different 
conditions or trial types of the task, including fixation periods where relevant, censored 
volumes that have been excluded due to movement, and the session mean. Contrasts are 
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then calculated for each participant (for example, Misconception > Control, see Chapter 
5 section 5.3.6), and then entered into the second level model (The FIL methods group, 
2015). It is from the second level analyses that maps are created and inferences drawn. 
Thresholds are put into place to determine which voxels and clusters are to be reported, 
and these are determined by the researcher. The chance of false positives due to multiple 
comparisons can be managed through applying a family-wise error (FWE) corrected 
threshold, either at the voxel level, which is a conservative approach similar to 
Bonferroni, or at the cluster level, typically at the default p < .05 threshold, with an 
uncorrected voxel level threshold of p < .001. There remains debate in the field regarding 
whether or not FWE correcting is sufficient, and what the best thresholds are to 
adequately control for false positives (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016; Flandin & 
Friston, 2017). The researcher can also determine an extent threshold, which produces 
maps of clusters of a minimum number of voxels. 
 In this thesis, SPM12 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/ software/spm12/) was used to 
preprocess and analyse the data. MNI coordinates were used to define regions. Region 
labelling was completed with Automatic Anatomical Labeling (AAL) (Tzourio-Mazoyer 
et al., 2002). BA labelling was completed with MRIcron (Rorden & Brett, 2000). 
MarsBaR (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) was used to calculate average 
parameter estimates per participant in different clusters. 
 
2.4.4 FMRI with young participants 
 As a non-invasive method of brain imaging with no known side effects, fMRI is 
well suited to non-clinical research, and particularly to use with children; repeated MRI 
has been shown to have no negative impact on children (Holland et al., 2014). A key 
challenge in using fMRI with young participants is the critical requirement that 
participants are still while inside the scanner. This can be difficult for children and 
adolescents, but it also introduces a possible confound because the extent of movement 
may be different across age groups (Dick et al., 2013). It is also possible that the amount 
of movement would be related to the participant’s inhibitory control ability, whereby 
those with poorer inhibition would find it harder to stop their desire to move inside the 
scanner. This confound would be particularly problematic for the fMRI study described in 
this thesis, where inhibitory control is a key variable of interest. Where there is too much 
movement, scans are removed from analyses, and where a participant has moved too 
much within a single session, this whole session is dropped from the analyses (see 
Chapter 5 section 5.3.5). Another issue with imaging young participants is that 
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anatomical atlases may not be appropriate for the wide variety in head sizes; using 
standard spaces based on young adult participants, as is typical, may lead to 
misclassification of brain tissue and spurious age differences, for instance (Richards, 
Sanchez, Phillips-Meek, & Xie, 2016). 
An additional age-related issue is that attention and task compliance may differ 
according to age, but this cannot easily be detected when participants are inside the 
scanner. For example, a child who is particularly struggling to pay attention in the 
unusual scanner environment may not be attending to the task as much as an older 
participant who is more comfortable inside the scanner and able to focus on the task. This 
could mean that the task being performed is essentially different for the two, and yet this 
is not taken account of in the analyses. However, age differences in the contrasts of 
interest are examined (although it is not necessarily clear what age effects reflect), and 
participants are monitored as well as possible from the console room. The fMRI operators 
can speak to the participant regularly to ensure they are as comfortable as possible, and 
cameras inside the scanner ensure operators can observe behavioural cues.  
 A final challenge with regards to conducting fMRI with young participants is 
recruitment. The requirement that participants have no metal in their body can be a 
particular challenge when the target age group is adolescents, many of whom have braces 
at this age. In addition, parents can sometimes have concerns about the participation of 
their child, and therefore not agree to their child’s participation, even if the child is keen. 
Finally, the loud scanner or the clinical atmosphere can be off-putting to young 
participants who may not have been fully aware of what the study entailed until arrival at 
the scanner suite, and who may then decide not to take part. This possibility can be 
reduced by describing the procedure in detail to the parent or guardian, and providing 
videos for the participant to watch in advance of making their decision. Some labs also 
have pretend scanners, where participants can get used to the environment before going 
into the main scanner, and practice lying still to the required degree. The youngest 
participants tested for this thesis were 11 years of age, so this process was not used. 
 
 Having described the features of the main tasks, and considered the use of fMRI, 
the thesis will now move on to the experimental chapters. The first experimental chapter 
describes a behavioural study seeking to establish to the association between science and 
maths reasoning and inhibitory control.  
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Chapter 3 Behavioural study 1: Inhibitory control in 
science and maths 
 
3.1 Overview 
When reasoning about counterintuitive concepts, inhibitory control is thought to 
enable the suppression of incorrect concepts. This study investigated the association 
between inhibitory control and counterintuitive science and maths reasoning in 
adolescents (N = 90, 11-15 years). The novel science and maths task measured reasoning 
about counterintuitive concepts, where misconceptions may be held, that are part of the 
school curriculum. Both response and semantic inhibition were associated with 
counterintuitive science and maths reasoning, when controlling for age, general cognitive 
ability and performance in control science and maths trials. Better response inhibition was 
associated with longer reaction times (RTs) in counterintuitive trials, while better 
semantic inhibition was associated with higher accuracy in counterintuitive trials. This 
novel finding suggests that different aspects of inhibitory control may offer unique 
contributions to reasoning about misconceptions during adolescence and provides support 
for the hypothesis that inhibitory control plays a role in science and maths reasoning. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
According to the traditional view of learning, prior knowledge is replaced or 
reorganised when new information is learnt (Posner et al., 1982; Vosniadou, 2007). A 
more recent theory suggests that in fact prior knowledge remains, and must be inhibited, 
along with any misleading perceptual cues or naïve theories, in order to reason effectively 
in science and maths (Dunbar et al., 2007; Houdé, 2000; Mareschal, 2016). Inhibitory 
control requirements are thought to be especially great during counterintuitive reasoning, 
where intuitive responses may interfere with reasoning. Brain regions associated with 
inhibitory control are recruited in adults when reasoning about misconceptions (Brault 
Foisy et al., 2015; Masson et al., 2014), while the mechanisms are not yet well understood 
in adolescents. Behavioural research has linked individual differences in inhibitory 
control to performance in science and maths in adolescence (Gilmore et al., 2015; Khng 
& Lee, 2009) but there has been no examination of its association with reasoning about 
counterintuitive concepts specifically. 
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An understanding of the mechanisms underlying counterintuitive reasoning during 
adolescence is important because adolescents are faced with increasingly complex science 
and maths concepts (some of which can be counterintuitive) through compulsory school 
curricula (Department for Education, 2013b, 2013a). This is also a time when inhibitory 
control abilities and their neural correlates undergo protracted development (Humphrey & 
Dumontheil, 2016; Ordaz et al., 2013). It is unclear whether response or semantic 
inhibition is most important for effective reasoning about counterintuitive concepts in 
adolescence, since studies tend to focus on one measure of inhibitory control. This 
distinction is important in considering how best to inform teaching and learning practices. 
If response inhibition is most important, it may be that encouraging physical stopping of a 
response would help most, while an approach that increases consideration of different 
possible answers might help most if semantic inhibition is most important.  
The current study therefore aimed to investigate the association between 
inhibitory control and counterintuitive science and maths reasoning in 11- to 15-year-
olds, roughly corresponding to the Key Stage 3 curriculum. The youngest participants 
were in Year 7 which is the first year of secondary school and the start of the Key Stage 3 
curriculum. The oldest participants were in Year 10 and had completed the Key Stage 3 
curriculum. The problems presented could therefore relate to Key Stage 3 and be suitable 
for all participants, with improvements in performance expected with age. 
It was hypothesised that better semantic inhibitory control, evidenced by less 
interference effect on accuracy and RT in the numerical Stroop task, would allow 
participants to better solve the conflict between the intuitive response and the correct 
answer, and that they would therefore show more accurate and faster responses on 
misconception problems, relative to control problems, which were designed to not 
involve misconceptions but target similar science and maths topics. It was also 
hypothesised that better response inhibition, evidenced by higher accuracy in simple and 
complex No-Go trials, would be associated with better misconception performance, by 
limiting impulsive responses. It was hypothesised that these associations would be 
specific to counterintuitive reasoning, with lower associations between science and maths 
performance in control trials and inhibitory control. There were no hypotheses as to 
which type of inhibitory control would be most predictive of misconception performance, 
so this was examined in an exploratory manner. As science and maths problem-solving 
typically requires the maintenance of some information in working memory, and as 
misconceptions in particular may elicit competition between, and comparison of, intuitive 
and counterintuitive responses in working memory, it was finally hypothesised that 
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performance in complex No-Go trials would show a greater association with science and 




Ninety pupils with no known neurological or developmental disorders, from an 
English state secondary school where most students are from minority ethnic heritages, 
and the proportion of free school meals (determined by parental income-related benefits) 
is well above average, took part. Letters were sent to parents of 11- to 15-year-olds (in 
Years 7 to 10), inviting their children participate. Written informed parental consent was 
obtained, where parents confirmed that their children had no known neurological or 
developmental disorders. Participants aged 11 or 12 years verbally consented, while 13- 
to 15-year-olds provided written consent, in accordance with the guidelines of the local 
ethics committee, which approved the study. For simplicity of reporting, age groups are 
referred to according to the mean age of the group (for example, 12y refers to 12-year-
olds, the Year 7 participants whose ages ranged between 11.75 and 12.67).  
 
3.3.2 Tasks 
3.3.2.1 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
The Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests of the WASI-II (Wechsler, 2011) 
were administered using the stimulus book, to control for the contribution of general 
cognitive ability to science and maths performance (Table 3.1). The Vocabulary subtest 
requires participants to explain the meaning of words, while the Matrix Reasoning subtest 
requires participants to choose the picture that completes a pattern. 
 
Table 3.1. Participant characteristics. Age groups did not differ in WASI Vocabulary, p’s > .2. 






Age group n M (SD) Range n M (SD) M (SD) 
12y 25 12.14 
 
11.75-12.67 13:12 33.01 (3.51) 19.00 (3.46) 
13y 25 13.26 
 
12.75-13.75 17:8 33.12 (3.69) 18.12 (3.14) 
14y 21 14.32 
 
13.92-14.75 9:12 33.71 (5.02) 19.67 (2.92) 
15y 19 15.21 
 
14.75-15.75 12:7 35.26 (3.21) 18.32 (4.06) 
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3.3.2.2 Science and maths misconceptions 
 The science and maths misconceptions task was administered on a laptop (see 
Methods section 2.1 for details). Participants were presented with science and maths 
statements, mostly accompanied with a picture, and were asked to indicate whether the 
statement was correct or incorrect. Half were misconception problems, and half were 
control problems, where no counterintuitive reasoning was anticipated. In addition, half 
of the problems were true and half were false. Note that it was anticipated that the true 
problems might be easier to answer correctly. No practice was given but participants were 
shown an example screen containing one control problem that was not included in the 
main trial. 
 
3.3.2.3 Inhibitory control 
The simple and complex Go/No-Go and numerical Stroop were administered on a 
laptop (see Methods section 2.2 for details). The Go/No-Go, measuring response 
inhibition, required participants to press the left or right key in response to Go trials, and 
to withhold their response for No-Go trials. In the complex version, a small working 
memory load was introduced as the previous trial had to be kept in mind in order to 
respond correctly. In the numerical Stroop, participants pressed a key to indicate how 
many numbers were shown on the screen, not responding to the number represented by 
the digits themselves. In congruent trials, the number matched the digit (e.g. ‘2 2’), and in 
incongruent trials they did not match (e.g. ‘3 3 3 3’). 
 
3.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested in a quiet space in school for approximately 45 min 
during the school day. The experimenter described each computerised task, emphasising 
that responses should be given as quickly and accurately as possible. The tasks were 
performed in the following order: simple Go/No-Go, complex Go/No-Go, numerical 
Stroop, science and maths misconceptions, WASI Vocabulary, and WASI Matrix 
Reasoning. Participants were given no results, and no rewards for taking part, and it was 





3.3.4 Statistical analysis 
Examination of boxplots across tasks showed outliers, so exclusionary criteria 
were put in place before analysis commenced. Participants whose mean accuracy or RT 
was further than ±3.29 standard deviations (SDs) away from the group mean were 
excluded from analyses of the task on which they were an outlier, as standardised scores 
outside that range are cause for concern (Field, 2012). Effect sizes are reported as partial 
eta squared (ηp2). Main effects of Age group were followed up with three planned tests 
assessing differences between 12y and 15y, 13y and 15y, and 14y and 15y, since the 
greatest differences were anticipated in comparison to the oldest group who had covered 
all concepts.  
In the science and maths misconceptions task analysis, three participants were 
excluded due to low accuracy (one 13y) or slow RT (one 12y, one 13y), leaving a final N 
= 87 participants. Two (Trial type: control, misconception) x two (Discipline: science, 
maths) x two (Statement type: true, false) x four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) mixed 
model repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed on accuracy 
and RT.  
Three participants were excluded from the simple Go/No-Go analysis because of 
low accuracy (one 12y, one 13y) or high RT (one 12y) leaving a final N = 87 participants. 
Two participants were excluded from the complex Go/No-Go analysis, because of low 
accuracy (one 12y) or an inability to pass the practice (one 12y), leaving a final N = 88 
participants. Four participants were excluded from the Stroop analysis because of low 
accuracy (one 12y, one 13y) or because they were unable to perform the two-handed task 
due to a hand injury (one 13y, one 15y), leaving a final N = 86 participants. Two (Trial 
type: Go, No-Go or congruent, incongruent) x four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) 
mixed model repeated measures ANOVAs were run on accuracy scores in each of the 
three tasks and on RT in the Stroop task. One-way ANOVAs examined the effect of Age 
group (12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) on Go RT in the simple and complex Go/No-Go tasks 
separately. 
Participants excluded from any individual task analysis were also excluded from 
the regression analyses (final ns: 12y: n = 20, 13y: n = 22, 14y: n = 21, 15y: n = 18), 
leaving a total N = 81 participants. Correlations were run between the variables of interest 
to examine collinearity and assess associations between measures across the whole 
sample. Hierarchical multiple regressions first investigated the contribution of inhibitory 
control to general science and maths performance, and then investigated whether 
inhibitory control variables could explain individual differences in science and maths 
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misconception accuracy and RT specifically, while accounting for performance in control 
trials.  
The first regression models included science and maths overall accuracy and RT 
as dependent variables. The control variables were inserted using the enter function in 
block 1: age in months, and WASI Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning raw scores. These 
variables were expected to have an influence on the outcome measure, but were not the 
primary predictive variables of interest. Raw WASI scores were entered rather than 
standardised scores so that scores were directly comparable across ages. Standardised 
scores were not included since age was controlled for separately through entering age in 
months, and the inspection of standardised scores was not of specific interest in this study 
of participants with no known disorders. Go/No-Go variables were entered stepwise in 
block 2: simple No-Go accuracy, complex No-Go accuracy, simple Go accuracy, 
complex Go accuracy, simple Go RT, complex Go RT. Stroop variables were entered 
stepwise in block 3: accuracy cost (congruent minus incongruent), RT cost (incongruent 
minus congruent), congruent accuracy, and congruent RT.  
The second regression models investigated misconception accuracy and RT. 
Again the control variables were inserted using the enter function in block 1: age in 
months, WASI Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning raw scores, and this time including 
science and maths control performance (accuracy or RT). The same Go/No-Go variables 
were entered stepwise in block 2, and Stroop variables were entered stepwise in block 3.  
Inclusion of separate Go/No-Go and Stroop blocks allowed for investigation of 
variance explained individually by response and semantic inhibition. Stepwise entry and 
the inclusion of variables that do not necessarily reflect inhibition (such as Go accuracy or 
congruent Stroop RT) enabled examination of the possibility that general processing 
speed or accuracy alone were the most important predictors of performance, rather than 
inhibition per se. 
Follow up exploratory regressions were run on science and maths separately 
where there were significant inhibitory control predictors, to examine possible discipline-
specific effects and to explore whether directions of association were consistent. All 
follow up models included the control variables and the inhibitory control variables 





3.4.1 Science and maths misconceptions 
In line with the design of this task, participants tended to give the correct answer 
in control trials, with a mean accuracy of 82.2%, while they made more errors on 
misconception trials, where the mean accuracy was 54.7%. While this is close to chance 
performance (50%), the range of mean accuracy on individual misconception problems 
suggests that participants did not consistently guess across all problems, demonstrating 
that participants answered correctly more often on some trials than others (Figure 3.1). 
This indicates that the accuracy in misconception trials is not attributable to chance 
performance (guesses) on all problems.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Histogram of mean accuracy in the 96 science and maths misconception problems. 
 
A two (Trial type: control, misconception) x two (Discipline: science, maths) x 
two (Statement type: true, false) x four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) mixed model 
repeated measures ANOVA performed on accuracy showed main effects of Trial type and 
Statement type, with greater accuracy in control compared to misconception trials, and 





Table 3.2. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the science and maths misconceptions 
task. 
  Accuracy (%) RT (ms) 
  M (SE) M (SE) 
Main effects    
Trial type  
F(1, 83) = 816.73,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .908 
F(1, 83) = 310.32,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .789 
 Control  82.2 (0.8) 5156 (134) 
 Misconception  54.7 (0.9) 6683 (190) 
Discipline  n.s., p = .367 
F(1, 83) = 55.73,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .402 
 Science  68.1 (0.9) 5598 (147) 
 Maths  68.9 (0.7) 6240 (180) 
Statement type  
F(1, 83) = 38.64,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .318 
F(1, 83) = 5.26,  
p = .024, ηp2 = .060 
 True  72.5 (0.8) 5837 (158) 
 False  64.4 (1.1) 6002 (168) 
Age group  
F(3, 83) = 5.61,  
p = .001, ηp2 = .169 
n.s., p = .631 
 12y  65.3 (1.3) 6149 (301) 
 13y  66.5 (1.3) 5856 (307) 
 14y  69.2 (1.4) 6073 (322) 
 15y  72.8 (1.5) 5601 (338) 
Interaction effects 
Trial type Statement type 
F(1, 83) = 11,48,  
p = .001, ηp2 = .121 
n.s., p = .076 
 Control 
 True 84.8 (0.9) 4986 (136) 
 False 79.6 (1.1) 5327 (153) 
 Misconception 
 True 60.2 (1.1) 6688 (199) 
 False 49.3 (1.4) 6678 (204) 
Discipline Statement type 
F(1, 83) = 67.73,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .449 
F(1, 83) = 14.15,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .146 
 Science 
 True 75.8 (1.1) 5406 (146) 
 False 60.3 (1.4) 5791 (159) 
 Maths 
 True 69.3 (0.9) 6268 (181) 
 False 68.5 (1.1) 6214 (193) 
 
These main effects were modulated by a significant interaction between Trial type 
and Statement type (Table 3.2), which was followed up with two repeated measures 
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ANOVAs on control and misconception accuracy. The interaction was attributable to less 
difference in accuracy between true and false statements in control trials, F(1,83) = 11.33,  
p = .001, ηp2 = .120, compared to misconception trials, F(1,83) = 28.57,  p < .001, ηp2 = 
.256. There was an additional significant interaction between Discipline and Statement 
type, whereby the difference between true and false statements was significant for science 
trials, F(1,83) = 84.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .505, but not maths trials, p = .629 (Table 3.2). 
There was a main effect of Age group on accuracy, F(3, 83) = 5.61, p = .001, ηp2 = .169. 
Follow-up planned comparisons revealed significant differences between 12y and 15y, p 
< .001, 13y and 15y, p = .002, and marginal differences between 14y and 15y, p = .077, 
each of which demonstrated increasing accuracy with age (Table 3.2). 
There was a significant interaction between Discipline and Age group F(3, 83) = 
3.68, p = .015, ηp2 = .117. Follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs performed separately 
in each Discipline showed a significant effect of Age group for science trials F(3, 83) = 
4.95, p = .003, ηp2 = .152 and maths trials F(3, 83) = 5.15, p = .003, ηp2 = .157. 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons (Figure 3.2) revealed significant increases in 
accuracy between 12y and 15y in science, p = .043, and maths, p = .002, and between 13y 
and 15y in science, p = .002. 
 
 
The same ANOVA was performed on RT. There were main effects of Trial type, 
Discipline, and Statement type, with longer RTs in maths compared to science trials, 
Figure 3.2. Accuracy estimated marginal means in science and maths trials by age. Dark bars 
represent science, light bars represent maths. *,** indicate p < .05 and p < .01 respectively.  
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misconception compared to control trials, and false compared to true trials (Table 3.2). 
There was no main effect of Age group on RT. As with the accuracy analyses, there was a 
significant interaction between Discipline and Statement type, which was followed up 
with two further repeated measures ANOVAs. There was a significant difference between 
true and false statements for science, F(1,83) = 20.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .198, with longer 
RTs for false trials (Table 3.2), while there was no significant difference between true 
and false trials for maths, p = .589. No other interaction was significant, p’s > .1. 
In summary, the main finding of interest was lower accuracy and longer RTs in 
misconception compared to control trials. This is consistent with the hypothesis and 
design of the paradigm, since it was anticipated that intuitive responses would be 
incorrect and reasoning would take longer in misconception trials. Lower accuracy and 
longer RTs were also found for false statements compared to true statements in science, 
but not maths. Maths RTs were longer than science RTs overall. Finally, improved 
performance with age was reflected in accuracy only and more prolonged in science than 
maths.  
 
3.4.2 Inhibitory control 
Mixed repeated measures ANOVAs performed on accuracy in the Go/No-Go 
tasks revealed a main effect of Trial type for both the simple and complex tasks, with 
higher accuracy for Go trials than No-Go trials (Table 3.3). On average, 53% of Go 
errors were omissions. There was a main effect of Age group on accuracy for the simple 
Go/No-Go task only, and planned post-hoc comparisons revealed a significant difference 
between 12y and 15y, p = .029 (other p’s > .70).  
Similarly, one-way ANOVAs revealed a marginal effect of Age group on RT in 
the simple task only (Table 3.3). Planned post-hoc comparisons showed a significant 
difference between 12y and 15y, p = .020, and between 13y and 15y, p = .023, but only 
marginally between 14y and 15y, p = .090. In all cases, RTs were faster in the older age 
group. 
In the numerical Stroop task, the repeated measures ANOVAs revealed a 
significant main effect of Trial type for both accuracy and RT (Table 3.3) with greater 
accuracy and faster RTs for congruent trials than incongruent trials. There was also a 
main effect of Age group on accuracy, but not RT. Post-hoc comparisons showed 
significantly poorer accuracy at 12y than 15y only, p = .013 (all other p’s > .92). The 
interaction between Trial type and Age group was not significant, p = .622. 
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Table 3.3. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the inhibitory control tasks. Note that 








M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Accuracy (%)    
Trial type 
F(1, 83) = 93.37,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .529 
F(1, 84) = 183.31,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .686 
F(1, 82) = 224.29,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .732 
 Go/Congruent 96.4 (0.4) 84.5 (1.0) 96.1 (0.4) 
 No-Go/Incongruent 84.7 (1.3) 53.6 (2.0) 80.1 (1.2) 
Age group 
F(3, 83) = 3.16,  
p = .029, ηp2 = .102 
n.s, p = .725 
F(3, 82) = 3.58,  
p = .017, ηp2 = .116 
 12y 86.7 (1.4) 69.2 (2.2) 84.3 (1.3) 
 13y 91.5 (1.4) 67.7 (2.1) 89.2 (1.3) 
 14y 92.4 (1.5) 68.2 (2.3) 89.5 (1.4) 
 15y 91.4 (1.6) 71.3 (2.5) 89.4 (1.5) 
RT (ms)      
Trial type - - 
F(1, 82) = 426.67,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .839 
 Go/Congruent 346 (3) 400 (6) 671 (9) 
 No-Go/Incongruent - - 779 (11) 
Age group 
F(3, 83) = 2.36,  
p = .078 
n.s., p = .530 n.s., p = .122 
 12y 354 (7) 400 (11) 745 (18) 
 13y 353 (7) 399 (10) 752 (19) 
 14y 348 (7) 413 (11) 700 (20) 
 15y 330 (7) 388 (12) 703 (21) 
 
In summary, No-Go errors (commissions) were more common than Go errors 
(omissions and incorrect side judgements) in both Go/No-Go tasks. Accuracy in the 
Stroop task was higher and correct responses faster in congruent than incongruent trials. 
There were age effects for accuracy on the simple Go/No-Go task, and the Stroop, with 
better performance in the oldest age group compared to the youngest age groups. 
 
3.4.3 Regression analyses 
Correlations between the variables of interest were examined (Table 3.4) and 





Table 3.4. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths combined. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations are 
highlighted in bold; a,b,c indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively.   
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Misconception accuracy                 
2. Misconception RT .04                
3. Control accuracy .39c .22               
4. Control RT -.01 .89c .05              
5. Age (months) .38c -.11 .27a -.16             
6. WASI Vocabulary .31b -.04 .51c -.14 .21a            
7. WASI Matrix Reasoning .13 .21a .21 .14 -.02 .15           
8. Simple No-Go accuracy .17 -.24a .02 -.18 .21 -.01 -.20          
9. Complex No-Go accuracy .03 .09 .07 .01 -.04 .09 -.09 .18         
10. Simple Go accuracy .13 -.14 .14 -.12 .15 .06 .00 .48c .10        
11. Complex Go accuracy .24a -.04 .12 -.08 .18 .06 .13 .00 -.09 .10       
12. Simple Go RT -.13 .24a -.24a .35b -.33b -.16 -.22a .11 .07 -.19 -.21a      
13. Complex Go RT -.04 .22a -.10 .31b -.07 -.15 -.10 .28b .13 .07 -.23a .66c     
14. Stroop accuracy cost .03 -.03 -.04 -.05 -.04 -.12 .06 -.25a -.19 -.03 .13 .28b -.21    
15. Stroop RT cost -.16 .06 -.05 .09 .06 -.09 -.05 .14 -.18 -.05 -.07 .15 .06 -.11   
16. Stroop congruent accuracy .20 -.10 .23a -.08 .42c .05 -.07 .48c .10 .36c -.01 .11 .24a -.27a -.29b  
17. Stroop congruent RT -.06 .14 -.14 .22a -.23a -.15 -.13 -.02 -.04 -.23a -.12 .56c .44c -.26a .01 .05 
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An initial hierarchical multiple regression (Table 3.5) investigated whether 
inhibitory control measures could account for variance in science and maths accuracy 
overall. Model 1 was significant, explaining 34% of the variance, with age and WASI 
Vocabulary both significant predictors of accuracy. No inhibitory control variables were 
selected by a second model. The second hierarchical multiple regression (Table 3.5) 
examined whether inhibitory control could account for variance in science and maths RT 
overall. Model 2a was not significant, while model 2b was significant, explaining 14% of 
the variance, with both WASI Matrix Reasoning and Simple Go RT significant 
predictors. Simple Go RT uniquely predicted 10% of the variance in science and maths 
RT. Since this measure is thought to reflect general RT as opposed to inhibitory control 
per se, this association was not followed up. 
 
Table 3.5. Regression models for science and maths overall performance. Significant predictors 
(p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science and maths accuracy 
Model 1 
F(3, 77) = 13.06, 
p < .001, R2 = 34% 
Constant  1.87 .064 
Age (months) .30 3.16 .002 
WASI Vocabulary raw .40 4.20 < .001 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .13 1.36 .177 
Science and maths RT 
Model 2a 
F(3, 77) = 1.07, 
p = .366, R2 = 4% 
Constant  2.74 .008 
Age (months) -.07 -0.58 .566 
WASI Vocabulary raw -.07 -0.59 .555 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .18 1.60 .114 
Model 2b 
F(4, 76) = 3.19, 
 p = .018, R2 = 14%, 
ΔR2 = 10.4% 
Constant  -0.56 .577 
Age (months) .03 0.26 .799 
WASI Vocabulary raw -.04 -0.32 .748 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .27 2.43 .017 
Simple Go RT .35 3.03 .003 
 
A third hierarchical multiple regression (Table 3.6) investigated whether 
inhibitory control measures could account for science and maths misconception accuracy. 
The first model (3a) with age, WASI Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning raw scores, and 
science and maths control accuracy as predictors, was significant, explaining 26% of the 
variance. Age and science and maths control accuracy were significant predictors of 
misconception accuracy. Stroop RT cost was selected using a stepwise approach in model 
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3b, uniquely accounting for 5% of the variance. Greater Stroop RT cost was associated 
with lower misconception accuracy. No Go/No-Go variables were selected by the model. 
 
Table 3.6. Regression models for science and maths misconceptions. Significant predictors (p < 
.05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science and maths misconception accuracy 
Model 3a 
F(4, 76) = 6.61, 
p < .001, R2 = 26% 
Constant  -0.62 .535 
Age (months) .29 2.83 .006 
WASI Vocabulary raw .10 0.85 .397 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .09 0.87 .389 
Science and maths control accuracy .26 2.22  .029 
Model 3b 
F(5, 75) = 6.68, 
p < .001, R2 = 31%, 
ΔR2 = 5.0% 
  
Constant   -0.24 .812 
Age (months) .30 3.02 .004 
WASI Vocabulary raw .08 0.71 .482 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .09 0.87 .389 
Science and maths control accuracy .26 2.28 .026 
Stroop RT cost -.22 -2.33 .023 
Science and maths misconception RT 
Model 4a 
F(4, 76) = 101.52, 
p < .001, R2 = 84% 
Constant  -1.37 .174 
Age (months) -.01 -0.23 .819 
WASI Vocabulary raw .09 1.89 .063 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .07 1.46 .148 
Science and maths control RT .911 19.61 < .001 
Model 4b 
F(5, 75) = 86.61, 
 p < .001, R2 = 85%, 
ΔR2 = 1.0% 
 
Constant  -1.73 .088 
Age (months) -.01 -0.12 .908 
WASI Vocabulary raw .08 1.66 .101 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .07 1.48 .143 
Science and maths control RT .91 20.05 < .001 
Complex No-Go accuracy .10 2.26 .027 
 
The fourth regression investigated misconception RT. The first model (4a) with 
age, WASI Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning raw scores, and science and maths control 
RT as predictors, was significant, explaining 84% of the variance. Only science and 
maths control RT was a significant predictor of misconception RT. Complex No-Go 
accuracy was selected in model 4b, uniquely accounting for 1% of the variance. Greater 
complex No-Go accuracy was associated with higher misconception RT. No Stroop 
variables were selected by the model. 
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Follow up exploratory regressions (Table 3.7) examined the extent to which these 
associations held for science and maths individually. Stroop RT cost was not a significant 
predictor of science (model 5) or maths (model 6) misconception accuracy, although the 
p-values were at trend and the coefficients were in the same direction as the combined 
analyses. Complex Go/No-Go accuracy was not a significant predictor of science (model 
7) or maths (model 8) misconception RT. This time the coefficient was positive for 
maths, as with the combined analyses, but negative for science. 
 
Table 3.7. Regression models for science and maths misconceptions separately. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science misconception accuracy 
Model 5 
F(5, 75) = 4.21, 
p = .002, R2 = 22% 
  
Constant  -0.21 .904 
Age (months) .21 2.00 .049 
WASI Vocabulary raw -.02 -0.19 .849 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .00 0.00 .999 
Science control accuracy .35 2.98 .004 
Stroop RT cost -.18 -1.77 .080 
Maths misconception accuracy 
Model 6 
F(5, 75) = 3.98, 
p = .003, R2 = 21% 
Constant  0.05 .961 
Age (months) .27 2.52 .014 
WASI Vocabulary raw .15 1.30 .199 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .15 1.42 .160 
Maths control accuracy .09 0.76 .452 
Stroop RT cost -.18 -1.76 .083 
Science misconception RT 
Model 7 
F(5, 75) = 32.84, 
p < .001, R2 = 69% 
Constant  -0.11 .915 
Age (months) .08 1.28 .203 
WASI Vocabulary raw .03 0.37 .711 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .01 0.14 .890 
Science control RT .84 12.43 < .001 
Complex No-Go accuracy -.10 -1.55 .124 
Maths misconception RT 
Model 8 
F(5, 75) = 43.02, 
p < .001, R2 = 74% 
Constant  -0.79 .430 
Age (months) -.08 -1.31 .195 
WASI Vocabulary raw .11 1.78 .079 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .11 1.86 .067 
Maths control RT .83 13.96 < .001 




In summary, the regression analyses revealed unique roles for response and 
semantic inhibition in reasoning about science and maths misconceptions. Both response 
inhibition (complex No-Go accuracy) and semantic inhibition (Stroop RT cost) were 
predictors of performance when science and maths misconceptions were combined. 
Proficiency in semantic inhibition was more important for predicting misconception 
accuracy, while proficient response inhibition was more important for predicting longer 
RTs when addressing misconception problems. When disciplines were analysed 
separately the association with complex No-Go accuracy was similar, albeit at trend level, 
for science and maths, while the association with Stroop RT cost was inconsistent. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
The current study investigated the role of inhibitory control in counterintuitive 
science and maths reasoning in adolescence. It was hypothesised that better inhibitory 
control would be associated with better performance in science and maths misconception 
problems, when controlling for performance on related problems, age, and general 
cognitive ability. Ninety adolescents were tested on response and semantic inhibition and 
a novel science and maths misconceptions task. Both response and semantic inhibition 
were associated with performance in science and maths misconception trials, beyond 
performance in control trials and individual differences in general cognitive ability or age. 
This was the first study to consider the unique roles of response and semantic inhibition 
in this context, demonstrating that response inhibition may be more related to RTs in 
counterintuitive reasoning, while semantic inhibition may be more related to accuracy.  
As anticipated, accuracy was lower and RTs slower for misconception trials, 
indicating that reasoning about counterintuitive curriculum-related concepts leads to 
misconceptions in this age group, even in the oldest participants who should have a good 
understanding of these concepts having covered them all at school. Only small age effects 
were observed, in line with standardised assessment findings that only small 
improvements are made in maths within this age range (Ryan & Williams, 2007). 
The reduction in accuracy in false trials compared to true trials was greater for 
misconception than control trials, which may be due to increased cognitive demand in 
false trials. To arrive at the correct response, the participant must first read the statement 
and detect an error, then possibly generate the true statement internally before deciding 
that the statement presented is false. This may explain why it is easier to answer a true 
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statement correctly, especially if it is counterintuitive. This pattern of performance was 
observed in science trials only, which may be explained by the inclusion in maths of nine 
problem-sets containing equations, where both true and false trials require a mental 
calculation, which should limit any specific increase in cognitive demand for false trials. 
It should also be noted that a higher proportion of science trials were accompanied by a 
picture (79% versus 50%) which cannot be ruled out as a source of difference between 
the two disciplines. 
Overall, these findings support the previous literature that misconceptions due to 
intuitive reasoning exist in this age range (Driver et al., 2015; Stavy & Tirosh, 2000). 
Although the task was novel and thus has not been extensively validated, the inclusion of 
problems that cover the curriculum broadly is a strength of the study, allowing greater 
generalisation and relevance for education. 
The inhibitory control tasks showed a degree of improvement with age, echoing 
findings in the literature (Leon-Carrion et al., 2004). Some measures of inhibitory control 
were moderately correlated with each other, with the highest correlations between RT 
measures, likely representing processing speed (Kail, 1993) rather than inhibition per se. 
There was a marginal negative correlation between the two inhibitory control measures 
that were selected by the regression model: higher complex response inhibition accuracy 
was associated with lower semantic inhibition RT cost. This suggests that response and 
semantic inhibition are partially related, in keeping with the previous literature 
(Verbruggen et al., 2004), whereby the ability to make less impulsive motor responses is 
linked to the ability to suppress irrelevant stimuli with less interference. 
Both response and semantic inhibition were associated with science and maths 
misconception performance when controlling for age, general cognitive ability, and 
control performance. In line with the hypothesis, a smaller difference in RT between 
incongruent and congruent Stroop trials, suggesting less interference and better semantic 
inhibition, was associated with higher accuracy on misconception trials. These results fit 
with the proposal that semantic inhibition may allow suppression of naïve beliefs or 
irrelevant perceptual information in order to reach the correct answer to counterintuitive 
problems. Although the amount of variance explained was small, it is still meaningful 
given that the model controlled for age, general cognitive ability (verbal and non-verbal), 
and performance in related science and maths control trials. The fact that the association 
is observed after inclusion of control trials as a covariate in the analyses is consistent with 
the idea that semantic inhibitory control may play a specific (or more important) role in 
science and maths counterintuitive reasoning rather than science and maths reasoning 
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more broadly. This interpretation is bolstered by the regression analyses of overall 
science and maths performance which showed no significant inhibitory control predictors 
for accuracy. For RT, Simple Go RT was a significant predictor, but this measure is not 
thought to be an inhibitory control measure per se, rather it appears to represent an overall 
speed of response factor. 
The ability to withhold a response in the complex Go/No-Go task was associated 
with longer RTs on misconception trials. Therefore, contrary to the hypothesis, good 
response inhibition was not associated with better performance in the science and maths 
misconceptions task. However, a possible interpretation is that good response inhibition 
may afford more time for consideration of the response, with a less impulsive pattern of 
responding. Individuals may not necessarily eventually choose the correct response, but 
they may be able to spend more time thinking about their response and evaluate 
competing alternative answers. 
The complex Go/No-Go measured inhibitory control within the context of a 
cognitive load. The regression model’s selection of a complex rather than simple Go/No-
Go variable implicates individual differences in the ability to manage combined response 
inhibition and working memory demands. The use of this ability is exemplified by a 
maths misconception problem that requires counting items and calculating probabilities, 
and holding this information in mind while considering how it applies to the statement. 
This account is consistent with suggestions that beliefs must be held in working memory 
during reasoning, before the incorrect response is inhibited (Zaitchik et al., 2014). 
Measuring a purer form of working memory in a separate task would enable assessment 
of the extent to which working memory makes a unique contribution outside of the 
context of inhibitory control (see Chapters 4, 6 and 7). 
The discipline-specific analyses had reduced power due to the smaller number of 
trials, in addition to the different number of pictures within the stimuli, so must be 
interpreted cautiously. There were also fewer maths problems than science problems. The 
results overall suggest that misconceptions in science and maths show similar 
associations to semantic inhibition, with potentially different associations with response 
inhibition: higher complex No-Go accuracy was associated with shorter responses in 
science but longer responses in maths. However, these exploratory analyses did not reach 
significance so further research would be necessary to determine discipline-specific 
associations.  
The associations seen in this novel study suggest that both response inhibition and 
semantic inhibition play unique roles in counterintuitive science and maths reasoning 
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problems that are curriculum-related. The study provides further evidence that poor 
reasoning partly reflects poor inhibitory control as opposed to simply poor logic or 
understanding. An examination of the neural correlates of counterintuitive reasoning in 
adolescence would reveal more about the cognitive mechanisms involved (see Chapter 
5). 
 
The thesis will next consider learning of counterintuitive concepts in science and 
maths, as opposed to reasoning about them. Chapter 4 describes two classroom-based 
studies that attempted to establish the extent to which inhibitory control is related to the 




Chapter 4 Classroom studies: Inhibitory control in 
science and maths learning 
 
4.1 Overview 
Behavioural and neuroimaging research suggests that inhibitory control is an 
important factor in counterintuitive science and maths reasoning, and by extension, 
learning. The current studies sought to investigate the role of inhibitory control in 
learning new counterintuitive concepts in the classroom, in an attempt to bring the 
research closer to educational practice. Working memory was also considered, to 
establish whether it would have a unique role in learning counterintuitive material, 
beyond inhibition. In study A, 12- and 13-year-olds (N = 48) were taught two new 
counterintuitive physics concepts in their normal school lessons, and in study B, 13- and 
14-year-olds (N = 69) were taught a new counterintuitive maths concept in their normal 
school lesson. Inhibitory control did not associate with misconception presence one week 
before the lessons, one week following the lessons, nor one month later in either study. 
However, response inhibition and working memory were associated with better 
performance on control maths questions. The studies highlight the difficulties in 
conducting classroom-based research, and tentatively suggest that inhibitory control may 
be more important for reasoning about counterintuitive concepts that are already learnt as 
opposed to during the acquisition of new counterintuitive concepts. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
 The behavioural study presented in Chapter 3 demonstrated that both response 
and semantic inhibitory control were predictors of performance in misconception 
problems. This provided further evidence for the idea that inhibitory control enables the 
suppression of incorrect responses during science and maths reasoning. In addition to 
assisting in-the-moment reasoning, inhibitory control is thought to have a role in the 
learning of new counterintuitive concepts through the same mechanism of suppressing 
conflicting prior knowledge or perceptual information (Mareschal, 2016). While there are 
a number of studies investigating links between inhibitory control and science and maths 
reasoning, there have been relatively few attempts to examine inhibitory control in the 
learning of new information. 
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 Notable examples investigated inhibitory control and other executive functions in 
the learning of new biology (Rhodes et al., 2014) and chemistry (Rhodes et al., 2016) 
concepts. Participants were aged 12 to 13 years and both studies took the same approach. 
In biology, participants were taught about DNA, and in chemistry, participants were 
taught about acids and alkalis. Each teaching session lasted 45 min, and included taught 
material and a practical session. Following the lesson, participants completed an 
assessment that covered facts taught in the lesson as well as conceptual understanding 
that required problem-solving. Inhibitory control (the stop signal task), spatial working 
memory, attention set-shifting, and planning were all measured prior to the lesson to 
examine how each of these could predict science outcomes. In biology, planning 
predicted performance on the factual part of the assessment, while working memory and 
planning both predicted the conceptual part of the assessment (Rhodes et al., 2014). In 
chemistry, there were no significant predictors of the factual part of the assessment, while 
working memory and attention set-shifting predicted the conceptual part of the 
assessment (Rhodes et al., 2016). These findings suggest that inhibitory control may not 
be important in learning new concepts, and that there may be different patterns of 
association for different science disciplines. Working memory may be a common 
important factor that contributes to both biology and chemistry learning. However, these 
studies did not look at counterintuitive concepts, so it remains possible that inhibitory 
control would contribute to learning new science and maths material where 
misconceptions may be present. There is also the possibility that semantic inhibition 
might play a more important role in learning than response inhibition, which was 
measured in the studies from Rhodes and colleagues (2014, 2016).  
The aim of the current studies was to assess the extent to which inhibitory control 
associates with the learning of new counterintuitive concepts in a typical classroom 
setting. In order to ensure that the studies were close to a normal school learning exercise, 
close consultation with teachers occurred during the design of the studies, which also 
ensured that participants had not previously encountered the material at school. Study A 
aimed to investigate the role of inhibitory control in learning new counterintuitive physics 
concepts, while study B aimed to investigate the same associations in maths. As in 
Chapter 3, both response and semantic inhibition were investigated to examine the 
possible specificity of these measures. Taking into account the studies described above, 
working memory was also measured. Since working memory was a last minute addition, 
in study A this occurred in a later testing session after the initial pre-test. The working 
memory measure was added due to the publication of other research that indicated 
105 
 
working memory was an important component in learning new material in science 
(Rhodes et al., 2014). It was considered that even though testing was at a later date, 
individual differences in working memory would likely be stable enough to relate 
meaningfully to performance in the physics tests. Finally, it was expected that the extent 
to which participants pay attention in lessons might influence performance, so 
observations of participants in their lessons took place. In both studies, it was 
hypothesised that those with better inhibitory control would be better able to suppress 
their naïve theories and reach the correct answer following a lesson on the 
counterintuitive concept. Exploratory analyses examined the role of working memory, 
and attention in classroom lessons on general measures of physics and maths 
performance. 
 
4.3 Study A: Physics 
Discussions with a school physics teacher identified two counterintuitive physics 
concepts that a) the students had not learned yet; b) students were likely to get wrong 
before receiving taught material on; c) some students were likely to keep getting wrong 
after instruction; and d) were relevant to the age group and going to be taught that year 
(Figure 4.1). These criteria were selected to ensure that the concepts were relevant to the 
participants’ normal learning, allowing conclusions to relate to the classroom, and to 
maximise variability in responses to enable assessment of individual differences. The first 
counterintuitive concept concerned gravity, and the misconception that heavier objects 
fall to the ground faster than lighter objects of the same size (the gravity misconception). 
The second counterintuitive concept was related to pressure change, and the 





Two Year 8 classes of participants at an English fee-paying independent 
secondary school where students come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and 
performance is above the national average, took part (N = 48, 22 girls, 26 boys). The age 
range was 12.75 to 13.75 years (M = 13.28, SD = 0.24). Letters were sent home to parents 
inviting their children to take part, accompanied by opt-out consent forms. Written 
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consent was obtained from participants before taking part. There was no exclusion 
criterion, and the local ethics committee approved the study. 
  
4.3.1.2 Physics lessons 
Each counterintuitive concept was addressed in a separate physics lesson. The 
lessons were designed and carried out by the teacher who usually teaches these classes 
(the same teacher for all pupils). Each lesson lasted 45 min and included taught material, 
group experiments, and worksheets, in the format of a normal school lesson. There was 
no measure of fidelity, since the teacher was asked to simply teach their lesson as they 
normally would, in order to make the lesson as close to normal practice as possible. This 
means that the pupils from one class may have had a slightly different learning 
experience to the pupils from another class, as the teacher may have adapted the teaching 
approach to better suit the pupils.   
 
4.3.1.3 Measures 
4.3.1.3.1 Physics tests 
A physics test was administered at three time points to track changes in 
counterintuitive concept understanding, as well as general physics performance (at pre-
test, post-test, and follow up). The 10 min paper and pen physics test consisted of nine 
questions: the two counterintuitive concept questions (Figure 4.1), and a range of 
questions addressing other physics topics at an appropriate level for the participants. The 
questions were a mixture of multiple choice and those requiring written answers, 
designed with the help of the teacher, including three that the teacher thought constitute 
counterintuitive concepts and four that did not. The physics teacher thought that this 
range of questions was close to mimicking a typical class test which would include 
different types of questions examining different types of content (i.e. counterintuitive and 
non-counterintuitive, and different topics in the curriculum). The order of the questions 
and of answers for the multiple choice questions of the physics test varied between the 
three time points. Responses to the gravity and pressure questions were coded with a 1 or 
































An average score for the other seven questions was also calculated and the school 
provided average physics scores and end of year physics exam results for more general 
measures of physics performance.  
 
4.3.1.3.2 Executive function tasks 
The executive function tasks were programmed in PHP and JavaScript, running in 
an Ubuntu web server with data stored using mysql. The simple and complex Go/No-Go 
tasks and numerical Stroop were administered as in the first behavioural study, but in a 
group testing session as a class, in an IT room, where each participant carried out the 
tasks on a separate computer. A brief introduction was given by the researcher, who 
explained which website to go to, as well as the response keys required for each task. 
Participants were asked to complete the tasks in silence and to read the instructions 
carefully before each task. They were also told to raise their hand if they had any 
problems or questions, and the researcher spoke to any individuals who required help 
(e.g. if they had not understood the instructions and were not passing the practice). 
Accuracy and RT were recorded for all three tasks, and together they took approximately 
10 min to complete. 
A computerised dot matrix task, adapted from the Dot Matrix test of the 
Automated Working Memory Assessment (Alloway, 2007), was administered in a 
separate group testing session to measure VS-WM. In a practice phase, three dots 
appeared in turn for 600 ms each in a white four by four grid, with a 300 ms delay 
between dots. The grid turned orange for a delay of 1500 ms, and when the grid turned 
white again, participants used the computer mouse to click where the dots had appeared, 
in the order that they had appeared. The practice repeated, with a different order of dots, 
if the participant failed. The main trial continued with a load of three dots, and the load 
increased by one after four trials, until two incorrect answers were given at any one load, 
or the highest level of load eight was completed. The total number of correct trials was 
recorded. The task took approximately 3 min. 
Participant behaviour during the two taught lessons was observed by the 
researcher, using an adapted version of a system developed by Blatchford, Bassett and 
Brown (2011), for a very coarse measure of general attention in lessons. Each participant 
was observed in turn. Each observation lasted 10 s, followed by 20 s for coding the 
observed behaviour into two categories: either as on-task or off-task (or half and half if 
applicable). The process immediately continued with the next child, and paused only 




collect equipment and were no longer identifiable based on the location of their chair). 
Observations continued throughout the whole lesson, so that multiple observations were 
recorded per participant per lesson. The mean number of observations per participant was 




During the inhibitory control assessment, participants first performed the simple 
Go/No-Go, then the complex Go/No-Go, and then the numerical Stroop. The physics pre-
test took place in a physics lesson within three days of the inhibitory control assessment. 
The two 45 min counterintuitive concept lessons took place within a week of the pre-test. 
The physics post-test was two weeks after the pre-test, and the follow up occurred 
approximately four weeks later. The VS-WM task was completed approximately seven 
months later. Note that six participants also took part in study B, three of whom had not 
completed the executive function tasks and so their executive function data were taken 
from study B. 
 
4.3.1.5 Statistical analysis 
4.3.1.5.1 Physics tests 
Participants who missed a counterintuitive concept lesson or a physics test were 
excluded on the relevant analyses (those who attended the lesson and answered all three 
tests: gravity final N = 33, pressure final N = 32). Cochran’s Q was calculated to examine 
change over time in misconception responses for the gravity and pressure questions 
individually, and these were followed up with McNemar Tests. 
 
4.3.1.5.2 Executive function tasks 
Participants whose mean accuracy or RT was further than ±3.29 SDs away from 
the group mean were excluded from analyses of the task on which they were an outlier. 
One participant was excluded from simple Go/No-Go analyses due to low accuracy and a 
further participant was excluded for high RT (final N = 46). One participant was excluded 
from complex Go/No-Go analyses due to low accuracy (final N = 47). Two participants 
opted out of completing the numerical Stroop task, and one participant was excluded from 




 Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on accuracy in the simple and 
complex Go/No-Go with the within-subject factor Trial type (Go, No-Go). Two further 
repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on accuracy and RT in the numerical 
Stroop with the within-subject factor Trial type (congruent, incongruent). 
Five participants did not complete the VS-WM task: Since this measure was 
collected later, three participants had since left the school, and a further two were not able 
to attend a testing session (final N = 43). There were no outliers on the VS-WM task. One 
participant was absent from both lessons so had no observation data (final N = 47).  
 
4.3.1.5.3 Association between executive functions and physics 
First, point-biserial partial correlations, controlling for age, were used to examine 
associations between inhibitory control (simple No-Go accuracy, complex No-Go 
accuracy, Stroop accuracy cost, and Stroop RT cost) and presence of a gravity and 
pressure misconception at each of the three time points. Second, point-biserial partial 
correlations, controlling for age, were used to examine associations between the same 
inhibitory control variables and presence of a misconception at post-test and follow up 
only in those who held the misconception at pre-test. Participants who missed a lesson 
were excluded from the analysis relating to that lesson. 
Third, partial correlations controlling for age were run to examine the association 
between executive function (simple No-Go accuracy, complex No-Go accuracy, Stroop 
accuracy cost, Stroop RT cost, VS-WM, percentage on-task) and general physics 
performance (average number of correct responses across the physics tests, average 
physics score at school, end of year physics exam).  
 
4.3.2 Results 
4.3.2.1 Physics tests 
Cochran’s Q indicated a significant change in the presence of the gravity 
misconception over time, Q(2) = 38.00, p < .001 (Figure 4.2a). McNemar’s tests showed 
significant differences between pre-test and both post-test and follow up, p’s < .001, but 
no difference between post-test and follow up where no misconception was held by any 







Cochran’s Q also showed a change over time in presence of the pressure 
misconception, Q(2) = 9.81, p = .007 (Figure 4.2b). McNemar’s tests showed a marginal 
reduction in presence of the misconception between pre- and post-test, p = .064, and no 
significant difference between post-test and follow up or between pre-test and follow up, 
p’s > .1.  
Overall there was a reduction in the number of pupils who held a misconception 
after the counterintuitive concept lesson, as anticipated. In the gravity misconception, all 
participants learnt the correct answer and maintained this even at follow up. 
 
4.3.2.2 Executive function tasks 
Repeated measures ANOVAs on accuracy in both the simple and complex 
Go/No-Go showed a significant effect of Trial type, with higher accuracy in Go trials 
than No-Go trials (Table 4.1). Repeated measures ANOVAs on accuracy and RT in the 
numerical Stroop showed significant effects of trial type with higher accuracy and faster 
RTs in congruent trials than incongruent trials (Table 4.1). The inhibitory control tasks 
















 M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Accuracy (%) 
Trial type F(1, 45) = 78.48, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .636 
F(1, 46) = 243.58, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .841 
F(1, 44) = 45.03, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .506 
 Go/Congruent 98.9 (0.3) 92.4 (1.1) 90.2 (1.9) 
 No-Go/Incongruent 79.0 (2.3) 44.7 (3.3) 78.0 (2.5) 
RT (ms) 
Trial type - - F(1, 44) = 131.67, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .750 
 Go/Congruent 383 (5) 439 (12) 701 (13) 
 No-Go/Incongruent - - 773 (13) 
 
 Descriptive statistics for all other measures, including executive functions and 
physics tests, are reported in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2. Mean, standard deviation and range in VS-WM, attention in lessons, average correct in 
other physics test questions, average school physics score and end of year physics exam score. 
Measure M (SD) Range 
VS-WM total 10 (3) 0-16 
Attention in lessons percentage on-task 76 (25) 0-100 
Physics test average correct 2.3 (1) 0-5 
Average school physics score 81 (6) 68-95 
End of year physics exam score 67 (12) 39-88 
 
4.3.2.3 Association between executive functions and physics 
Point-biserial partial correlations between misconception presence at each time 
point and inhibitory control (simple No-Go accuracy, complex No-Go accuracy, Stroop 
accuracy cost, Stroop RT cost), controlling for age, showed no significant associations, 
p’s > .1. There was also no association between pressure misconception presence at post-
test and follow up when looking only at those who held the misconception at pre-test, p’s 
> .3. 
Partial correlations between executive function (simple No-Go accuracy, complex 




general physics performance (average physics test scores excluding the two 
misconceptions, average physics score at school, end of year physics exam), controlling 
for age, showed a few trend associations. Complex No-Go accuracy was negatively 
associated with physics school test average, r(29) = -.31, p = .083. Stroop RT cost was 
negatively associated with both physics school test average, r(29) = -.33, p = .073 and 
physics end of year exam, r(29) = -.33, p = .073. 
 
4.3.3 Study A Discussion 
 This study attempted to determine the extent to which inhibitory control associates 
with the learning of new counterintuitive physics concepts in the classroom. There was no 
association between inhibitory control and misconception presence before or after 
teaching of counterintuitive concepts relating to gravity and pressure. 
 An unexpected finding was that after being taught the gravity concept, all 
participants answered correctly, preventing analysis into individual differences at post-
test or follow up for this concept. This concept had been chosen in consultation with the 
physics teacher, in part because it was anticipated that students would continue to find 
this concept challenging following the lesson. This was based on the teacher’s own 
experience teaching this concept, and was in line with findings from the adult 
neuroimaging study in which adults continued to get this concept wrong when they were 
not science experts (Masson et al., 2014). Ceiling performance following teaching may be 
due to the high ability of the sample included in this study, or alternatively due to the 
nature of the questions, which changed very little between tests. Perhaps changing the 
questions more would have reduced familiarity, or including a more complex question 
that required written explanation would have elicited latent misconceptions. It is also 
possible that extra attention was given to learning the concepts because the participants 
were aware that they were taking part in a research study, and so the new concepts were 
potentially more salient than would normally be the case. Finally, this unexpected result 
might have arisen because the time between teaching and testing was relatively short. The 
adults tested by Masson and colleagues (2014) would have been taught the concept many 
years previously, rather than just a few weeks before testing. 
Performance improved, and variation remained for the pressure concept, but no 
inhibitory control variables associated with misconception presence at any time point. 
This lack of association may indicate that inhibitory control is not an important factor in 




learning (Rhodes et al., 2014, 2016). An alternative explanation is that the sample size 
was too low to detect what may be a small effect in relation to counterintuitive concept 
learning specifically. The sample size reduced throughout the course of the study due to 
participant absences from lessons. For a full data set, a participant had to be present for a 
total of 8 sessions, and in a busy school where many students have extracurricular lessons 
in the day this was a challenge. Nonetheless, generally there were only a few participants 
missing for each individual analysis. 
Finally, the exploratory investigations into executive function measures and more 
general measures of physics performance did not show any significant associations. This 
time the finding did not replicate the previous findings in science learning which found an 
association between working memory and science learning (Rhodes et al., 2014, 2016). It 
is possible that had the working memory measure been administered closer to the time of 
the science lesson, a link would have been found. It was assumed that individual 
differences would be stable within the 7 month period, but this was not explicitly tested.  
Nonetheless, a replication of the two science learning studies by Rhodes and colleagues 
(2014, 2016) found that in physics there was no significant association between learning 
and executive function (S. M. Rhodes, J. N. Booth, L. E. Palmer, R. A. Blythe, M. 
Delibegovic, & N. J. Wheate, personal communication, November 22, 2018). There were 
some trend associations which can be tentatively discussed. There was a negative 
association between response inhibition in the context of a working memory load 
(complex No-Go accuracy) and physics school test average. This is the opposite of what 
might be expected, as the behavioural study in Chapter 3 reported that this measure was 
positively associated with misconception RT, which was taken to reflect increased time 
reasoning. More consistently with findings from Chapter 3, Stroop RT cost, a measure of 
semantic inhibition, was negatively associated with both school measures of physics. This 
means that those who were less affected by the conflict required to respond to 
incongruent trials performed better in school physics tests. This is some further evidence 
that semantic inhibition may play a role in general physics performance, although these 
relations were not significant at an alpha level of .05 so firm conclusions cannot be 
drawn. 
Overall, study A showed no evidence for inhibitory control in learning new 





4.4 Study B: Maths 
Study B aimed to investigate inhibitory control in the learning of a new 
counterintuitive maths concept. Parts of the method were tweaked to capitalize on what 
was learnt from study A and in response to teacher requirements. This time, the VS-WM 
task was completed in the same session as the inhibitory control tasks. Two teachers were 
involved in choosing the misconception for study B as no teacher taught more than one 
class in a year group. The teachers felt that only one misconception should be taught as 
this would fit better with their schedule. The counterintuitive concept chosen in 
consultation with the teachers was reverse percentages (Figure 4.3), which fulfilled the 
same criteria as in study A. Due to the nature of the concept, it was considered that the 
same concept could be addressed through numerous questions, since the numbers and 
words can be changed. This would allow for more variation in responses rather than 
capturing presence of a misconception with just one question at each time point. 
Participants were a year older in this study, as the teachers who were keen to take part did 
not teach any Year 8 classes. Finally, to increase the number of participants, two classes 
took part in the study one year, and another two classes took part the following year. A 







Figure 4.3. Example (a) misconception and (b) control questions in the maths test. 
Misconception questions provide the final value following a percentage change, while control 







Four Year 9 classes of participants at the same English fee-paying independent 
secondary school where students come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and 
performance is above the national average, took part (N = 69, 38 girls, 31 boys). The age 
range was 13.00 to 14.42 years (M = 13.85, SD = 0.36). The classes ranged in ability from 
top to bottom set. Letters were sent home to parents inviting their children to take part, 
accompanied by opt-out consent forms. Written consent was obtained from participants 
before taking part. There was no exclusion criterion, and the local ethics committee 
approved the study. 
 
4.4.1.2 Maths lessons 
One maths lesson addressed the counterintuitive concept, and each class was 
taught by their own teacher. The lessons were designed and carried out by the teachers 
who usually teach these classes. Each lesson lasted 45 min and included taught material 
and practice questions in the format of a normal school maths lesson. 
 
4.4.1.3 Measures 
4.4.1.3.1 Maths tests 
Maths tests were administered at three time points as in study A. The 10 min 
paper and pen maths tests each consisted of ten questions: five relating to the 
counterintuitive concept, and five control questions (Figure 4.3). The questions all 
required calculations and were open ended, calculators were allowed, and the questions 
were designed to mimic a typical class test. All questions were checked with the teachers 
to ensure they correctly represented the counterintuitive concept and that they were at the 
right level for the class. Each test contained different questions, and the misconception 
and control questions appeared in random order. The number of correct answers was 
calculated for misconception and control questions on each test. 
An overall number of correct responses on the control questions was also 
calculated and the school provided average maths scores and end of year maths exam 
results for more general measures of maths performance. Note that 33 participants do not 
have data for the school maths performance measures as these participants took part in the 
study in the second year, and so they have not been finalised and provided by the school 





4.4.1.3.2 Executive function tasks 
Inhibitory control and working memory measures were administered as described 
in study A. In order to increase the number of observations per participant for the 
attention in lessons measure, this was carried out over three lessons for each class, rather 
than two. This was to get a more representative measure of their classroom behaviour 
since there would have only been one observation if only the counterintuitive concept 
lesson was observed. 
 
4.4.1.4 Procedure 
The inhibitory control and VS-WM assessment took place in the normal school 
maths room or in the computer room, as a class group, for a session lasting approximately 
15 min. Participants first performed the simple Go/No-Go, then the complex Go/No-Go, 
then the numerical Stroop, and finally the VS-WM task. The maths pre-test took place in 
the normal maths room as part of a lesson, either the day before or the day after the 
inhibitory control tasks. The 45 min counterintuitive concept lesson took place four or 
five days after the pre-test, and was given by the normal maths teacher. The maths post-
test occurred seven days later, and the follow up was approximately four weeks later.  
 
4.4.1.5 Statistical analysis 
4.4.1.5.1 Maths tests 
Participants who did not attend the counterintuitive concept lesson were excluded 
from the analysis (final N = 57). A two (Question type: control, misconception) by three 
(Time: pre-test, post-test, follow up) repeated measures ANOVA was run on accuracy. 
These were followed up with further repeated measures ANOVAs. 
 
4.4.1.5.2 Executive function tasks 
The same cut-off of ±3.29 SDs from the group mean was applied to outliers. One 
participant was not present for the initial testing sessions, one participant was removed 
from all Go/No-Go analyses due to low Go accuracy, and two participants were removed 
from all Stroop analyses because of low accuracy (simple Go/No-Go final N = 67, 
complex Go/No-Go final N = 67, numerical Stroop final N = 66, and VS-WM final N = 
68). Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on accuracy in the simple and 




repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on accuracy and RT in the numerical 
Stroop with the within-subject factor Trial type (congruent, incongruent). 
  Due to computer failure, one class’s observation data for one lesson was lost. The 
mean number of observations per participant was 12 (SD = 9). The variation was large 
due to the different sizes of the classes which ranged from 7 to 26 pupils.  
 
4.4.1.5.3 Association between executive functions and maths 
First, partial correlations controlling for age were run between misconception total 
correct and inhibitory control (simple No-Go accuracy, complex No-Go accuracy, Stroop 
accuracy cost, and Stroop RT cost) at each time point. Second, partial correlations 
controlling for age were run between misconception total correct and inhibitory control at 
post-test and follow up only in those who scored 0, 1, or 2 at pre-test in misconception 
questions (this threshold indicating that they held the misconception). Those who missed 
the misconception lesson were excluded from analyses relating to post-test and follow up. 
Third, partial correlations controlling for age were run to examine the association 
between executive function (simple No-Go accuracy, complex No-Go accuracy, Stroop 
accuracy cost, Stroop RT cost, VS-WM, percentage on-task) and general maths 
performance (number of correct control answers across the maths tests, average maths 
score at school, end of year maths exam).  
 
4.4.2 Results 
4.4.2.1 Maths tests 
The repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of Question type F(1, 50) = 
66.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .572, with more correct responses to control questions than to 
misconception questions (Figure 4.4). There was also a main effect of Time, F(2, 100) = 
3.96, p = .022, ηp2 = .073, and a significant interaction between Question type and Time, 






Figure 4.4. Estimated marginal mean number of correct responses (± SE) in control and 
misconception maths questions at each time point. 
This interaction was first followed up with separate ANOVAs for accuracy in 
misconception questions. There was a main effect of Time, F(2, 98) = 10.62, p < .001, ηp2 
= .178. Follow up repeated measures ANOVAs showed a significant difference between 
pre- and post-test, F(1, 51) = 11.98, p = .001, ηp2 = .190, post-test and follow up, F(1, 51) 
= 24.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .326, but not between pre-test and follow up, p = .855.  
A repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy in control questions showed a main 
effect of Time, F(2, 100) = 5.496, p = .005, ηp2 = .099. Follow up repeated measures 
ANOVAs showed a significant decrease between post-test and follow up, F(1, 51) = 7.65, 
p = .008, ηp2 = .130, but not from pre-test to post-test or follow up, p’s > .08.  
Overall the maths tests did not show the anticipated pattern of sustained increased 
performance after the lesson. Performance in the misconception questions decreased after 
the lesson then returned to pre-test levels. Performance in the control questions increased 
slightly after the lesson and then decreased to pre-test levels. 
 
4.4.2.2 Executive function tasks 
Repeated measures ANOVAs on accuracy in the simple and complex Go/No-Go 
both showed a significant effect of Trial type, with higher accuracy in Go trials than No-
Go trials (Table 4.3). Repeated measures ANOVAs on accuracy and RT in the Stroop 
showed significant effects of trial type with higher accuracy and faster RTs in congruent 
trials than incongruent trials (Table 4.3). The inhibitory control tasks showed the 













 M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Accuracy (%)    
Trial type 
F(1, 66) = 118.01,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .641 
F(1, 66) = 316.14,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .827 
F(1, 54) = 107.08,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .622 
 Go/Congruent 99.0 (0.2) 92.9 (1.0) 92.8 (0.9) 
 No-Go/Incongruent 82.7 (1.6) 48.4 (2.5) 80.6 (1.4) 
RT (ms)    
Trial type 
n/a n/a F(1, 65) = 148.38,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .695 
 Go/Congruent 365 (4) 404 (6) 706 (11) 
 No-Go/Incongruent - - 779 (10) 
 
 Descriptive statistics for the remaining executive function and maths measures are 
reported in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4. Mean, standard deviation and range in VS-WM, attention in lessons, overall correct in 
maths control questions, average maths test score and end of year maths exam score. 
 Measure M (SD) Range 
VS-WM total 10 (3) 0-16 
Attention in lessons percentage on-task 90 (13) 40-100 
Maths control correct 14 (1) 9-15 
Average school maths score 59 (13) 31-85 
End of year maths exam score 44 (13) 17-44 
 
4.4.2.3 Association between executive functions and physics 
Partial correlations between misconception total correct and inhibitory control 
(simple No-Go accuracy, complex No-Go accuracy, Stroop accuracy cost, and Stroop RT 
cost), controlling for age, showed only one marginal association. Simple No-Go accuracy 
was associated with misconception total correct at pre-test, r(63) = .22, p = .075, all other 
p’s > .1. The same partial correlations were run at post-test and follow up only in those 
who had low misconception accuracy at pre-test, and none of these associations were 




Partial correlations, controlling for age, were run between all executive function 
measures (simple No-Go accuracy, complex No-Go accuracy, Stroop accuracy cost, 
Stroop RT cost, VS-WM, percentage on-task) and general maths performance (number of 
correct control answers across the maths tests, average maths score at school, end of year 
maths exam). Simple No-Go accuracy positively correlated with total correct responses in 
maths control questions, r(57) = .29, p = .025. The percentage on-task measure positively 
correlated with maths end of year exam, r(31) = .55, p = .001, and marginally correlated 
with maths school test average, r(31) = .33, p = .065. No other associations were 
significant, p’s > .1. 
 
4.4.3 Study B Discussion 
 This study attempted to determine the extent to which inhibitory control associates 
with the learning of a new counterintuitive maths concept in the classroom. There was no 
convincing association between inhibitory control and misconception performance, but 
there were associations between both response inhibition and attention in lessons with 
general maths performance. 
Contrary to the hypotheses, performance in misconception questions dropped 
between pre-test and post-test. This is contrast to study A which found an increase in 
performance after the counterintuitive concept lessons. It was anticipated that pre-test 
performance would be very low, and that performance would increase after the lesson. 
One explanation is that at post-test, participants thought they knew the procedure having 
received the lesson, but as it is a difficult concept were more likely to get it wrong 
through reduced effort associated with believing the procedure is well understood. 
Performance then increased to pre-test levels, perhaps because the time lag meant 
participants had to think harder about how to do the problems. An explanation given by a 
teacher for the persisting low misconception performance following the lesson is that the 
calculation procedure is very hard, and will take a long time for the students to learn. 
They have been doing the control questions for a long time, and the new method required 
for misconception questions is difficult to get used to.  
Performance in control trials decreased at follow up, which was also surprising, 
although performance was high at all three time points. One explanation for the lower 
control performance at follow up is that those who had learned the correct strategy for the 
new counterintuitive concept were now using the misconception strategy for control 




ability, whereby participants feel they have learnt the concept and put less effort in at 
post-test. In a future study, it would be worth asking students to write down the individual 
steps taken in coming to an answer, in order to test this directly. Since calculators were 
used, many students simply wrote down their answer without showing their working. 
Alternatively, time of day of testing may have influenced performance since the tests 
were carried out at different times.  
As in study A, the results provide minimal evidence for the role of inhibitory 
control in learning new counterintuitive concepts, although response inhibition (simple 
No-Go accuracy) was marginally related to misconception performance at pre-test. It is 
noteworthy that response inhibition was also related to control performance, which 
perhaps indicates that response inhibition is important in solving maths problems of this 
kind. While the attention in lessons measure derived from observations did not relate to 
the maths misconception or control problems, it did relate to maths performance in the 
school tests. This may indicate a more long-term consequence of how much attention is 
paid in lessons.  
Overall the findings from study B did not implicate inhibitory control in learning 
new counterintuitive maths concepts in the classroom, in concert with findings from 
study A and similar studies in science learning (Rhodes et al., 2014, 2016). 
 
4.5 General Discussion 
The results of studies A and B did not confirm the hypotheses that those with 
better inhibitory control would perform better on misconception questions following a 
lesson on the counterintuitive concept. Following a lesson on a counterintuitive gravity 
concept, participants were all able to answer the question correctly, precluding 
examination of individual differences at post-test and follow up. This may be due to the 
inclusion of a school where performance is above the national average for this study. 
There was variation in responses after a lesson on a counterintuitive pressure concept, but 
inhibitory control was not related to performance. Following a lesson on a 
counterintuitive maths concept relating to percentage change, misconception performance 
dipped and then returned to pre-test levels. Inhibitory control did not relate to 
misconception performance. It is possible that the studies would have shown a 
modulating role of inhibitory control in classes that were generally more disruptive and 
less focussed, where inhibitory control requirements would have been greater to enable 




material that had not previously been covered at school, it is also possible that 
participants spent some time outside of the classroom learning more about the concepts 
that were addressed. 
The studies were a first attempt to bring the research on inhibitory control and 
counterintuitive reasoning into the classroom to assess the relevance of the research to 
normal classroom learning. The process of working with teachers to decide on the best 
concepts to address was useful in ensuring that the concepts were relevant to school 
learning. It also meant that the teachers were enthusiastic, interested, and invested in the 
results. However, the sample sizes were determined by the number of teachers who 
volunteered to take part in the studies, and thus were not based on formal power analyses. 
Small sample size is one explanation for the lack of effects observed, given the results 
from Chapter 3 that showed inhibitory control to relate to misconception problems. In 
addition, the age of the participants was determined by the classes that the teachers 
taught, rather than for theoretical reasons, and therefore changed between studies. 
In order to make the physics and maths tests as close to normal classroom tests as 
possible, pen and paper tests were given. This meant that the experience for participants 
was as close to normal learning and testing as possible, but had the additional 
consequence that there was no RT data for those tests. It is possible that RT measures of 
performance may have been related to inhibitory control, but that these associations were 
undetectable in the data collected. It has been suggested that inhibitory control is involved 
in moment-by-moment decision making processes in science (Tolmie, Ghazali, & Morris, 
2016) that would not be well captured in the measures used here. This example highlights 
a key struggle in educational neuroscience research: the trade-off between a design that is 
ecologically valid (in this case, the inclusion of a paper and pen test) and a design that can 
reveal more about underlying cognitive processes (such as a computerised test that 
gathers RTs). Neither type of study is able to tell us everything, which is why a mixture 
of designs is the best approach to understand more about underlying processes and their 
relevance to education. Nonetheless, while RT was important in the Chapter 3, accuracy 
was too, and the lack of association in these studies indicates that inhibitory control does 
not appear to relate to misconception performance. 
Overall, the studies described here did not convincingly implicate inhibitory 
control in performance on new counterintuitive classroom concepts. While these findings 
were contrary to the hypotheses and previous research into behavioural associations (e.g. 
Chapter 3; Gilmore, Keeble, Richardson, & Cragg, 2015; Khng & Lee, 2009; Zaitchik, 




outside the context of misconceptions (Rhodes et al., 2014, 2016). It is possible that 
inhibitory control is important when reasoning about counterintuitive concepts that have 
already been learnt, but of less importance when learning new counterintuitive concepts. 
This would be contrary to the suggestion that old theories must be inhibited for new 
information to be learnt (Mareschal, 2016). The studies took a first step in bringing the 
research question to the classroom, in an initial exploratory manner. To improve on the 
studies reported here, future research could attempt larger sample sizes, and inclusion of a 
broader range of misconceptions to uncover more about the role of different executive 
functions. 
 
Having used a behavioural study and two classroom studies to explore the role of 
inhibitory control in science and maths, the thesis next uses fMRI to examine the same 
associations. Specifically, Chapter 5 will explore the neural correlates of counterintuitive 
science and maths reasoning, and the extent to which these brain regions overlap with 





Chapter 5 FMRI analysis 1: Neural correlates of 
inhibitory control and science and maths reasoning 
 
5.1 Overview 
Behavioural research has indicated that both response and semantic inhibition 
contribute to counterintuitive reasoning in adolescence. Adult research has shown 
recruitment of PFC regions during counterintuitive science reasoning. This has been 
interpreted as reflecting inhibition processes, but as yet there is no evidence for 
overlapping activation of counterintuitive reasoning and inhibitory control within the 
same participants. In the current fMRI study, 34 adolescents (aged 11-15 years) answered 
science and maths problems and completed response (simple and complex Go/No-Go) 
and semantic (numerical Stroop) inhibition tasks. Increased BOLD signal was observed in 
parietal (BA 40) and prefrontal (BA 8, 45) regions in misconception problems compared 
to control problems, where no counterintuitive reasoning was required. Both response and 
semantic inhibition BOLD signal overlapped with misconception-specific activation in 
the IPL and frontal gyri, but there was also activation unique to counterintuitive 
reasoning. These novel results provide neural evidence that inhibitory control is one of 
the mechanisms supporting counterintuitive science and maths reasoning in adolescence.  
 
5.2 Introduction 
The behavioural results from Chapter 3 showed that both response and semantic 
inhibition were associated with counterintuitive science and maths reasoning in 
adolescence. Inhibitory control predicted unique variance in performance on 
misconception problems, indicating that it may be implicated in counterintuitive 
reasoning specifically rather than in general reasoning in science and maths. This finding 
provided further support for the theory that inhibitory control enables the suppression of 
prior knowledge, misleading perceptual cues, and naïve theories (Houdé, 2000; 
Mareschal, 2016). The neural correlates of reasoning about misconceptions have not 
previously been studied in adolescents, but there is neuroimaging research with adults. 
Two studies examined the neural underpinnings of reasoning about two scientific 
misconceptions and found that experts compared to novices recruited brain regions 
associated with inhibitory control: dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC (BA 9/10/45/46/47) 




adults showed greater PFC (BA 47) activation when reasoning about counterintuitive 
stimuli relating to perimeter compared to when reasoning about non-counterintuitive 
stimuli (Stavy & Babai, 2010). In both cases, the authors argued that the recruitment of 
these brain areas indicates that participants were using inhibitory control in order to 
inhibit misconceptions.  
However, this interpretation relies on reverse inference since inhibitory control 
brain activation was not captured in these studies. It is possible that within the set of 
participants tested, inhibitory control would not recruit those specific brain regions, and 
the activations reflect other processes. In addition, these tasks showed repeated stimuli 
referring to the same misconceptions throughout, which means that the results may not 
accurately demonstrate the brain regions involved in science and maths reasoning that 
occurs in real life, where different problems are encountered. Responses may have 
become automatized in those studies, with little reasoning occurring during observation of 
the stimuli, particularly after viewing many trials. Further, from these results it is not 
possible to determine whether these activations reflect response or semantic inhibition, if 
indeed they do show inhibition. The current study therefore sought to examine 
counterintuitive science and maths reasoning about a range of misconceptions relevant to 
school learning, and to directly compare the neural activation with response and semantic 
inhibitory control activation. 
Adolescents completed versions of the science and maths misconceptions task and 
inhibitory control tasks that were adapted from Chapter 3, inside an fMRI scanner. The 
first aim was to establish the BOLD signal associated with reasoning about science and 
maths misconceptions. The second aim was to assess the brain regions associated with 
response and semantic inhibition. Previous research has shown response and semantic 
inhibition to recruit regions including the DLPFC (BA 44), the IFG (BA 48), and the 
ACC (BA 24/32) (e.g. Adleman et al., 2002; Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002). The third 
aim was to establish the extent to which brain regions associated with counterintuitive 
reasoning overlapped with those associated with inhibitory control. Thus, the study was 
novel in examining adolescents and comparing inhibition and counterintuitive reasoning 
activation within participants. It was hypothesised that neural overlap would be observed 
in regions commonly associated with inhibitory control, in particular the lateral PFC 







Thirty-eight pupils (20 girls, 18 boys) aged 11 to 15 years, with no known 
neurological or developmental disorders, from a range of schools in different 
demographic areas, took part. Flyers were sent from schools to parents of pupils in Years 
7 to 10, inviting their children to take part. Written informed parental and participant 
consent was obtained in accordance with the guidelines of the local ethics committee, 
which approved the study. Participants were given pictures of their brain and £20 for 
participation, and travel expenses for participants and their parents were reimbursed. 
To control for general cognitive ability in the behavioural analyses, the WASI 
Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests were administered as in Chapter 3. One 
participant was excluded due to low accuracy in the science and maths misconceptions 
task (15y girl). Three participants were excluded due to movement: one in both the 
science and maths misconceptions task and the Go/No-Go (12y girl), one in the Go/No-
Go (15y girl), and one in the Stroop (12y boy). Two participants had just one run 
excluded due to movement in the science and maths misconceptions task (12y girl, 15y 
boy) so were kept in the analysis, discarding the concerning run. Exclusionary criteria 
relating to movement are described in detail below. The final sample consisted of 34 
participants, of which 17 were girls and 17 were boys (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1. Participant characteristics of final sample, N = 34. There was no correlation between 
age in months and standardised WASI scores (Wechsler, 2011), p’s > .2, and no gender difference 






5.3.2.1 Science and maths misconceptions 
 The science and maths misconceptions task was adapted from Chapter 3 to be 
suitable for the scanner (see Method section 2.1 for details). Participants were presented 
with science and maths statements, and judged whether they were true or false. Stimuli 
appeared in four alternating blocks of separate science and maths trials. Between trials, 
Variable Range M (SD) 
Age in months 137-185 161 (16) 
WASI Vocabulary raw score 31-43 38 (3) 




participants were presented either with a fixation cross, or a simple arrows task that acted 
as an active baseline. A practice outside the scanner included three science and three 
maths control problems that were not repeated in the main trial, with no performance 
threshold. 
 
5.3.2.2 Inhibitory control 
 The Go/No-Go and numerical Stroop were adapted from Chapter 3 for the 
scanner (see Method section 2.2 for details). Both tasks had a block design. In the Go/No-
Go, there were blocks of Go trials only, blocks of simple Go/No-Go trials, and blocks of 
complex Go/No-Go trials. In the Stroop there were congruent blocks and mixed blocks. 
Practices were completed outside the scanner. Go/No-Go practice blocks of 10 trials were 
repeated if more than one No-Go error was made in the Simple and Complex blocks, and 
if more than one Go error was made in Go blocks. A Stroop familiarisation phase of eight 
trials of asterisks instead of digits was repeated if more than one error was made. A 
Congruent practice of eight trials was repeated if more than one error was made. Finally, 
a practice Mixed block of eight trials was repeated if more than two errors were made. 
  
5.3.3 Procedure 
The testing session lasted a total of 2 hours. Participants first practiced each of the 
three tasks outside the scanner to ensure the instructions were understood. Participants 
then completed the science and maths misconceptions task inside the scanner, followed 
by a structural scan for 5.5 min, then the Go/No-Go task and finally the numerical Stroop 
task. Overall, participants spent approximately 50 min inside the scanner. Additional 
behavioural tasks were administered outside the scanner and will be elaborated on in 
Chapter 6. 
 
5.3.4 Behavioural data analysis 
For the science and maths misconceptions task mean RTs were calculated from all 
trials. Two (Discipline: science, maths) x two (Trial type: control, misconception) 
repeated measures ANCOVAs covarying for z-scored age in months were run on 
accuracy and RT. For the inhibitory control tasks mean RTs were calculated from correct 
trials only. Repeated measures ANCOVAs investigated the difference between Trial 
types in the Go/No-Go task (Go in Go blocks, Go in Simple blocks, Go in Complex 




task (congruent in Congruent blocks, congruent in Mixed blocks, incongruent in Mixed 
blocks) for accuracy and RT (for Go trials only in Go/No-Go task), covarying for z-
scored Age in months. Main effects were followed up with Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons. 
 Hierarchical multiple regressions investigated the extent to which inhibitory 
control variables account for individual differences in science and maths misconception 
accuracy and RT in a replication of Chapter 3, albeit with a much smaller sample. As in 
Chapter 3, raw scores are used for the WASI tasks so that age is controlled for only once 
(through entering age separately), and so that changes with age in the number of correct 
responses can be examined. Finally, standardised scores were not of particular interest in 
this study where participants had no known developmental disorders. Block 1 variables 
were inserted using the enter method: age in months, WASI Vocabulary and Matrix 
Reasoning raw scores, and science and maths control performance (accuracy or RT). 
Block 2 contained Go/No-Go and Stroop variables entered stepwise: Simple Go RT cost 
(Simple Go RT – RT in Go blocks), Complex Go RT cost (Complex Go RT – RT in Go 
blocks), Stroop accuracy cost (congruent – incongruent) and Stroop RT cost (incongruent 
– congruent), where congruent trials included those in both congruent and mixed blocks. 
RT cost measures were used in the Go/No-Go since high accuracy was anticipated in this 
version of the Go/No-Go where there are now 50% No-Go trials. This would be in line 
with previous research showing no age differences in accuracy where 50% No-Go trials 
were used in a study of 8- to 20-year-olds (Tamm et al., 2002). It was considered that RT 
cost would therefore better reflect response inhibition. 
 
5.3.5 MRI data acquisition and preprocessing 
Brain imaging data were acquired on a 1.5 Telsa Siemens Avanto MRI scanner 
with a 30-channel head coil. Structural data were acquired with a T1-weighted 
magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo (MPRAGE) with 2x generalised 
autocalibrating partial parallel acquisition (GRAPPA) acceleration, lasting 5.5 min. 
Functional data were acquired in six sessions using the Centre for Magnetic Resonance 
Research (CMRR) multiband echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (Xu et al., 2013) 4x 
acceleration, leak block on (Cauley et al., 2014) repetition time (TR) = 1 s, echo time 
(TE) = 45 ms, comprising 44 slices covering most of the cerebrum, with a resolution of 3 




acquired between the science and maths misconceptions task and the inhibitory control 
tasks.  
MRI data were preprocessed and analysed using SPM12 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/ 
spm/software/spm12/). Functional images were realigned to the mean images after the 
first realignment in a two pass procedure using a second-degree B-spline interpolation to 
correct for movement during the session. The bias-field-corrected structural image was 
co-registered to the mean realigned functional image, and segmented on the basis of MNI 
registered International Consortium for Brain Mapping tissue probability maps. Resulting 
spatial normalisation parameters were applied to the realigned images to obtain 
normalised functional images with a voxel size of 3 x 3 x 3 mm, which were smoothed 
with an 8 mm full-width at the half-maximum Gaussian kernel. FD was calculated for 
each volume as a scalar measure of head motion across the six realignment estimates 
(Siegel et al., 2014). Volumes with an FD greater than 0.9 mm were censored and 
excluded from the GLM estimation by including a regressor of no interest for each 
censored volume. Scanning runs with more than 15% of volumes censored or a root mean 
square movement greater than 1.5 mm were excluded from the analysis.  
 
5.3.6 FMRI data analysis 
Scanning runs were treated as separate time series, each of which was modelled 
by a set of regressors in the GLM. All regressors were convolved with a canonical 
haemodynamic response function (HRF) and, together with the separate regressors 
representing each censored volume and the session mean, comprised the full model for 
each session. All coordinates are given in MNI space, region labelling was completed 
with AAL (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), and BA labelling was completed with 
MRIcron (Rorden & Brett, 2000).  
Science and maths misconceptions task data in each of the four runs were 
modelled by box-car regressors separately representing Misconception and Control trials 
using each trial’s RT as the duration, and arrows task blocks, using 16 s minus each 
preceding Misconception or Control trial’s RT as the duration. A first-level contrast of the 
difference between Misconception and Control trials was calculated. Science and maths 
conditions were collapsed as there was no difference between science and maths in the 
Misconception > Control contrast.  
In the Go/No-Go task, box-car regressors modelled Go blocks, Simple Go/No-Go 




duration) separately. First-level contrasts between Simple Go/No-Go and Go blocks, and 
Complex Go/No-Go and Go blocks were calculated. In the numerical Stroop task, box-car 
regressors modelled Congruent blocks and Mixed blocks (21 s duration) and fixation 
blocks (10 s or 15 s duration) separately. First-level contrasts between Mixed and 
Congruent blocks were calculated. For both tasks there was an additional single event-
related regressor of duration zero for all errors.  
First-level contrasts were entered into one sample t-tests to create SPM maps 
which were thresholded at p < .001 uncorrected at the voxel level and at FWE-corrected p 
< .05 at the cluster level. Voxels surviving a voxel level FWE-corrected p < .05 are also 
reported.  
In order to identify overlapping activations inclusive masking was used to identify 
brain areas of increased BOLD signal in the Misconception > Control contrast and in 
either of the Simple Go/No-Go > Go, Complex Go/No-Go > Go, and Mixed > Congruent 
numerical Stroop contrasts, using the same statistical threshold of p < .001 at the voxel 
level and FWE-corrected p < .05 at the cluster level. MNI coordinates and cluster size of 
overlapping regions were obtained using MarsBaR (Brett et al., 2002). 
In exploratory correlation analyses, age effects were examined in each contrast 
through one-sample t-tests entering age in months as a covariate. Correlations of 
individual differences in BOLD signal were run between inhibitory control activations 
(Complex Go/No-Go > Go, Stroop Mixed > Congruent) and science and maths activation 
(Misconception > Control) in each overlapping region identified, averaging the data over 
each cluster using MarsBaR. Associations between BOLD signal and behavioural 
measures were investigated through a Misconception > Control one sample t-test, 
entering performance measures from the Go/No-Go (Simple Go RT cost, Complex Go 
RT cost), numerical Stroop (RT cost, accuracy cost), and science and maths 
misconceptions accuracy cost (control – misconception) and RT cost (misconception – 
control) as covariates.  
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Behavioural results 
5.4.1.1 Science and maths misconceptions 
The repeated measures ANCOVA on accuracy (Table 5.2) showed significant 
main effects of Trial type and Discipline, with higher accuracy in control trials compared 




between Trial type and Discipline, whereby the difference between science and maths 
was significant for misconception trials, F(1, 32) = 13.20, p = .001, ηp2 = .292, but not for 
control trials, p = .5. 
 
Table 5.2. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the science and maths misconceptions 
task. 
  Accuracy (%) RT (ms) 
  M (SE) M (SE) 
Main effects    
Trial type  
F(1, 32) = 324.30,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .910 
F(1, 32) = 228.80,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .877 
 Control  85.8 (1.2) 5448 (130) 
 Misconception  59.9 (1.6) 6515 (147) 
Discipline  
F(1, 32) = 11.25,  
p = .002, ηp2 = .260 
F(1, 32) = 24.60, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .435 
 Science  75.1 (1.4) 5726 (143) 
 Maths  70.6 (1.4) 6237 (144) 
Interaction effects 
Trial type Discipline 
F(1, 32) = 4.22,  
p = .048, ηp2 = .116 
n.s., p = .465 
 Control 
 Science 84.8 (0.9) 5176 (145) 
 Maths 79.6 (1.1) 5721 (133) 
 Misconception 
 Science 60.2 (1.1) 6276 (153) 
 Maths 49.3 (1.4) 6754 (166) 
 
There was a main effect of Age, F(1, 32) = 8.06, p = .008, ηp2 = .201, which was 
modulated by a significant interaction between Trial type and Age, F(1, 32) = 4.19, p = 
.049, ηp2 = .116. Follow-up Pearson correlations indicated that there was a significant 
positive correlation between Age and accuracy in misconception trials, r = .47, p = .005, 
while the correlation between Age and accuracy in control trials was not significant, p = 
.095 (Figure 5.1).  
The repeated measures ANCOVA on RT (Table 5.2) showed significant main 
effects of Trial type, and Discipline, with faster RTs in control trials compared to 




   
There was no main effect of age, p = .7, but there was a significant interaction 
between Trial type, Discipline, and Age, F(1, 32) = 4.92, p = .034, ηp2 = .133, which was 
followed up with ANCOVAs and Pearson correlations. The interaction between 
Discipline and Age was significant in control trials, F(1, 32) = 6.481, p = .016, ηp2 = .168, 
with no association between Age and science control trials, r = .07, p = .7 and a non-
significant negative correlation between Age and maths control trials, r = -.25, p = .2. The 
interaction between Discipline and Age was not significant in misconception trials, p = .7. 
 
5.4.1.2 Inhibitory control 
The repeated measures ANCOVA on accuracy in the Go/No-Go showed a 
significant effect of Trial type (Table 5.3). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
showed significant differences (p’s < .028) between all trial types apart from between 
Complex Go and Complex No-Go trials, p = .5. Accuracy was highest in Simple No-Go 
trials, followed by Go trials in Go blocks, then Simple Go trials, Complex No-Go trials, 
and finally Complex Go trials. There was a main effect of Age, F(1, 32) = 5.97, p = .020, 
ηp2 = .157, where accuracy improved with age, and there was no interaction between Trial 
type and Age, p = .87. For RT, there was a significant effect of Trial type (Table 5.3) 
with significant differences between all trial types, p’s < .001. RTs were fastest in Go 
blocks, then Simple Go trials, and slowest in Complex Go trials. There was no significant 
effect of Age and no interaction, p’s > .6.  
 
Figure 5.1. Accuracy as a function of age in the science and maths misconceptions task. 
Scatterplots displaying correlation between age and percentage accuracy in (a) control trials and 




Table 5.3. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the inhibitory control tasks. 
 Accuracy (%) RT (ms) 
M (SE) M (SE) 
Go/No-Go 
F(4, 128) = 20.90,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .395 
F(2, 64) = 130.62,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .803 
Go trials   
 Go blocks 93.1 (0.8) 429 (6) 
 Simple blocks 92.8 (1.2) 470 (6) 
 Complex blocks 84.7 (1.5) 507 (7) 
No-Go trials   
 Simple blocks 95.5 (0.7) - 
 Complex blocks 87.9 (1.4) - 
Numerical Stroop 
F(2, 64) = 74.41,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .699 
F(2, 64) = 301.11,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .904 
Congruent trials   
 Congruent blocks 89.6 (0.9) 634 (11) 
 Mixed blocks 93.4 (1.2) 693 (11) 
Incongruent trials   
 Mixed blocks 76.0 (1. 9) 787 (11) 
 
The repeated measures ANCOVA on accuracy (Table 5.3) in the numerical 
Stroop showed a significant effect of Trial type, with significant differences between all 
trial types, p’s < .01. The highest accuracy was in Congruent trials in Mixed blocks, 
followed by Congruent trials in Congruent blocks, and finally Incongruent trials. There 
was no main effect of Age, p = .060. For RT there was a significant effect of Trial type 
(Table 5.3) with significant differences between all trial types, p’s < .001. RTs were 
fastest in Congruent trials within Congruent blocks, then Congruent trials in Mixed 
blocks, then Incongruent trials. There was no significant effect of Age and no interaction, 
p’s > .5.  
 
5.4.1.3 Regression analyses 
 The regression model for accuracy was significant, explaining 50% of the 
variance in science and maths misconception accuracy (Table 5.4). Age, WASI 
Vocabulary, WASI Matrix Reasoning, and science and maths control accuracy were 
entered into the model but none were significant predictors of performance on their own. 
The model for RT was significant, explaining 77% of the variance, and only RT for 





Table 5.4. Regression models for science and maths misconception accuracy and RT. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science and maths misconception accuracy 
Model 1 
F(4, 29) = 7.12, 
p < .001, R2 = 50% 
 
Constant  -2.48 .019 
Age (months) .26 1.69 .101 
WASI Vocabulary raw .30 1.78 .086 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .10 0.68 .502 
Science and maths control accuracy  .31 1.84 .077 
Science and maths misconception RT 
Model 2 
F(4, 29) = 24.87, 
p < .001, R2 = 77% 
Constant  1.06 .297 
Age (months) .05 0.50 .622 
WASI Vocabulary raw -.06 -0.62 .543 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw -.02 -0.19 .851 
Science and maths control RT .86 8.93 < .001 
 
 
5.4.1.4 Summary of behavioural results 
In summary, behavioural results showed that, as expected, performance was worse 
in misconception trials than control trials, worse in Complex Go/No-Go blocks than in 
Simple Go/No-Go blocks and in these than in Go blocks – although accuracy was high in 
No-Go trials themselves – and worse in incongruent trials and mixed numerical Stroop 
blocks than in congruent blocks. The only observed associations with age were an 
increase in misconception accuracy and an increase in overall Go/No-Go task accuracy. 
The regression analyses did not demonstrate the anticipated associations between 
inhibitory control and science and maths misconception performance. 
 
5.4.2 Neuroimaging results 
5.4.2.1 Science and maths misconceptions 
The contrast Misconception > Control (Table 5.5, Figure 5.2) showed increased 
BOLD signal in bilateral supramarginal gyrus (BA 40), extending into the IPL and AG, as 
well as in superior and middle frontal gyri (predominantly BA 8, extending into BA 9) 
and middle and inferior frontal gyri (BA 45, 47, 11). The right hemisphere activation 
extended along both dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC along BA 45 (Figure 5.2). There 





Table 5.5. Brain activation in science and maths misconception trials compared to control trials. 
a,b indicate pFWE < .05 at the voxel level, and pFWE < .05 at the cluster level (cluster defining 
threshold: puncorr < .001), respectively; L, R indicate left and right hemispheres respectively. 
Brain region L/R BA MNI Z-score Cluster size 
x y z 
Supramarginal gyrus R 40 60 -31 50 4.94a 527b 
Lingual gyrus L 37 -27 -49 -7 4.67a 26 
Superior frontal gyrus R 8 18 20 62 4.61a 220b 
Middle frontal gyrus R 9 36 17 59 4.13  
Supramarginal gyrus L 40 -63 -28 44 4.58a 163b 
Inferior parietal lobule L 40 -57 -37 47 3.99  
Middle frontal gyrus L 8 -36 14 62 4.56a 176b 
Superior frontal gyrus L 8 -21 26 62 3.73  
Middle frontal gyrus R 45 45 44 11 4.49 337b 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital) R 47 42 47 -10 4.32  
Middle frontal gyrus (orbital) R 11 27 41 -19 4.18  
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital) L 47 -42 47 -10 3.68 134b 
Inferior frontal gyrus L 45 -45 41 14 3.48  







5.4.2.2 Inhibitory control 
The Simple Go/No-Go > Go contrast showed no region of increased BOLD 
signal. The Complex Go/No-Go > Go contrast (Table 5.6, Figure 5.3) showed increased 
BOLD signal in a large bilateral parietal cluster covering the IPL, superior parietal gyri 
and precuneus, in a large bilateral frontal cluster covering the middle frontal gyri, 
precentral gyri, SMA and extending into the right anterior insula, as well as in smaller 
clusters in the left insula and caudate nucleus, right middle orbital frontal gyrus, and in 
the cerebellum.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. (a) Regions of increased BOLD signal in the right and left hemispheres in the 
Misconception > Control contrast of the science and maths task. (b) Mean parameter estimates (± 
SE) in misconception and control trials for the six main clusters (see Table 5.5). Zero represents 
the implicit baseline of the model, which includes the fixation phases. R: right; L: left; SMG: 
supramarginal gyrus; SFG: superior frontal gyrus; MFG: middle frontal gyrus; IFG: inferior 




Table 5.6. Brain activation in the complex Go/No-Go. a,b indicate pFWE < .05 at the voxel level, 
and pFWE < .05 at the cluster level (cluster defining threshold: puncorr < .001), respectively; L, R 
indicate left and right hemispheres respectively. 
Brain region L/R BA MNI Z-score Cluster size 
x y z 
Inferior parietal lobule R 40 39 -49 50 7.20a 2555b 
Inferior parietal lobule L 40 -42 -46 50 6.67a  
Precuneus R 7 9 -67 56 6.58a  
Precuneus L 7 -6 -70 53 6.43a  
Middle frontal gyrus R 45 45 35 35 6.66a 3898b 
Supplementary motor area L 32 -3 14 50 6.51a  
Superior frontal gyrus R 6/8 33 8 65 6.42a  
Anterior insula R  33 23 -4 6.14a  
Middle frontal gyrus R 46 36 50 20 6.14a  
Middle frontal gyrus L 6 -30 2 56 5.98a  
Inferior frontal gyrus R 44 45 8 26 5.39a  
Precentral gyrus L 6 -42 2 35 5.35a  
Middle frontal gyrus L 46 -33 56 17 5.06a  
Insula L 48 -30 20 5 6.17a 191b 
Caudate nucleus L  -18 2 20 3.65  
Crus I of cerebellar hemisphere L  -33 -58 -34 6.10a 590b 
Crus II of cerebellar 
 
L  -6 -79 -28 5.43a  
Crus I of cerebellar hemisphere R  36 -61 -31 6.00a 186b 
Lobule III of vermis R  3 -43 -19 5.72a 228b 






The Mixed > Congruent numerical Stroop contrast (Table 5.7, Figure 5.3) 
similarly showed increased BOLD signal in parietal clusters covering the IPL, superior 
parietal gyri and precuneus, frontal clusters located in the middle/inferior frontal gyri, 
extending into the precentral gyri, and a cluster in the right inferior temporal gyrus. 
 
Table 5.7. Brain activation in numerical Stroop. a,b indicate pFWE < .05 at the voxel level, and pFWE 
< .05 at the cluster level (cluster defining threshold: puncorr < .001), respectively; L, R indicate left 
and right hemispheres respectively. 
Brain region L/R BA MNI Z-score Cluster 
size x y z 
Precentral gyrus L 44 -42 8 32 5.89a 517b 
Inferior frontal gyrus L 45 -51 29 32 5.10a  
Middle frontal gyrus L 46 -48 50 14 4.62a  
Inferior parietal lobule L 40 -45 -43 56 5.88a 1007b 
Inferior parietal lobule L 40 -48 -37 44 5.59a  
Precuneus L 7 -6 -64 50 4.81a  
Figure 5.3. Regions of increased BOLD signal in the right and left hemispheres in (a) the 
complex Go/No-Go blocks > Go blocks contrast of the Go/No-Go task and (b) the Mixed blocks 
> Congruent blocks contrast of the numerical Stroop task. For both contrasts puncorr < .001 at the 




Superior parietal gyrus L 7 -27 -61 53 4.74a  
Inferior parietal lobule R 2/40 48 -37 53 5.82a 888b 
Angular gyrus R 40/7 33 -52 44 5.73a  
Inferior parietal lobule R 40 39 -43 44 5.68a  
Superior occipital gyrus R 7 30 -64 41 5.30a  
Inferior frontal gyrus  R 44 45 8 23 5.46a 564b 
Middle frontal gyrus R 45 51 35 23 4.97a  
Inferior temporal gyrus R 20 51 -52 -13 4.96a 143b 
 
5.4.2.3 Overlapping activation 
Of the six clusters observed in the Misconception > Control contrast, all except 
the left IFG showed partial overlap with the Complex Go/No-Go > Go contrast, and all 
except the left middle and right superior frontal gyri also showed partial overlap with the 
numerical Stroop Mixed > Congruent contrast (Table 5.8, Figure 5.4). However, this 
overlap was not complete. The network of brain regions showing increased BOLD signal 
in the inhibitory control tasks was broader (Figure 5.4) and part of the increased BOLD 
signal in the six science and maths clusters was unique to the Misconception > Control 
contrast (Figure 5.4). 
 
Table 5.8. Overlapping activation between the inhibitory control tasks contrasts and the science 
and maths task Misconception > Control contrast. Coordinates are the centre of mass of each 
cluster as calculated by MarsBaR. L, R, indicate left and right hemispheres respectively. 




 MNI   
Cluster size x y z 
Overlap between Misconception  > Control and Complex Go/No-Go > Go 
 Superior frontal gyrus R 8 25 15 61 127 
 Inferior frontal gyrus  R 11 28 44 -18 8 
 Middle frontal gyrus R 45 45 43 21 69 
 Inferior parietal lobule R 40 49 -43 47 333 
 Middle frontal gyrus L 8 -23 13 63 20 
 Inferior parietal lobule L 40 -52 -44 49 66 
Overlap between Misconception > Control and Mixed > Congruent Numerical Stroop 
 Middle frontal gyrus R 45 46 41 21 67 
 Inferior parietal lobule R 40 47 -41 48 188 
 Inferior frontal gyrus L 45 -47 47 9 9 





5.4.2.4 Exploratory correlations 
Age in months was not a significant covariate for any contrast. Correlations of 
individual differences in mean BOLD signal between inhibitory control activations 
(Complex Go/No-Go > Go, Stroop Mixed > Congruent) and science and maths activation 
(Misconception > Control) in each overlapping region identified were not significant. No 
Figure 5.4. Overlapping activation between the science and maths and inhibitory control tasks 
contrasts. BOLD signal in Misconception > Control and (a) Complex Go/No-Go > Go and (b) 
Mixed > Congruent in the numerical Stroop. Inhibitory control task contrasts are shown in blue, 
while the science and maths Misconception > Control contrast is shown in red, and regions of 
overlap are shown in purple. Note that the slices shown are the same in (a) and (b) to enable 
comparison between images, and the z-coordinate is indicated in the bottom left corner. Black 
circles highlight regions of overlap between the two contrasts, while white circles highlight regions 
common to all three contrasts. Contrasts are overlaid using MRIcron onto an image of the mean 




performance measures on any of the tasks were significant covariates for the 
Misconception > Control contrast (performance measures were Simple Go RT cost, 
Complex Go RT cost, Stroop RT cost, Stroop accuracy cost, science and maths 
misconceptions accuracy cost, and science and maths misconceptions RT cost). 
 
5.5 Discussion 
 The current study investigated the neural mechanisms of counterintuitive 
reasoning in adolescence and the overlap with inhibitory control. It was hypothesised that 
there would be overlap in the lateral PFC (9/45/46) and the ACC (BA 32). This was the 
first study to provide a direct comparison of the neural correlates of counterintuitive 
reasoning and inhibitory control within the same participants, and is unique in its 
inclusion of a broad range of science and maths topics. It was also the first study to 
address this research question with adolescents, rather than using an adult sample. The 
results showed some overlap but also considerable specificity of the neural correlates of 
counterintuitive reasoning and inhibitory control.  
Analysis of the behavioural data showed better performance in control trials than 
misconception trials, Complex than Simple Go/No-Go trials, and incongruent than 
congruent Stroop trials, as anticipated. Accuracy improved in misconception but not 
control trials with age, and in the Go/No-Go but not the numerical Stroop with age. The 
regression analyses did not replicate the results from Chapter 3 which may be due to the 
smaller sample size in the present study.  
The comparison of activation in trials involving counterintuitive reasoning to 
those with no counterintuitive reasoning showed increased BOLD signal in parietal and 
frontal regions, which overlapped to some extent with BOLD signal in both response 
inhibition in the context of a small working memory load (complex Go/No-Go) and 
semantic inhibition (numerical Stroop). Parietal overlap may be related to common 
requirements for attentive control and responding to alerting stimuli (Singh-Curry & 
Husain, 2009), which may be greater in counterintuitive problems and not related to 
inhibition per se. Prefrontal overlap suggests common executive processes in inhibitory 
control and counterintuitive reasoning in science and maths, supporting adult 
neuroimaging findings of increased activation in inhibitory control brain regions during 
counterintuitive science reasoning (Brault Foisy et al., 2015; Masson et al., 2014). For the 




science and maths, indicating that counterintuitive reasoning requires domain-general 
processes that are not specific to reasoning or knowledge within the discipline. 
Despite some overlap, the activation for science and maths counterintuitive 
reasoning was not fully aligned with inhibitory control activation. In part this was due to 
the broad network of inhibitory control regions, which formed some large clusters that 
extend away from counterintuitive reasoning areas. However, there was also activity 
specific to counterintuitive reasoning that was not present during the performance of 
response or semantic inhibition tasks. Although previous neuroimaging research has 
predominantly focussed on the involvement of inhibitory control in counterintuitive 
science and maths reasoning, these results highlight the need to explore other factors, 
beyond inhibitory control, which may play a role, including relational reasoning (see 
Chapters 6 and 7). This novel finding also highlights the importance of directly 
examining the brain activation associated with the cognitive function assumed to explain 
activity in a different task, rather than to rely on reverse inference. It is also worth 
considering the potential role of the multiple-demand (MD) network, a system which 
reflects cognitive challenge (Duncan, 2010). It is possible that these overlapping regions 
are indicative of increased challenge as opposed to common inhibition demands. 
The Simple Go/No-Go blocks, when contrasted with Go blocks, showed no 
increased BOLD signal. While 50% No-Go trials are common in fMRI studies of 
inhibitory control to increase the proportion of trials requiring inhibitory control per task 
block (e.g. Tamm et al., 2002), this high percentage may have meant that the task became 
too simple to demonstrate strong response inhibition effects. It is therefore not clear that it 
is only response inhibition in the context of cognitive load that overlaps with 
counterintuitive reasoning, since the purer response inhibition measure appears to have 
been watered down by the task design. However, the possible interpretation that response 
inhibition combined with cognitive load contributes to counterintuitive reasoning is 
consistent with the behavioural study reported in Chapter 3 using 25% No-Go trials, 
whereby No-Go accuracy in the complex Go/No-Go task, but not in the simple Go/No-Go 
task, was associated with counterintuitive reasoning performance. 
In contrast to the adult research and the hypothesis, increased BOLD signal was 
not observed in the ACC on any task. ACC activation is thought to reflect error-
processing and underlie the transition from adolescent to adult-level inhibitory control 
performance (Ordaz et al., 2013). This may also be attributable to the block design of the 
inhibitory control tasks, leading to a reduction in ACC BOLD signal that is specific to 




in the counterintuitive science and maths reasoning contrast, which did not follow a block 
design. There were also no age effects in the neuroimaging data for any task, where 
previous research has shown decreased recruitment of PFC with age in inhibitory control 
(Luna, Marek, Larsen, Tervo-Clemmens, & Chahal, 2015).  
While a range of schools were approached for recruitment, with participants from 
both state and fee-paying independent schools, it is likely that the sample is not entirely 
representative of the adolescent population. Those who opted to take part may have been 
those with parents who have a particular interest in science and maths, or who would 
encourage their children to take part in a research study outside of school. It is possible 
that such parents would be from a higher socioeconomic bracket. It is also likely that the 
adolescents who volunteered perform relatively well at school science and maths; those 
who strongly dislike or perform poorly in science and maths at school may have decided 
not to do extra science and maths in their spare time. Overall, this may have meant that 
the results are less generalizable to the adolescent population as a whole, potentially 
masking different effects that would arise in a sample with wider variation in results. 
In sum, the neuroimaging results provide some further support for the theory that 
inhibitory control enables suppression of naïve theories and distracting information, 
supporting counterintuitive reasoning across a wide range of science and maths topics in 
adolescence. The existence of overlapping regions in part supports previous 
neuroimaging studies of reasoning about misconceptions (Brault Foisy et al., 2015; 
Masson et al., 2014), but there are also distinct prefrontal and parietal patterns of 
activation during counterintuitive reasoning. 
 
The thesis next considers a second candidate cognitive process that may support 
science and maths problem-solving: relational reasoning. Chapter 6 will examine the 
extent to which individual differences in behaviour and brain activation during science 
and maths associates with analogical and non-verbal relational reasoning. In particular, 
the analysis is concerned with examining these associations over and above the possible 





Chapter 6 FMRI analysis 2: Relational reasoning and 
the neural correlates of science and maths reasoning 
 
6.1 Overview 
 Relational reasoning is a domain-general skill that matures through adolescence 
and is thought to be involved in science and maths reasoning. The unique contributions of 
verbal analogical reasoning and non-verbal matrix reasoning to science and maths 
performance are not well understood. In the current fMRI analysis, 11- to 15-year-olds (N 
= 34) answered science and maths problems inside the scanner, and took tests of 
relational reasoning outside the scanner. Better verbal analogical reasoning was 
associated with better science and maths accuracy and faster RTs, while non-verbal 
matrix reasoning was associated only with faster science RTs. More fine-grained analysis 
showed that analogical reasoning predicted science but not maths performance when 
other contributing factors were controlled for. Science and maths reasoning led to broad 
activation of bilateral networks in regions including the occipital lobe (BA 17, 18, 19), 
the inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37), hippocampus (BA 27), IPL (BA 7, 40, 2) and 
inferior frontal gyri (BA 44, 45, 48). Maths reasoning showed additional activation in the 
midcingulate area (BA 24) and the bilateral postcentral gyrus (BA 3). Increased BOLD 
signal in the parahippocampal gyrus, paracentral lobule and cerebellum during science 
reasoning was associated with better performance on the non-verbal matrix reasoning 
task. Increased BOLD signal in the left temporal lobe during maths reasoning was 
associated with better performance on the verbal analogical reasoning task. There were no 
associations between misconception performance specifically and relational reasoning 
when relevant executive function and vocabulary measures were controlled for. Overall, 
relational reasoning showed association with general science and maths reasoning. 
 
6.2 Introduction 
Relational reasoning is the ability to detect patterns between different 
representations (Crone et al., 2009). Analogical reasoning, the ability to observe 
similarities between items based on common associations (Whitaker et al., 2017), is the 
most studied type of relational reasoning, and is thought to be particularly important in 
learning new information. Other posited types of relational reasoning include anomalous, 




developmental trajectories (Jablansky et al., 2015). Relational reasoning ability continues 
to develop through adolescence (Richland et al., 2006; Whitaker et al., 2017), and there is 
evidence that as age increases, so does relational reasoning-related activation in the 
RLPFC (BA 10/47) (Dumontheil et al., 2010), VLPFC (BA 45) and SPL (BA 7) (Wright 
et al., 2008).  
Behavioural studies have linked relational reasoning to executive functions. One 
study found that early semantic inhibition and general executive function was associated 
with later performance on a verbal analogy task (Richland & Burchinal, 2013). Similarly, 
VS-WM was related to all four types of non-verbal relational reasoning measured by the 
TORR (Grossnickle et al., 2016). Behavioural studies have also shown significant 
associations between relational reasoning and science and maths. The research in science 
is limited however, with studies typically using analogy as a successful method of 
teaching new scientific information (Jee et al., 2013; Matlen et al., 2009), as opposed to 
investigating individual differences. The role of analogical reasoning in moment-to-
moment processing is therefore less clear. The literature is somewhat more developed in 
maths, with individual differences in maths shown to associate with individual differences 
in relational reasoning in 4- to 5-year-olds (White et al., 1998), 7- to 8-year-olds 
(Farrington-Flint et al., 2007), and adults (Alexander et al., 2016). 
The current study therefore aimed to expand the research on relational reasoning 
in three ways. First, the study aimed to look at the association between relational 
reasoning and science and maths while controlling for possible shared associations with 
executive function measures. It is currently unclear the extent to which associations 
between relational reasoning and science and maths may be driven by shared reliance on 
executive functions. Second, the study aimed to additionally study associations between 
relational reasoning and science and maths counterintuitive reasoning, again controlling 
for possible shared associations with executive functions. Third, the study aimed to 
determine whether individual differences in relational reasoning relate to individual 
differences in brain activation during science and maths reasoning. 
The science and maths data described in Chapter 5 were re-analysed to assess 
possible unique associations with two types of relational reasoning. Verbal analogical 
reasoning and non-verbal matrix reasoning tasks were administered. It was first 
hypothesised that both types of relational reasoning would improve with age, as shown in 
previous behavioural studies (Jablansky et al., 2015; Richland et al., 2006; Whitaker et 
al., 2017). It was further hypothesised that better relational reasoning ability would be 




(e.g. White, Alexander, & Daugherty, 1998). In terms of brain data, it was hypothesised 
that better relational reasoning would be associated with greater recruitment of brain 
regions associated with science and maths. In particular, greater activation was 
anticipated in regions involved in relational reasoning: the RLPFC (BA 10/46) 
(Dumontheil et al., 2010), the VLPFC (BA 45), and the SPL (BA 7) (Wright et al., 2008). 
It was hypothesised that verbal analogical reasoning would be more important in 
science, since the language requirements are greater in science trials than maths trials, 
some of which present equations. It is thought that verbal encoding of associations is a 
key skill in the learning of science (Tolmie et al., 2016), indicating possible shared verbal 
requirements of both science and verbal analogical reasoning. It was also hypothesised 
that non-verbal matrix reasoning would be more important in maths, which requires less 
language and more visuospatial reasoning. This would fit with behavioural research that 
has shown a greater link between maths and non-verbal reasoning than verbal analogical 
reasoning (van der Sluis, de Jong, & van der Leij, 2007). Finally, it was anticipated that 
associations between relational reasoning and science and maths (in terms of behaviour 
and brain activation) would be most important in the context of overall performance, 




The sample consisted of the participants from fMRI analysis 1 in Chapter 5, i.e. 
34 adolescents aged 11 to 15 years old (17 girls, 17 boys) (see section 5.3.1 for details). 
None of the participants were outliers on the relational reasoning measures using a 




6.3.2.1 Science and maths misconceptions 
 The behavioural and brain data from the science and maths misconceptions task in 
Chapter 5 (see section 5.3.2.1 for details) was used for this analysis. Here, rather than 
focusing only on contrasting activation between misconception and control trials, 
analyses also considered activation collapsing across these two trial types, but separately 





6.3.2.2 Inhibitory control 
 The behavioural inhibitory control data from both the Go/No-Go and numerical 
Stroop in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3.2.2 for details) were used for this analysis. Simple 
and complex Go RT cost were the response inhibition measures used. Accuracy and RT 
costs in the numerical Stroop were the semantic inhibition measures used. 
 
6.3.2.3 Analogical reasoning 
A verbal analogical reasoning task (Table 6.1) adapted from Leech, Mareschal, 
and Cooper (2007) was administered on a laptop using an online Google Form in a quiet 
room outside the scanner. Four practice items were administered with discussion between 
the participant and experimenter, to ensure that the task was understood. There were 24 
questions given in the format A:B::C:?, with a choice of four options. No time limit was 
given; participants were left to complete the task in their own time and could scroll up 
and down through different questions as all were present on the screen at once. The total 
number of correct responses was recorded (range = 15-24, M = 20, SD = 3). 
 
6.3.2.4 WASI 
 The Matrix Reasoning subtest of the WASI-II (Wechsler, 2011) was carried out 
using the manual, as described in Chapter 3 (see section 3.3.2.1 for details). This 
provided a measure of non-verbal relational reasoning ability. The raw score was used in 
the analyses, as opposed to the standardised score, to enable meaningful examination of 
changes with age (range = 15-26, M = 22, SD = 3).  
 The Vocabulary subtest of the WASI-II (Wechsler, 2011) was carried out using 
the manual, as described in Chapter 3 (see section 3.3.2.1 for details), providing a 
control measure of verbal ability. The raw score was used in the analyses (range = 31-43, 






Table 6.1. Questions in the verbal analogical reasoning task. Response options appeared in fixed order. P = practice item. Correct responses are in bold. 
No. Question Response 1 Response 2 Response 3 Response 4 
P 1 Nose is to Smelling as Eye is to Stink Glasses Seeing Listening 
P 2 Plane is to Air as Submarine is to Water Torpedo Flight Navy 
P 3 Right is to Wrong as Good is to Mistaken Morality Decent Bad 
P 4 Man is to Child as Oak is to Tree Acorn Teenager Leaf 
1 Bear is to Cave as Dog is to Dog House Bulldog Leash Cat 
2 Ocean is to Fountain as Desert is to Sandbox Water Oasis Dry 
3 Barber is to Scissor as Fireman is to Hose Policeman Fire Station Postman 
4 Asleep is to Wide Awake as Calm is to Tranquiliser Napping Cycling Frantic 
5 Bright is to Dark as Midday is to Sun Midnight Lunchtime Shiny 
6 Bird is to Wings as Fish is to Shrimp Fins Shark Water 
7 Unjust is to Fair as Obsessed is to  Fanatic Biased Passionate Indifferent 
8 Necklace is to Neck as Watch is to Watch Case Bracelet Ring Wrist 
9 Noisy is to Deafening as Quiet is to Ear-Splitting Peaceful Silent Headphones 
10 Tractor is to Aeroplane as Walk is to Trainers Bicycle Sprint  Sit 
11 Turtle is to Shell as Bird is to Feathers Nest Parrot Pigeon 
12 Guzzle is to Sip as Cascade is to Drink Rocks Stream Chemical Reaction 
13 Boiling is to Warm as Chilly is to Freezing Pepper Winter Scorching 
14 Sock is to Foot as Hat is to Woolly Hat Head Cap Hat Rack 
15 Snack is to Feast as Peckish is to Food Thirsty Starving Bite 
16 Valley is to Mountain as Mine is to Coal Canyon Tower Bury 




      
      
      
      
17 Fish is to Water as Squirrel is to Mouse Nuts Tree Hamster 
18 House is to City as Star is to Galaxy Sun Dwelling Celebrity 
19 Doctor is to Hospital as Policeman is to Detective Police Car Police Station Security Man 
20 Damp is to Drenched as Drizzle is to Downpour Storm Moist Umbrella 
21 Cat is to Milk as Dog is to Wolf Bone Fox Ball 
22 Genius is to Stupid as Crazy is to Sane Straightjacket Mastermind Bad 
23 Radio is to Ear as TV is to CD Player Microwave Eye Table 





6.3.2.5 Working memory 
 VS-WM was assessed using the dot matrix as in the classroom studies in Chapter 
4 (see section 4.3.1.3.2 for details), but this version was programmed in MATLAB (The 
MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA) and administered one-to-one, rather than administered 
online in a group testing session. Verbal working memory (VWM) was assessed using a 
verbal backwards digit span task. The experimenter read out a series of numbers and the 
participant verbally repeated the numbers in reverse order straight away. A practice of 
two items was given, and repeated with additional explanation if the participant did not 
get the answer right. Both tasks started with a load of three items, and the load increased 
in sets of four trials until two incorrect answers were given at any one load. The number 
of correct trials was recorded for each task (VS-WM score range = 2-16, M = 9, SD = 4; 
VWM score range = 2-18, M = 10, SD = 4).  
 
6.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested on these behavioural measures in a quiet room either 
before or after taking part in the fMRI procedure described in Chapter 5 (see section 
5.3.3 for details), in a session lasting approximately 30 min. The experimenter explained 
each task to ensure that participants understood what was required. 
 
6.3.4 Statistical analysis 
Analyses first focussed on the behavioural and brain data collapsing across 
misconception and control trials in science and maths. In a second stage, analyses 
contrasted misconception and control trials, as in Chapter 5. 
 
6.3.4.1 Overall science and maths reasoning 
6.3.4.1.1 Behavioural analysis 
Correlations were run between the key variables to examine associations and test 
for multicollinearity. Hierarchical multiple regressions investigated the extent to which 
relational reasoning variables could account for individual differences in overall science 
and maths accuracy and RT by discipline. Block 1 variables included the control 
variables, which were inserted stepwise so that only the significant predictors were kept 
in the model: age in months, WASI Vocabulary raw score, VS-WM total correct, VWM 
total correct, simple Go RT cost, complex Go RT cost, Stroop accuracy cost, Stroop RT 




reasoning score and WASI Matrix Reasoning raw score. Relational reasoning measures 
were entered last to establish the unique variance they could explain, over and above age, 
vocabulary, and executive functions. 
  
6.3.4.1.2 FMRI analysis 
FMRI data were preprocessed and modelled as described in Chapter 5 (see 
section 5.3.5 for details). First-level contrasts of the difference between science trials 
(misconception and control trials combined) and the arrows task (Science > Arrows) and 
between maths trials (misconception and control trials combined) and the arrows task 
(Maths > Arrows) were calculated. Contrasts were entered into one sample t-tests to 
create SPM maps which were thresholded at p < .001 uncorrected at the voxel level and at 
FWE-corrected p < .05 at the cluster level. Peak voxels significant at FWE-corrected p < 
.05 at the voxel level are also indicated. Associations between BOLD signal and age were 
investigated through entering age in months as a covariate to the one sample t-tests. 
Associations between BOLD signal and relational reasoning were investigated 
through entering analogical reasoning scores and WASI Matrix Reasoning raw scores as 
covariates. Where there were significant regions of activation, these were followed up by 
averaging the data for the Science > Arrows or Maths > Arrows contrast over each 
identified cluster using MarsBaR (Brett et al., 2002). Regressions were first run on mean 
activation in each cluster, entering science or maths accuracy and RT in block 1 using the 
enter method, followed by the relevant relational reasoning measure stepwise in block 2. 
Finally, further regressions were run on mean activation in each cluster, entering the same 
variables as in the behavioural analyses stepwise, to examine whether relational reasoning 
associations remained when controlling for the effect of any other significant factors (age, 
vocabulary, and executive function). 
 
6.3.4.2 Counterintuitive science and maths reasoning 
To examine misconception-specific associations, further correlations were run on 
science and maths accuracy and RT by trial type (misconception and control). Science 
and maths were combined for these analyses because there were no discipline effects for 
the Misconception > Control contrast. Further hierarchical multiple regressions 
investigated the extent to which the relational reasoning variables could account for 
individual differences in science and maths misconception accuracy and RT specifically. 




months, WASI Vocabulary raw score, VS-WM total correct, VWM total correct, and 
control performance (accuracy or RT). Block 2 contained the relational reasoning 
measures entered stepwise: analogical reasoning score and WASI Matrix Reasoning raw 
score. 
In order to investigate associations specific to misconceptions, relational 
reasoning measures were entered as covariates into the Misconception > Control contrast 
described in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3.6 for details). 
  
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Overall science and maths reasoning 
6.4.1.1 Behavioural results 
Correlations between the variables of interest (Table 6.2) showed neither 
relational reasoning measure to correlate with age. The two relational reasoning measures 
were positively correlated with one another. In terms of associations with science and 
maths, WASI Matrix Reasoning was significantly associated only with science RT, such 
that those with better Matrix Reasoning scores were faster to answer science problems. 
Analogical reasoning, on the other hand, was associated with all science and maths 
measures; those with better analogical reasoning were more accurate and faster on both 
science and maths problems.  
In terms of associations with executive function, again different patterns were 
observed for the two relational reasoning measures. WASI Matrix Reasoning was 
positively associated with both measures of working memory, but none of the inhibitory 
control measures. In contrast analogical reasoning was positively associated with VS-
WM but not VWM, and positively associated with Simple Go RT cost. Those who had 
better analogical reasoning had a larger RT cost, so were more affected by No-Go trials, 
i.e. they slowed down more when No-Go trials were present. 
There were also links between science and maths performance and executive 
function. Simple Go RT cost was positively associated with science accuracy, showing 
that those who performed better on the science task had a larger RT cost. VS-WM was 
significantly related to all science and maths measures, such that those with better VS-
WM scores were faster and more accurate in science and maths. Finally, VWM was 






Table 6.2. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths by discipline. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations 
























Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Science accuracy              
2. Science RT -.19             
3. Maths accuracy .61c -.26            
4. Maths RT -.16 .73c -.28           
5. Age (months) .40a .02 .42a -.16          
6. WASI Vocabulary .63c -.32 .51b -.23 .45b         
7. Simple Go RT cost .41a -.33 .03 -.11 .00 .33        
8. Complex Go RT cost .06 -.28 -.01 -.05 .05 .23 .59c       
9. Stroop accuracy cost .04 .10 .15 .01 .21 .08 .00 -.07      
10. Stroop RT cost -.14 -.06 .06 .15 -.09 -.22 .00 .14 -.14     
11. WASI Matrix Reasoning .33 -.37a .28 -.24 -.06 .20 .28 .09 .06 .24    
12. Analogical reasoning  .67c -.48b .48b -.42a .04 .48b .38a .11 .11 -.09 .54b   
13. VS-WM .36a -.36a .45b -.35a .15 .14 .09 .06 .06 .21 .44a .45b  




 The first hierarchical multiple regression investigated whether relational reasoning 
variables could account for individual differences in science accuracy when relevant age, 
vocabulary, and executive function differences were taken into account (Table 6.3). First, 
executive function measures, vocabulary, and age were entered stepwise, so that any 
significant variables could be taken account of before adding relational reasoning. In 
model 1a, WASI Vocabulary was a significant predictor, and 40% of the variance in 
science accuracy was explained. In model 1b, VWM total was added, explaining an extra 
11% of the variance. Finally, analogical reasoning was selected by model 1c, explaining 
an additional 12% of the variance in science accuracy.  
Table 6.3. Regression models for overall science and maths accuracy by discipline. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science accuracy 
Model 1a 
F(1, 31) = 20.56, 
p < .001, R2 = 40% 
Constant  0.44 .667 
WASI Vocabulary raw .63 4.54 < .001 
Model 1b 
F(2, 30) = 15.27, 
p < .001, R2 = 50%,  
ΔR2 = 10.6% 
Constant  0.30 .765 
WASI Vocabulary raw .59 4.51 < .001 
VWM total .33 2.53 .017 
Model 1c 
F(3, 29) = 16.31, 
p < .001, R2 = 63%, 
ΔR2 = 12.3% 
Constant  .01 .995 
WASI Vocabulary raw .39 3.02 .005 
VWM total .24 2.07 .047 
Analogical reasoning score .42 3.10 .004 
Maths accuracy 
Model 2a 
F(1, 31) = 10.85, 
p = .002, R2 = 26% 
Constant  1.07 .295 
WASI Vocabulary raw .51 3.29 .002 
Model 2b 
F(2, 30) = 10.14, 
p < .001, R2 = 40%,  
ΔR2 = 14.4% 
Constant  0.98 .336 
WASI Vocabulary raw .46 3.20 .003 
VWM total .38 2.69 .012 
 
The second regression looked at maths accuracy (Table 6.3) and similarly found 




variance, and VWM total was a significant predictor in model 2b, explaining 14% more 
of the variance in maths accuracy. However, no relational reasoning measures were 
selected in the next step. 
The next hierarchical multiple regressions were performed on RT (Table 6.4). 
VS-WM total was a significant predictor in model 3a for science RT, explaining 13% of 
the variance. Model 3b selected analogical reasoning score, explaining an additional 13% 
of the variance, and within this model VS-WM, was no longer significant. In maths, 
model 4 also selected VS-WM as a significant predictor, explaining 12% of the variance. 
No further variables were selected for maths RT.    
 
Table 6.4. Regression models for overall science and maths RTs by discipline. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science RT 
Model 3a 
F(1, 31) = 4.56, 
p = .041, R2 = 13% 
Constant  17.25 < .001 
VS-WM total -.36 -2.14 .041 
Model 3b 
F(2, 30) = 5.29, 
p = .011, R2 = 26%, 
ΔR2 = 13.2% 
Constant  8.97 < .001 
VS-WM total -.18 -1.01 .323 
Analogical reasoning score -.41 -2.32 .028 
Maths RT 
Model 4 
F(1, 31) = 4.22, 
p = .048, R2 = 12% 
Constant  18.33 < .001 
VS-WM total -.35 -2.06 .048 
 
 Overall, the behavioural results showed that analogical reasoning was associated 
with science and maths accuracy and RT. Associations with science, but not maths, 
remained significant when VS-WM (for RT) or vocabulary and VS-WM (for accuracy) 
were taken into account. Better analogical reasoning was therefore uniquely associated 
with higher accuracy and faster RTs in science only. WASI Matrix Reasoning was 
associated with faster science RTs, but this association did not hold when other measures 





6.4.1.2 FMRI results 
The contrast of [(Maths > Arrows) > (Science > Arrows)] was significant 
(although not the inverse) so science and maths were kept separate. The Science > 
Arrows contrast showed increased BOLD signal in a broad bilateral network of regions, 
with greater activation in the left hemisphere (Figure 6.1). A large bilateral cluster was 
observed in the occipital lobe (BA 17, BA 18, BA 19) extending to the inferior temporal 
gyrus (BA 37) and hippocampus (BA 27), and dorsally to the IPL (BA 7, 40, 2). Within 
the PFC, bilateral activation was seen in the inferior frontal gyri (BA 44, BA 45, BA 48). 
Further bilateral activation was observed in the superior temporal pole (BA 38) and insula 
(BA 47). Age was not a significant covariate for this contrast. 
 
 
The Maths > Arrows contrast showed increased BOLD signal in similar regions 
observed in the Science > Arrows contrast (Figure 6.2). A cluster was observed in the 
SMA (BA 8), extending to the midcingulate area (BA 24). There was also activation in 
the thalamus, and the right IFG (BA 45). Finally, this contrast showed increased BOLD 




Figure 6.1. Regions of increased BOLD signal in the Science > Arrows contrast from the one 
sample t-test with no covariates added. Contrasts puncorr < .001 at the voxel level and pFWE < .05 at 
the cluster level. Images are rendered on the canonical brain in SPM, showing from left to right: 





Further analyses assessed whether brain activation in either of these contrasts was 
associated with relational reasoning behavioural measures. In the Science > Arrows 
contrast, analogical reasoning was not a significant covariate but there were three clusters 
significantly positively correlated with WASI Matrix Reasoning. The first had a peak in 
the parahippocampal gyrus (BA 37), the second was more dorsal with a peak in the 
paracentral lobule (BA 4), and the third was in the cerebellum (BA 18) (Table 6.5, 
Figure 6.3). 
 
Table 6.5. Regions where BOLD signal during science or maths reasoning versus the arrows task 
positively correlates with relational reasoning, apFWE < .05 at the voxel level, bpFWE < .05 at the 
cluster level (cluster defining threshold: puncorr < .001). 
Brain region L/R BA MNI Z-score Cluster 
size x y z 
Science > Arrows and WASI Matrix Reasoning 
 Parahippocampal gyrus R 37 33 -34 -10 4.72a 1396b 
 Cuneus R 18 9 -76 17 4.67a  
 Lobule III of vermis R 27 6 -46 -22 4.69  
 Paracentral lobule L 4 -3 -34 56 4.42 228b 
 Precuneus L 5 -9 -46 68 4.15  
 Midcingulate area L 23 -3 -43 44 3.35  
 Crus I of cerebellar 
 
R  12 -76 -28 3.99 91b 
 Lobule VI of vermis R 18 6 -82 -19 3.72  
Maths > Arrows and analogical reasoning 
 Middle temporal gyrus L 21 -57 2 -16 4.64 264b 
 Middle temporal pole L 20 -39 8 -31 4.06  
 Superior temporal pole L 38 -42 14 -22 3.99  
Figure 6.2. Regions of increased BOLD signal in the Maths > Arrows contrast from the one 
sample t-test with no covariates added. Contrasts puncorr < .001 at the voxel level and pFWE < .05 at 
the cluster level. Images are rendered on the canonical brain in SPM, showing from left to right: 






In the Maths > Arrows contrast a 264 voxel cluster in the left middle temporal 
gyrus (BA 21) extending to the middle (BA 20) and superior temporal pole (BA 38) was 
a significant positive covariate with analogical reasoning (Table 6.5, Figure 6.3). WASI 
Matrix Reasoning did not correlate with the maths contrast. 
Average parameter estimates within each cluster were calculated and plotted 
against accuracy in the relevant relational reasoning task (Figure 6.4), indicating that 
these associations were not due to outliers but general trends across participants. Follow-
up analyses were performed in SPSS. The association between WASI Matrix Reasoning 
and Science > Arrows BOLD signal in all three clusters remained significant when 
controlling for science accuracy and RT, p’s < .001.  
Figure 6.3. Brain regions where BOLD signal during science or maths reasoning positively 
correlated with behavioural relational reasoning performance, z-coordinates are indicated in the 
bottom left corner. Clusters are plotted on six horizontal slices of the average normalised 





Regressions were run on each of the clusters, entering the control variables (age, 
WASI Vocabulary, and executive functions) stepwise in block 1, followed by WASI 
Matrix Reasoning stepwise in block 2. Full regression tables are reported in Appendix 2, 
and for all three clusters, WASI Matrix Reasoning score remained a significant predictor 
of Science > Arrows BOLD signal, p’s < .001. In addition, the model for activation in the 
parahippocampal gyrus cluster selected VWM and Simple Go RT cost, although neither 
were significant after WASI Matrix Reasoning was included in the model. The model for 
activation in the paracentral lobule selected Complex Go RT cost and VWM, although 
VWM was no longer significant when WASI Matrix Reasoning was added. Finally, the 
model for crus I of the cerebellum selected VS-WM, and this did not remain significant 
when WASI Matrix Reasoning was added. In all cases, the beta values were positive, 
such that better working memory and higher cost, i.e. more slowing down in the presence 
of No-Go trials, were associated with larger parameter estimates (i.e. greater activation). 
Figure 6.4. Average parameter estimates plotted against relational reasoning accuracy for the four 
significant clusters. Science > Arrows covaried with WASI Matrix Reasoning in clusters that have 
their peak in (a) the parahippocampal gyrus, (b) the paracentral lobule, and (c) crus I of cerebellar 
hemisphere; (d) Maths > Arrows covaried with analogical reasoning in the cluster that has its peak 




The association between analogical reasoning and Maths > Arrows BOLD signal 
in the temporal lobe cluster remained significant when controlling for maths accuracy and 
RT, p < .001. In addition, the regression (see full table in Appendix 2) showed that 
analogical reasoning remained a significant predictor of Maths > Arrows BOLD signal 
when the control variables were entered stepwise in a first block, p < .001. The model 
selected Simple Go RT cost as a significant positive predictor, but this was no longer 
significant when analogical reasoning was selected by the model. 
The neuroimaging results revealed that a broad network of bilateral brain regions 
showed increased BOLD signal during science and maths reasoning, with maths 
activation spreading out further than science. Increased BOLD signal across the 
parahippocampal gyrus, paracentral lobule and cerebellum during science reasoning was 
associated with higher WASI Matrix Reasoning raw scores. Increased BOLD signal in 
the left temporal lobe during maths reasoning was associated with better performance on 
the analogical reasoning task. These associations held when controlling for the effects of 
working memory and response inhibition. 
 
6.4.2 Counterintuitive science and maths reasoning 
6.4.2.1 Behavioural results 
For these analyses, data from the science and maths disciplines were combined as 
no difference in brain activation between misconception and control trials were observed 
between the disciplines in Chapter 5. Correlations split by misconception and control 
trials (Table 6.6) showed that WASI Matrix Reasoning was positively associated with 
control accuracy, while analogical reasoning was associated with higher accuracy and 
faster RTs across both trial types. Better VS-WM was associated with higher accuracy 











Table 6.6. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths 
misconceptions. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations are highlighted in bold, a,b,c 
indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Misconception accuracy     
2. Misconception RT -.08    
3. Control accuracy .57c -.34   
4. Control RT -.20 .88c -.44b  
5. Age (months) .47b -.06 .29 -.10 
6. WASI Vocabulary .59c -.29 .53b -.29 
7. Simple Go RT cost .25 -.21 .17 -.25 
8. Complex Go RT cost .00 -.15 .09 -.19 
9. Stroop accuracy cost .14 .07 .03 .04 
10. Stroop RT cost -.13 .09 .10 .00 
11. WASI Matrix Reasoning .26 -.31 .38a -.33 
12. Analogical reasoning  .55b -.44b .63c -.49b 
13. VS-WM .30 -.32 .54b -.42a 
14. VWM .28 -.28 .42a -.33 
 
 
Hierarchical multiple regressions examined age, vocabulary and executive 
function as predictors of science and maths misconception performance and tested 
whether relational reasoning measures accounted for unique variance in performance. For 
misconception accuracy, Model 5a was significant, selecting WASI Vocabulary as a 
significant positive predictor, explaining 35% of the variance, F(1, 31) = 16.63, p < .001. 
Model 5b was significant, adding control accuracy as a positive predictor, which 
explained an additional 10% of the variance, F(2, 30) = 11.97, p < .001. No further 
variables were selected. The regression on misconception RT showed that only control 
RT was a significant positive predictor, explaining 77% of the variance F(1, 31) = 
103.55, p < .001. 
Neither relational reasoning measure was found to associate with brain activation 
in the Misconception > Control contrast.  
Overall, the results showed that analogical reasoning was associated with all trial 
types, while WASI Matrix Reasoning was associated only with control accuracy. When 
accounting for control performance, no relational reasoning measures were predictors of 
misconception performance. There were no associations between science and maths 






This study aimed to investigate the role of relational reasoning in science and 
maths. In particular, both verbal analogical reasoning and non-verbal matrix reasoning 
were examined in the context of general science and maths, and in the context of 
misconceptions. Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no association between relational 
reasoning measures and age in this sample, where previous research has found relational 
reasoning to develop in this age range (Richland et al., 2006; Whitaker et al., 2017). This 
may be due to the insufficient power of this study for behavioural analyses or the 
relatively narrow age range of the participants, who were selected to be in or having just 
finished Key Stage 3. The study by Richland and colleagues found age improvements in a 
sample of 68 3- to 14-year-olds, while the study by Whitaker and colleagues observed age 
improvements in a sample of 95 6- to 18-year-olds. It is also possible that the tasks used 
here were not sensitive to age changes. 
In terms of general science and maths, when controlling for other factors, better 
analogical reasoning was associated with higher accuracy and faster responses in science 
only. While the previous evidence linking analogical reasoning with science has typically 
focussed on learning (Jee et al., 2013; Matlen et al., 2009), and analogy is specifically 
thought to be key in learning (Whitaker et al., 2017), this new evidence shows that 
analogical reasoning is also associated with in-the-moment reasoning. Correlations 
indicated an association between maths and analogical reasoning but when other factors 
were taken into account this effect was no longer present. Previous evidence linking 
analogical reasoning to maths (Alexander et al., 2016; White et al., 1998), may be in part 
attributable to visuospatial working memory (VS-WM) or vocabulary, which were not 
controlled for in those studies.  
Even though non-verbal matrix reasoning was not associated with science 
behaviourally when controlling for other factors, it was positively associated with 
increased BOLD signal during science reasoning. Increased activation in the 
parahippocampal gyrus was associated with better performance in matrix reasoning. Luo 
and colleagues (2003) found activation in this region for a similar analogical reasoning 
task, and suggested that the parahippocampal gyrus had a role in maintaining individual 
mental representations during analogical reasoning. Increased activation in the 
paracentral lobule, encompassing primary motor and sensory areas, during science 




less clear links to shared functions. Since there were no behavioural associations, it is 
possible that those who were better at matrix reasoning engaged those brain networks 
more during science reasoning, but they did not necessarily hold the knowledge necessary 
to get the answers correct. This would explain the lack of association between neural 
activity and accuracy. 
Working memory and response inhibition were associated with brain activation in 
science regions that covaried with matrix reasoning, although when matrix reasoning was 
selected by the model, these effects typically reduced or disappeared. This suggests that 
the association between relational reasoning and science is not driven solely by executive 
functions. 
During maths reasoning, increased BOLD signal in the temporal lobe was 
associated with better analogical reasoning. The middle temporal gyrus is thought to be 
crucial for the semantic processing of multimodal information (Visser, Jefferies, 
Embleton, & Ralph, 2012). The requirement for processing of multimodal stimuli is clear 
in the maths task, which presented both words and pictures, and sometimes equations. 
While the analogical reasoning task only presented words, it is possible that the words 
presented conjured mental pictures, or that the spatial processing inherent in the task (i.e. 
A is to B as C is to …) required integration of the two modes of processing. Response 
inhibition was associated with activation in the temporal lobe, with the effect 
disappearing when analogical reasoning was selected by the model. As with science, this 
indicates that the association between analogical reasoning and maths is not driven by 
executive functions. The activation of this region may reflect the involvement of 
cognitive processes that are involved in both inhibitory control and analogical reasoning, 
but more strongly involved in analogical reasoning. 
 It was surprising that maths did not relate to non-verbal matrix reasoning, since 
previous evidence has shown matrix-type reasoning measures to relate with maths in 
particular (Farrington-Flint et al., 2007; Green et al., 2017). The greater link between 
maths and verbal reasoning compared to non-verbal reasoning is in contrast to other 
research (van der Sluis et al., 2007) and may highlight the relatively high language 
requirements of the current maths task. It is worth noting that there are examples of other 
studies that have shown behavioural and neuroimaging data not to map directly onto each 
other. One such study attributed these differences to the varying sensitivity of the 
different methods, since there are likely factors that influence behavioural data which 




 The two relational reasoning measures were correlated with each other, indicating 
that high performance on one task is related to high performance on the other. However, 
the patterns of behavioural association were distinct, indicating that relational reasoning 
is an umbrella term to describe different types of ability. Aspects of verbal ability were 
controlled for in terms of expressive vocabulary and in the backwards digit span 
(measuring VWM), indicating that it was likely not just the verbal component of the 
analogical reasoning task that was driving the association. Rather, it seems that the ability 
to reason analogically may have specific importance in science reasoning.  
 This study was a first attempt to investigate different types of relational reasoning 
in science and maths within behavioural and neuroimaging data. The small sample size 
was a limitation of the study, particularly in looking at the behavioural data. A 
sufficiently powered behavioural study (see Chapter 7) is needed to draw firmer 
conclusions about the role of relational reasoning in science and maths. Overall the data 
so far suggest that analogical reasoning predicts unique variance in science performance, 
with more limited behavioural, but some neural associations in maths. Matrix reasoning 
showed minimal behavioural associations, but was related to neural activation in science. 
These effects are observed over and above individual differences in relevant executive 
functions, age and vocabulary. 
 
 Having established possible links between relational reasoning and science and 
maths, the thesis will next probe this association with a sufficiently powered behavioural 
study. Chapter 7, the final experimental chapter of the thesis, will further consider the 
extent to which individual differences in analogical and non-verbal relational reasoning 
associate with science and maths performance, again while examining a possible 





Chapter 7 Behavioural study 2: Relational reasoning 
and inhibitory control in science and maths 
 
7.1 Overview 
Inhibitory control and relational reasoning are two domain-general skills that 
continue to mature through adolescence. Both of these abilities are thought to be involved 
in science and maths reasoning, but their relative importance is unknown. In the current 
study, 11- to 15-year-olds (N = 120) completed response and semantic inhibition tasks 
(complex Go/No-Go, numerical Stroop, Hayling sentence completion), verbal analogical 
and non-verbal relational reasoning tasks (analogical reasoning and Cattell Culture Fair, 
CCF), and a counterintuitive science and maths reasoning task. Both verbal and non-
verbal reasoning was associated with better performance in science and maths in general 
and specifically for misconception problems. These associations held when vocabulary 
and executive function were taken into account. Inhibitory control as measured by the 
Hayling sentence completion test was associated with science and maths performance 
generally, but not in the context of misconceptions. Overall the results indicate that 
relational reasoning is associated with general science and maths reasoning, with a 
particular link to reasoning about misconceptions.  
 
7.2 Introduction 
 This study aimed to investigate further the interplay of inhibitory control, 
relational reasoning, and science and maths problem-solving. Results from Chapter 6 
indicated that both verbal analogical and non-verbal matrix reasoning were related to 
science and maths reasoning in terms of both behavioural and brain data, with executive 
functions and vocabulary possibly playing a mediating role. The results also indicated 
that relational reasoning was important for overall science and maths performance, and 
possibly in the context of misconceptions specifically. In Chapter 5, behavioural 
measures of inhibitory control were not significant predictors of science and maths 
performance in the regression models, and it was considered that a larger behavioural 
study would enable a better examination of the associations between inhibitory control, 
relational reasoning, and science and maths while controlling for vocabulary and working 
memory. Therefore, this study aimed to establish the unique contributions of inhibitory 




 In this study, it was important that the tasks fit into one school lesson of 45 min, 
as one of the schools requested that the testing session last only one lesson per participant 
to minimise school disruption. This requirement constrained some of the task decisions. 
The simple Go/No-Go was not included as Chapters 3 and 5 found that it was only the 
complex Go/No-Go that related to science and maths performance. The Stroop task was 
administered, but the number of trials was halved compared to Chapters 3 and 4. An 
additional measure of semantic inhibition was added to the testing session, in an attempt 
to include a task that more closely reflects the kind of inhibitory control that might be 
used while reasoning in science and maths. The measure selected was the Hayling 
sentence completion test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), which requires participants to listen 
to a sentence and inhibit the word that fits at the end of the sentence. Since the other 
inhibitory control tasks have no verbal component and do not rely on prior knowledge, it 
was considered that an inhibitory control task that recruits language and prior knowledge 
might show a unique association with science and maths reasoning (see full details in the 
Methods section below). Previous research has suggested that the Stroop and Hayling 
sentence completion measure different aspects of inhibition, as in one study performance 
on the two was not associated when controlling for fluid intelligence, and the neural 
correlates were dissociable (Cipolotti et al., 2016). Despite both aiming to measure 
semantic inhibition, the Hayling seems to measure inhibition in the context of 
implementing a strategy, while the Stroop measures inhibition in the context of 
suppressing the salient information. An exploration of the role of the two tests in science 
and maths reasoning is therefore of interest. 
 In Chapters 3, 5, and 6, the WASI Matrix Reasoning task was used as a measure 
of non-verbal matrix reasoning. In order to capture a greater range of non-verbal 
relational reasoning skills, the CCF test (Cattell & Cattell, 1959) was used in this study. 
This test was chosen because it combines four types of relational reasoning, and was thus 
considered likely to provide a more holistic estimate of relational reasoning. The CCF 
also has a time limit per scale and it was therefore possible to better estimate the length of 
the testing session with this measure, in contrast to the WASI Matrix Reasoning task and 
other relational reasoning tasks that have no time limit or a very generous time allowance. 
As in Chapters 4 and 6, working memory was considered a potentially important 
contributing factor. To control for the role of working memory, the backwards digit span 
was administered as in Chapter 6 to measure VWM. This task was chosen as it was a 
significant predictor of science and maths accuracy (arguably the more important 




 It was hypothesised that inhibitory control would specifically predict 
misconception performance, in replication of Chapter 3. It was also anticipated that the 
Hayling sentence completion test might be a better predictor of science and maths 
misconception performance than the other inhibitory control variables, due to the greater 
shared task requirements. It was further hypothesised that relational reasoning would 
predict science and maths performance generally, with verbal analogical reasoning being 




One hundred and twenty pupils participated in this study (Table 7.1). An a priori 
power analysis conducted using G*Power showed that for a medium effect size with 90% 
power and 5 tested predictors, 116 would be a sufficient sample size. Letters were sent to 
parents of 11- to 15-year-olds (in Years 7 to 10), inviting their children to take part. 
Written informed parental consent confirmed that participating children had no known 
neurological or developmental disorders. Participants aged 11 or 12 years verbally 
consented, while 13- to 15-year-olds provided written consent, in accordance with the 
guidelines of the local ethics committee, which approved the study. In contrast to the 
previous studies, the sample is predominantly boys (Table 7.1).  
 
Table 7.1. Participant characteristics. There was no gender difference in mean age, p = .644. 
   Age (years) Girls : Boys 
Age group n M (SD) Range n 
12y 30 12.05 (0.34) 11.50-12.67 7:23 
13y 30 13.12 (0.36) 12.33-13.67 7:23 
14y 30 14.08 (0.39) 13.41-14.75 7:23 
15y 30 15.15 (0.33) 14.42-15.67 7:23 
 
Two different schools were recruited for the study, the first of which was an 
English state secondary school where most students are from minority ethnic heritages, 
and the proportion of free school meals (determined by parental income-related benefits) 
is well above average, with 7 girls and 8 boys recruited per year group, while the second 
was an English fee-paying independent secondary boys’ school where performance is 




intended that each year group would have half girls and half boys, but recruitment for this 
study proved challenging and the boys’ school was particularly keen to be involved. 
 
7.3.2 Tasks 
7.3.2.1 Science and maths misconceptions 
The science and maths misconceptions task was administered in a similar manner 
to Chapter 3 (see section 2.1 for details). Science and maths problems were intermixed, 
as in the first behavioural study, with a 12 s limit and a 9 s warning as in the fMRI study, 
to ensure the maximum time spent on this task was under 20 min. 
 
7.3.2.2 Inhibitory control 
The complex Go/No-Go measured response inhibition and was administered as in 
Chapter 3 (see section 2.2.1 for details). The numerical Stroop measured semantic 
inhibition, and had half as many trials as in Chapter 3 (see section 2.2.2 for details), to 
reduce the time spent on this task, and trials were presented in two blocks. The Hayling 
sentence completion test was administered as in the manual, although it was programmed 
in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA) so that the researcher could type 
answers in and track RTs with the laptop rather than a stopwatch. In section 1 of the test, 
15 sentences missing their last word are read by the experimenter, and the participant 
must, as quickly as possible, say a word that completes the sentences (the sensible 
completion condition, Table 7.2). In section 2 of the test, again 15 sentences missing their 
last word are read by the experimenter and this time the participant must say a word as 
quickly as possible that does not fit at the end of the sentences (the unconnected 
condition, Table 7.2). Two practice items are given before the main test begins, to give 
the researcher an opportunity to explain the requirements of the task if they are not 
understood. The task measures semantic inhibition in the context of verbal and prior 
knowledge requirements. The Hayling overall scaled score was calculated as per the 
manual, by adding together an RT score from section 1, an RT score from section 2, and a 
score from section 2 based on number and type of errors given (i.e. if the word is 









Table 7.2. Example sentences missing their last word in the Hayling sentence completion test, 
taken from Burgess and Shallice (1996). 
Unconnected sentences 
The captain wanted to stay with the sinking 
He bought them in the sweet 
They went as far as they 
The whole town came to hear the mayor 
Most sharks attack very close to 
She called the husband at his 
None of the books made any 
Most cats see very well at 
The dog chased our cat up the 
The dough was put in the hot 
Jean was glad the affair was 
 
7.3.2.3 Relational reasoning 
 The verbal analogical reasoning task was administered on a laptop and adapted 
from Chapter 6 (see section 6.3.2.3 for details). This time the task was programmed in 
MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA), rather than as an online form. This 
enabled the task to be used on a laptop in school where there was no internet, and meant 
that only one question was presented at a time. There was no time limit for each question, 
as in the fMRI study. A few items were altered to make them gender neutral (e.g. fireman 
to firefighter) or to use British English (leash to lead). A self-timed break screen was 
included halfway through. The total number of correct responses out of 24 trials was 
recorded. 
 Scale 3 Form A of the CCF was administered as per the instructions, using the 
stimulus booklet and a response sheet whereby the participant marked their answer with a 
pencil. The booklet contained four non-verbal relational reasoning tests, measuring 
different aspects of relational reasoning: series, classifications, matrices, and conditions 
(topology). Instructions were read from the booklet verbatim. Each test in the booklet had 
a fixed time limit, and the task lasted a total of 12.5 minutes (not including instructions). 
The total number of correct responses was recorded for each scale, and the overall 





7.3.2.4 Working memory 
The backwards digit span measured VWM and was administered as in Chapter 6 
(see section 6.3.2.5 for details).  
 
7.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested in a quiet space in school for approximately 45 min 
during the school day. The experimenter described each computerised task, emphasising 
that responses should be given as quickly and accurately as possible. The tasks were 
performed in the following order: analogical reasoning, science and maths 
misconceptions, complex Go/No-Go, numerical Stroop, CCF. Due to constraints at the 
schools, it was not always possible to complete the full testing session. The Hayling 
sentence completion and backwards digit span were therefore completed at the end where 
time permitted, as these were considered to be less central to the main research questions. 
Participants were given no reward for taking part and were not provided with their results 
on any task, and it was explained that their responses would remain anonymous and 
independent of school assessments. 
 
7.3.4 Statistical analysis 
Exclusionary criteria were put in place before analysis commenced. Participants 
whose mean accuracy or RT was further than ±3.29 SDs away from the group mean were 
excluded from analyses of the task on which they were an outlier. Main effects of Age 
group were followed up with three planned tests assessing differences between 12y and 
15y, 13y and 15y, and 14y and 15y, since the greatest differences were anticipated in 
comparison to the oldest group. 
 
7.3.4.1 Science and maths misconceptions 
There were no outliers on this task (final N = 120). Two (Trial type: control, 
misconception) x two (Discipline: science, maths) x two (Statement type: true, false) x 
four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) mixed model repeated measures ANOVAs were 
performed on accuracy and RT in the science and maths misconceptions task.  
 
7.3.4.2 Inhibitory control 
Due to low accuracy, three participants were excluded from the complex Go/No-




numerical Stroop (two 13y, final N = 118). Two (Trial type: Go, No-Go or congruent, 
incongruent) by four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) mixed model repeated measures 
ANOVAs were performed on accuracy in the complex Go/No-Go and accuracy and RT 
in the numerical Stroop. A one-way (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) ANOVA was 
performed on RT in the complex Go/No-Go. 
There were no outliers on the Hayling sentence completion test, although one 
participant was not included due to experimenter error in test administration (final ns: 
12y: n = 16, 13y: n = 17, 14y: n = 23, 15y: n = 20, total N = 76 since not all participants 
completed the task). A one-way (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) ANOVA was performed 
on the Hayling overall scaled score, which does not take account of age.  
 
7.3.4.3 Relational reasoning 
There were no outliers on either relational reasoning test (final N = 120). The four 
CCF subscales correlated highly with each other, r’s between .429 and .482, and all 
scales were combined for analyses. A one-way (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) ANOVA 
was performed on the total number of correct responses in the analogical reasoning task 
and the CCF score. 
 
7.3.4.4 Working memory 
 There were no outliers on the backwards digit span measuring VWM (final N = 75 
since not all participants completed the task, range of scores = 1-18 M = 8, SD = 4). 
 
7.3.4.5 Regression analyses 
7.3.4.5.1 Overall science and maths reasoning 
Participants excluded from the Go/No-Go or Stroop analyses were also excluded 
from the regression analyses (final ns: 12y: n = 28, 13y: n = 28, 14y: n = 30, 15y: n = 29), 
leaving a final total N = 115. Correlations were run between the variables of interest to 
examine collinearity and assess associations between measures on all tasks. Hierarchical 
multiple regressions investigated whether inhibitory control and relational reasoning 
variables could account for individual differences in science and maths accuracy and RT.  
Regression models added age in months using the enter function in block 1. 
Inhibitory control variables were entered stepwise in block 2: complex No-Go accuracy, 
Stroop accuracy cost, and Stroop RT cost. Relational reasoning variables were entered 




this order, as the results from Chapters 3 and 6 indicated that inhibitory control was 
likely to be a significant but small predictor, with relational reasoning a larger predictor 
when it has an effect. Entering inhibition variables first meant that it would be possible to 
examine inhibitory control effects on their own first. This also follows the logic of 
Chapter 6 where executive function measures were entered first, and the analysis then 
considered the extent to which relational reasoning could explain variance over and above 
executive function. 
 
7.3.4.5.2 Counterintuitive science and maths reasoning 
Correlations were run between misconception and control accuracy and RT with 
the other variables of interest to examine collinearity and assess associations. Hierarchical 
multiple regressions investigated whether inhibitory control and relational reasoning 
variables could account for individual differences in science and maths misconception 
accuracy and RT, when accounting for control performance. 
Regression models added age in months and control accuracy or RT using the 
enter function in block 1. Inhibitory control variables were entered stepwise in block 2: 
complex No-Go accuracy, Stroop accuracy cost, and Stroop RT cost. Relational 
reasoning variables were entered stepwise in block 3: CCF score, and analogical 
reasoning score. 
 
7.3.4.5.3 Exploratory regressions 
Exploratory regression analyses were run on the sample who completed the 
Hayling sentence completion and VWM tasks (final ns: 12y: n = 14, 13y: n = 17, 14y: n = 
23, 15y: n = 19, leaving a final total N = 73). The same regression models were run as 
above, with VWM total entered as a control variable in block 1 and Hayling sentence 
completion overall scaled score entered as an inhibitory control variable in block 2. 
Where a regression was significant for science and maths combined, a follow up 
exploratory regression was run on science and maths separately, to examine possible 
discipline-specific effects and to explore whether directions of association were 
consistent between disciplines. The follow up model included the control variables and 
the reasoning and inhibitory control variables identified in the science and maths 






7.4.1 Science and maths misconceptions 
A two (Trial type: control, misconception) x two (Discipline: science, maths) x 
two (Statement type: true, false) x four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) mixed model 
repeated measures ANOVA performed on accuracy showed main effects of Trial type, 
Discipline and Statement type, with greater accuracy in control compared to 
misconception trials, science compared to maths trials, and true compared to false 
statements (Table 7.3).  
 
Table 7.3. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the science and maths misconceptions 
task. 
 Accuracy (%) RT (ms) 
M (SE) M (SE) 
Main effects 
Trial type  F(1, 116) = 632.57,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .845 
F(1, 116) = 352.55,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .752 
 Control 82.3 (0.9) 5601 (77) 
 Misconception 59.2 (1.1) 6425 (79) 
Discipline F(1, 116) = 11.74,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .092 
F(1, 116) = 24.11,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .172 
 Science 72.1 (0.9) 5874 (87) 
 Maths 69.4 (1.0) 6153 (72) 
Statement type F(1, 116) = 18.98,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .141 
n.s., p = .732 
 True 73.3 (1.0) 6005 (83) 
 False 68.2 (1.1) 6022 (74) 
Age group F(3, 116) = 4.14,  
p = .008, ηp2 = .097 
n.s., p = .367 
 12y 65.5 (1.8) 6130 (149) 
 13y 71.4 (1.8) 6142 (149) 
 14y 72.1 (1.8) 5965 (149) 
 15y 73.9 (1.8) 5817 (149) 
Interaction effects 
Trial type Discipline F(1,116) = 17.89,  
p = .001, ηp2 = .134 
n.s., p = .614 
 Control  Science 81.9 (1.0) 5472 (89) 




 Misconception  Science 62.3 (1.2) 6276 (92) 
 Maths 56.1 (1.4) 6576 (80) 
Trial type Statement type F(1, 116) = 6.34,  
p = .013, ηp2 = .052 
n.s., p = .060 
 Control  True 83.7 (1.1) 5543 (89) 
 False 80.8 (1.1) 5660 (78) 
 Misconception  True 62.9 (1.3) 6467 (91) 
 False 55.6 (1.5) 6384 (85) 
Discipline Statement type F(1, 116) = 32.96,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .221 
n.s., p = .384 
 Science  True 77.3 (1.0) 5885 (97) 
 False 66.9 (1.4) 5862 (88) 
 Maths  True 69.3 (1.3) 6124 (85) 
 False 69.5 (1.2) 6182 (77) 
 
These main effects were modulated by interactions that were followed up with 
repeated measures ANOVAs. The interaction between Trial type and Discipline was 
attributable to a difference between science and maths for misconception trials, F(1, 116) 
= 27.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .190, and not control trials, p = .534. The interaction between 
Trial type and Statement type was explained by a greater difference in accuracy between 
true and false statements in misconception trials, F(1,116) = 20.52,  p = .001, ηp2 = .150, 
compared to control trials, F(1,116) = 5.48,  p = .021, ηp2 = .045. Finally, the interaction 
between Discipline and Statement type was due to a significant difference between true 
and false trials for science, F(1,116) = 40.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .260, and not maths, p = 
.923. Overall accuracy increased with age and there was no interaction between age and 
any other variable. Follow-up planned comparisons revealed a significant difference only 
between 12y and 15y, p = .001.  
A two (Trial type: control, misconception) x two (Discipline: science, maths) x 
two (Statement type: true, false) x four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) mixed model 
repeated measures ANOVA performed on RT showed main effects of Trial type and 
Discipline, with faster RTs in control compared to misconception trials and in science 
compared to maths (Table 7.3). There was no main effect of Statement type or Age 
group. There was a significant three-way interaction between Trial type, Discipline, and 
Statement type, F(1, 116) = 6.20, p = .014, ηp2 = .051. This was followed up with further 
repeated measures ANOVAs, demonstrating that the difference between true and false 
was significant only for control maths trials, F(1,116) = 10.65,  p = .001, ηp2 = .084, with 




Overall the science and maths misconceptions task showed the main anticipated 
effect of lower accuracy and longer RTs in misconception trials compared to control 
trials, and an improvement in accuracy with age.  
 
7.4.2 Inhibitory control 
 A two (Trial type: Go, No-Go) x four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) mixed 
model repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy in the complex Go/No-Go showed a 
significant effect of Trial type, with higher accuracy in Go trials than No-Go trials (Table 
7.4). There was no significant effect of Age group, and no interaction between Trial type 
and Age group for accuracy, p = .774. A one-way ANOVA (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 
15y) on RT showed no significant effect of age (Table 7.4).   
 
Table 7.4. Accuracy and RT estimated marginal means in the complex Go/No-Go and numerical 
Stroop. 
 Complex Go/No-Go Numerical Stroop 
M (SE) M (SE) 
Accuracy (%) 
Trial type F(1, 113) = 275.87,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .709 
F(1, 114) = 178.02, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .610 
 Go/Congruent 88.9 (0.9) 96.3 (0.4) 
 No-Go/Incongruent 62.4 (1.6) 84.0 (1.0) 
Age group n.s., p = .483 n.s., p = .126 
 12y 75.6 (2.0) 88.3 (1.2) 
 13y 76.1 (2.0) 90.7 (1.3) 
 14y 77.7 (2.0) 89.4 (1.2) 
 15y 73.3 (2.0) 92.2 (1.2) 
RT (ms) 
Trial type - F(1, 114) = 261.94, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .967 
 Go/Congruent 406 (5) 714 (10) 
 No-Go/Incongruent - 800 (10) 
Age group 
n.s., p = .135 
F(3, 114) = 2.82, 
p = .042, ηp2 = .069 
 12y 422 (10) 805 (20) 
 13y 405 (9) 751 (20) 
 14y 407 (9) 741 (20) 




 A two (Trial type: congruent, incongruent) x four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) 
mixed model repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy in the numerical Stroop showed a 
significant effect of Trial type, with higher accuracy in congruent trials than incongruent 
trials (Table 7.4). There was no effect of Age group on accuracy, and no interaction 
between Trial type and Age group, p = .430. A repeated measures ANOVA on RT 
showed a significant effect of Trial type, with faster RTs in congruent trials than 
incongruent trials (Table 7.4). There was a main effect of Age group on RT. Planned 
comparisons showed that 12y was the only Age group significantly different to 15y, p = 
.009. 
A one-way (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) ANOVA showed no effect of Age 
group in the Hayling sentence completion, p = .182, overall M = 5.5, SD = 1.1.  
 Overall the Go/No-Go and Stroop tasks showed the anticipated inhibition effects 
of lower accuracy in trials requiring inhibition, and longer RTs in trials requiring 
inhibition in the numerical Stroop. Age effects were observed in numerical Stroop RTs 
where the oldest participants were faster than the youngest. 
 
7.4.3 Relational reasoning 
7.4.3.1 Overall science and maths reasoning 
 Descriptive statistics for the CCF, analogical reasoning, and VWM are reported in 
Table 7.5. One-way (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) ANOVAs showed no effect of Age 
group in the CCF score, p = .744, or analogical reasoning, p = .617.  
 
Table 7.5. Estimated marginal means and range in the CCF, analogical reasoning, and VWM by 
age. a indicates the subsample size that refers only to VWM. 
 Age Group 
12y 13y 14y 15y 
CCF score M 
 
21.8 (1.1) 22.5 (1.1) 22.5 (1.1) 23.5 (1.1) 
Range 11-32 13-33 9-36 10-35 
Analogical Reasoning score M 
 
16.7 (0.6) 17.5 (0.6) 16.9 (0.6) 17.8 (0.6) 
Range 9-23 10-23 10-22 10-23 
VWM total M 
 
7.3 (0.9) 8.5 (0.9) 7.5 (0.7) 8.6 (0.8) 
Range 4-12 2-12 1-17 2-18 





7.4.4 Regression analyses 
7.4.4.1 Overall science and maths reasoning 
 Correlations between the variables of interest were examined and assumptions 
regarding multicollinearity were met (Table 7.6). Note that there was a small positive 
correlation between age in months and performance on the Hayling sentence completion, 
and between age in months and CCF score, where there were no age effects in terms of 










Table 7.6. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths by discipline. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations 
are highlighted in bold, a,b,c  indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively, d,e denote subsamples of participants where n = 76 and n = 75 respectively. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Science accuracy            
2. Science RT -.22a           
3. Maths accuracy .69c -.26b          
4. Maths RT -.02 .73c -.11         
5. Age (months) .36c -.26b .29b -.18        
6. Complex No-Go accuracy .09 -.09 .11 -.13 -.04       
7. Stroop accuracy cost .09 -.01 .01 .07 -.11 .18      
8. Stroop RT cost .13 -.11 .00 .03 -.17 .04 .36a     
9. CCF score .64c -.07 .71c -.07 .19a .15 .19a -.01    
10. Analogical reasoning score .54c -.01 .59c .07 .14 .00 -.04 .06 .51c   
11. Hayling scaled scored .21 -.34b .23a -.27a .23a .22 .14 .04 .27a .10  






The first multiple regression investigated whether inhibitory control and relational 
reasoning could explain unique variation in science and maths accuracy (Table 7.7). 
Model 1a only included age and was significant, explaining 12% of the variance in 
accuracy. No inhibitory control variables were selected. Model 1b selected CCF score, 
explaining an additional 47% of the variance, and finally model 1c selected analogical 
reasoning score, explaining an extra 7% of the variance. Higher science and maths 
accuracy was associated with increasing age and better performance on the CCF and 
analogical reasoning tests. The second hierarchical multiple regression investigated which 
measures could explain variance in science and maths RT (Table 7.7). Model 2a, with 
age as the predictor, was significant, explaining just 6% of the variance. Older 
participants were faster on the task. No inhibitory control or relational reasoning 
measures were selected in further steps. 
 
Table 7.7. Regression models for science and maths accuracy and RT. Significant predictors (p < 
.05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science and maths accuracy 
Model 1a 
F(1, 113) = 16.00, 
p < .001, R2 = 12% 
Constant  2.97 .004 
Age (months)  .35 4.00 < .001 
Model 1b 
F(2, 112) = 80.65, 
p < .001, R2 = 59%, 
ΔR2 = 46.6% 
Constant  2.69 .008 
Age (months) .22 3.57 .001 
CCF score .70 11.29 < .001 
Model 1c 
F(3, 111) = 71.61, 
p < .001, R2 = 66% 
ΔR2 = 6.9% 
Constant  1.65 .101 
Age (months) .21 3.64 < .001 
CCF score .54 8.31 < .001 
Analogical reasoning score .31 4.75 < .001 
Science and maths RT 
Model 2a 
F(1, 113) = 6.90, 
 p = .010, R2 = 6% 
Constant  10.01 < .001 







The accuracy regressions were followed up by running them again for each 
discipline separately (Table 7.8), with the significant variables from the combined 
regressions inserted using the enter method. In both cases (models 3 and 4), all variables 
remained significant predictors with 52% of the variance explained in science and 60% of 
the variance explained in maths. 
 
Table 7.8. Regression models for science and maths accuracy by discipline. Significant predictors 
(p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science accuracy 
Model 3 
F(3, 111) = 40.41, 
p < .001, R2 = 52% 
Constant  1.38 .170 
Age (months) .23 3.48 .001 
CCF score .46 5.97 < .001 
Analogical reasoning score .27 3.49 .001 
Maths accuracy 
Model 4 
F(3, 111) = 54.71, 
p < .001, R2 = 60% 
Constant  1.30 .197 
Age (months) .15 2.41 .018 
CCF score .53 7.51 < .001 
Analogical reasoning score .30 4.21 < .001 
 
7.4.4.2 Counterintuitive science and maths reasoning  
Next, analyses concerned misconception performance. Correlations (Table 7.9) 
showed that both analogical reasoning and the CCF were positively associated with 
accuracy in both trial types, with no significant associations with RT. The Hayling was 
associated with faster RTs in both trial types, and higher accuracy in control trials only, 
although also in the positive direction for misconception accuracy. There were no 
significant associations with the other inhibitory control variables. Finally, VWM was 











Table 7.9. Pearson correlation coefficients of regression variables for science and maths split by 
misconception and control trials. Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations are highlighted 
in bold, a,b,c  indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively, d,e denote subsamples of 
participants where n = 76 and n = 75 respectively. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Misconception accuracy     
2. Misconception RT -.11    
3. Control accuracy .62c .02   
4. Control RT -.30b .82c -.24a  
5. Age (months) .36c -.23a .27b -.23a 
6. Complex No-Go accuracy .13 -.11 .06 -.11 
7. Stroop accuracy cost .03 .03 .06 .03 
8. Stroop RT cost -.01 -.04 .14 -.06 
9. CCF score .67c .03 .66c -.17 
10. Analogical reasoning score .55c .12 .56c -.07 
11. Hayling scaled scored .19 -.30b .27a -.33b 
12. VWM totale .29a .08 .32b .07 
 
 
Next, regressions were run on science and maths misconception performance 
while controlling for performance in control trials (Table 7.10). Model 5a was 
significant, explaining 42% of the variance in misconception accuracy, with age and 
control performance both significant predictors. No inhibitory control variables were 
selected. CCF score was added in model 5b which explained an additional 12% of the 
variance. Analogical reasoning score was added in model 5c and explained an extra 3% 
of the variance in misconception accuracy. The misconception RT regression was 
significant, with model 6a explaining 67% of the variance. Age was not a significant 
predictor, but control RT was. No inhibitory control variables were selected. Analogical 
reasoning score was entered in model 6b and explained an additional 3% of the variance, 








Table 7.10. Regression models for science and maths misconception accuracy and RT. 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science and maths misconception accuracy 
Model 5a 
F(2, 112) = 41.25, 
p < .001, R2 = 42% 
Constant  -2.44 .016 
Age (months) .20 2.69 .008 
Science and maths control accuracy .57 7.62 < .001 
Model 5b 
F(3, 111) = 43.70, 
p < .001, R2 = 54%,  
ΔR2 = 11.7% 
Constant  -1.69 .094 
Age (months) .20 2.92 .004 
Science and maths control accuracy .27 3.09 .003 
CCF score .46 5.33 < .001 
Model 5c 
F(4, 110) = 36.62, 
p < .001, R2 = 57% 
ΔR2 = 3.0% 
Constant  -1.98 .050 
Age (months) .20 3.05 .003 
Science and maths control accuracy .19 2.07 .041 
CCF score .40 4.69 < .001 
Analogical reasoning score .21 2.76 .007 
Science and maths misconception RT 
Model 6a 
F(2, 112) = 115.06, 
p < .001, R2 = 67% 
Constant  3.55 .001 
Age (months) -.05 -0.90 .369 
Science and maths control RT .81 14.55 < .001 
Model 6b 
F(3, 111) = 88.43, 
p < .001, R2 = 71%, 
ΔR2 = 3.2% 
Constant  2.76 .007 
Age (months) -.07 -1.39 .167 
Science and maths control RT .81 15.38 < .001 
Analogical reasoning score .18 3.49 .001 
 
 Misconception regressions were followed up by discipline. For accuracy in each 
of science and maths, the CCF score and analogical reasoning score both remained 
significant predictors of performance (Table 7.11). In science, model 7 explained 46% of 
the variance, with age and control accuracy both significant predictors in addition to the 
relational reasoning measures. In maths, model 8 explained 41% of the variance, with age 








Table 7.11. Regression models for science and maths misconception accuracy by discipline. 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science misconception accuracy 
Model 7 
F(4, 110) = 23.57, 
p < .001, R2 = 46% 
Constant  -2.04 .044 
Age (months) .23 3.24 .002 
Science control accuracy .19 2.21 .029 
CCF score .29 3.16 .002 
Analogical reasoning score .24 2.83 .006 
Maths misconception accuracy 
Model 8 
F(4, 110) = 18.70, 
p < .001, R2 = 41% 
Constant  -0.60 .547 
Age (months) .13 1.77 .080 
Maths control accuracy -.01 -0.06 .951 
CCF score .48 4.93 < .001 
Analogical reasoning score .20 2.15 .034 
 
 Analogical reasoning remained a significant predictor of both science and maths 
misconception RT (Table 7.12). In science, model 9 explained 66% of the variance, with 
control RT but not age a significant predictor. In maths, model 10 explained 46% of the 
variance, with age and control RT both significant predictors of misconception RT. 
 
Table 7.12. Regression models for science and maths misconception RT by discipline. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science misconception RT 
Model 9 
F(3, 111) = 72.25, 
p < .001, R2 = 66% 
Constant  1.32 .190 
Age (months) .00 -0.07 .947 
Science control RT .81 14.08 < .001 
Analogical reasoning score .16 2.86 .005 
Maths misconception RT 
Model 10 
F(3, 111) = 31.11, 
p < .001, R2 = 46% 
Constant  4.28 < .001 
Age (months) -.16 -2.23 .028 
Maths control RT .62 8.88 < .001 







7.4.4.3 Exploratory regressions  
Hierarchical multiple regressions were then run on the subsample who had 
Hayling sentence completion and VWM scores. For brevity, a summary is provided here 
and the regressions are reported fully in Appendix 3. For overall science and maths 
accuracy, VWM and Hayling scores were significant positive predictors, but when the 
relational reasoning measures were included in the model, they were no longer 
significant. This pattern held for science and maths accuracy separately. For science and 
maths overall RT, VWM total was not a significant predictor, while the Hayling was a 
predictor, explaining 11% of the variance in RT. Faster RTs were associated with better 
scores on the Hayling sentence completion test. Again, the pattern remained for both 
science and maths when they were considered separately. For science and maths 
misconception accuracy and RT, neither measure was a significant predictor of 
performance. 
In summary, the regression analyses showed that both relational reasoning 
measures predicted accuracy in science and maths, with the CCF explaining more 
variance than analogical reasoning. Those who had better relational reasoning scores also 
had higher science and maths accuracy. The same pattern was seen for misconception 
accuracy, when controlling for accuracy in control trials. For overall science and maths 
RT, there were no significant predictors, but analogical reasoning was a significant 
positive predictor of misconception RT: those who were better at analogical reasoning 
took longer to answer misconception problems. The relational reasoning associations 
remained significant predictors when working memory was added to the models. No 
Go/No-Go or Stroop variables were selected by any model. However, when verbal 
semantic inhibition as measured by the Hayling sentence completion test was included, it 
was a significant predictor of RT in science and maths. 
 
7.5 Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to determine the relative importance of inhibitory 
control and relational reasoning in science and maths problem-solving. There were three 
measures of inhibitory control, measuring response inhibition, semantic inhibition, and 
semantic inhibition in the context of increased verbal and prior knowledge requirements. 






showed that both relational reasoning measures were predictors of performance in science 
and maths general performance, and specifically in misconception performance. The only 
inhibitory control variable that was related to science and maths performance was the 
Hayling sentence completion test, which had greater reliance on verbal ability and prior 
knowledge. 
 
7.5.1 Inhibitory control and science and maths 
 Contrary to the hypothesis and the results from Chapter 3, inhibitory control as 
measured by the complex Go/No-Go and numerical Stroop did not predict misconception 
performance. Inhibitory control measures were entered into the models before the 
relational reasoning measures, so it is not the case that relational reasoning is explaining 
the same variance as inhibitory control. In this study, the simple Go/No-Go was not 
included and the numerical Stroop was halved in order to reduce the length of the testing 
session. It is possible that the shorter time spent on the inhibitory control tasks led to a 
different pattern of performance, which was less predictive of misconceptions. 
Nonetheless, the anticipated inhibitory control effects were observed: overall higher 
accuracy in Go and congruent trials compared to No-Go and incongruent trials, and 
longer RTs in incongruent trials.  
The Hayling sentence completion test was included as a measure of verbal 
semantic inhibition that may be more similar to the type of inhibition required during 
science and maths reasoning. The test is typically used in clinical populations so linking it 
to science and maths was novel here. Stroop performance did not correlate with Hayling 
sentence completion performance, which corroborates previous indications that the two 
tasks capture unique aspects of inhibition. This may be because strategy implementation 
is necessary for the Hayling, whereas in the Stroop, there is a constrained response set, 
possibly with much less of a requirement to implement a strategy (Cipolotti et al., 2016). 
Correlations showed that those who were better on the Hayling sentence completion test 
also had higher accuracy and faster RTs in the science and maths task. In the regression 
analyses, controlling for age and working memory, the Hayling was a significant 
predictor of overall accuracy and RT, which held for both science and maths separately. 
Only the association with RT remained when relational reasoning measures were entered 






misconception performance when accounting for control performance. These findings 
combined may highlight the verbal and knowledge-based nature of the science and maths 
task, such that the ability to suppress semantic verbal information is important in all types 
of problem.  
The results provide little evidence for a role of individual differences in inhibitory 
control in counterintuitive science and maths reasoning in adolescence, and also in 
science and maths more generally. Previous research relating inhibitory control to science 
has been inconsistent. One example showed that inhibitory control measured using a gift 
delay paradigm related to 3- and 4-year-olds’ ability to predict the movement of an object 
down an opaque tube (Baker et al., 2011). Another example linked a general measure of 
executive function that included inhibition to understanding of biology in 5- to 7-year-
olds (Zaitchik et al., 2014). These measures of inhibitory control were very different to 
those used in Chapters 3 and 7. It is possible that the aggregate executive function 
measure used by Zaitchik and colleagues (2014) did not reflect inhibition processes at all, 
since the different components were not separated. The findings here are more consistent 
with a study of 10-year-olds that found no link between semantic inhibition and scientific 
reasoning (Mayer et al., 2014), and learning studies that showed no association between 
response inhibition and learning biology (Rhodes et al., 2014) or chemistry (Rhodes et al., 
2016) or physics (Rhodes, n.d.) in 12- to 13-year-olds. Given the ages tested in the studies 
described, it is possible that inhibitory control is indeed important in science, but that 
individual differences in inhibitory control does not relate to science performance in 
adolescents. It may be more important for younger participants who have not yet reached 
the baseline level of ability that enables them to suppress misleading information or old 
theories. This might explain why the studies with younger children show a link (Baker et 
al., 2011; Zaitchik et al., 2014) while those with older children (Mayer et al., 2014) and 
adolescents (Rhodes et al., 2014, 2016) do not.  
This argument is less plausible in maths, where there have been links between 
individual differences in inhibitory control and maths in 3- to 6-year-olds (Merkley et al., 
2016), as well as in 11- to 14-year-olds (Gilmore et al., 2015; Khng & Lee, 2009). In 
addition, a negative priming study showed both 11- and 14-year-olds to respond more 
slowly to a maths problem that followed a prime with an incongruent relational term 
(Lubin et al., 2013). While they did not investigate individual differences on an inhibitory 






that was primed. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that inhibitory control might be 
important in maths at younger ages, when less sophisticated strategies for problem-
solving need to be inhibited, but then again later when number facts need to be 
suppressed (Cragg & Gilmore, 2014). According to this argument, inhibitory control’s 
role in maths takes an inverse U-shaped function, although the specific ages are unclear. 
The results of Chapter 3 and 7 do not convincingly implicate individual differences in 
inhibitory control in science and maths, but it remains possible that once a certain level of 
competence in inhibition is reached, there may be no advantage of better inhibitory 
control in the context of these misconception and control problems. 
This conclusion has important implications for individuals with developmental 
disorders where inhibitory control may be impaired, such as attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) (Simmonds, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008). For these adolescents, poor 
inhibitory control may mean that they are less able to suppress their intuitive but incorrect 
response, in spite of knowing the correct answer. Those with inhibitory control deficits 
therefore may require extra support in the classroom, to help them reason more 
effectively about counterintuitive concepts. 
 
7.5.2 Relational reasoning and science and maths 
The CCF showed a weak positive correlation with age, while the analogical 
reasoning task showed a non-significant positive correlation with age. Previous studies 
have shown maturation in relational reasoning between 5 and 17 years in one study 
(Jablansky et al., 2015), between 3 and 14 years in another (Richland et al., 2006), and 
between 6 and 14 years in another (Whitaker et al., 2017), and as such, a greater age 
effect was anticipated here than was found. This finding is similar to that seen in Chapter 
6 where age did not relate to analogical reasoning or matrix reasoning, although that was 
thought to be related to the small sample size in part. Nonetheless, one study showed the 
largest improvement from 6 to 10 years of age, and ceiling level performance at age 14 
(Whitaker et al., 2017), although this was likely due to the nature of the task which relied 
on pictures of familiar objects. Performance on the relational reasoning tasks in the 
current study was not at ceiling, and so the minimal age effects may simply reflect the 
relatively small age range tested here. When age was considered as a categorical factor 






which highlights the difficulty in providing the best description of age effects. Continuous 
analyses better reflect the true values of individuals’ ages, but group analyses are also of 
interest because these participants are grouped for their learning, and groups therefore 
reflect the time spent in formal learning environments. Considering both, as presented 
here, can therefore reveal more than just one approach alone, although more sophisticated 
curve fitting might be even more informative: other studies have found non-linear 
associations between relational tasks and age (Dumontheil et al., 2010; Magis-Weinberg, 
Blakemore, & Dumontheil, 2017), although these studies examined much larger age 
ranges. 
Both relational reasoning measures predicted accuracy in science and maths 
generally, as anticipated based on previous research (Farrington-Flint et al., 2007; Jee et 
al., 2013; White et al., 1998) and the findings presented in Chapter 6. The CCF 
explained more of the variance in performance than analogical reasoning, in contrast to 
Chapter 6, where the non-verbal matrix reasoning task explained less variance than 
analogical reasoning. The CCF was selected for this study as a more comprehensive 
measure of relational reasoning, with four different subscales, so this finding suggests that 
the CCF is indeed capturing more than the WASI Matrix Reasoning measure. The 
inclusion of both relational reasoning measures in the models suggests that there is not 
just one type of relational reasoning ability important for counterintuitive reasoning, 
which fits with the idea that relational reasoning can be split into distinguishable 
categories (Alexander et al., 2016). It is particularly noteworthy that the relational 
reasoning measures remained strong predictors of misconception accuracy when 
controlling for problems that require no counterintuitive reasoning. This novel finding 
indicates that relational reasoning may have a particular role in counterintuitive 
reasoning, which was not found in Chapter 6, where the sample size was smaller. In 
addition, the correlations between reasoning and performance by trial type in Chapter 6 
indicated a slightly larger association with control trials than misconception trials. 
However, this difference was minimal, and as such, the results from this larger 
behavioural study are more convincing.  
 No relational reasoning measures predicted overall RT in science and maths (as in 
Chapter 6), but analogical reasoning predicted misconception RTs when controlling for 
control problem RTs (in contrast to Chapter 6). The association was positive, such that 






especially interesting because the correlations between analogical reasoning and science 
and maths RT were not significant, and yet in Chapter 6 they were. This novel finding 
suggests that analogical reasoning may have specific importance for counterintuitive 
problem-solving, in addition to all types of science and maths reasoning. While fast RTs 
may traditionally be seen as indicators of better performance, this is further evidence in 
support of the conclusion in Chapter 3 that longer RTs may in fact reflect better 
performance; in particular, taking more time to reason about the problem presented. 
Comparing relations between different sets may be of importance when considering new 
problems, and the ability to do this when the problem is counterintuitive may be 
especially important, requiring a slowing down of responses to apply the analogy without 
error. For instance, when thinking about objects with different weights falling to the 
ground, it may be necessary to apply a previously learnt instance of objects falling to the 
current problem, with different objects relating analogously to one another. This 
reasoning would need to overcome the intuition that the heavier object falls faster. 
Overall, this finding suggests that encouraging students to slow down when answering 
problems in science and maths may help them to overcome misconceptions. Those with 
better analogical reasoning may recognise at some level that taking greater care in 
responding is helpful. 
Overall, the study found little evidence for a role of inhibitory control in science 
and maths reasoning. However, both verbal analogical and non-verbal relational 
reasoning were predictors of science and maths performance generally, and in the context 
of misconceptions, when controlling for age, vocabulary, and working memory. 
 
Having presented the results of the experimental chapters, the thesis will move on 
to the overall discussion. Chapter 8 will situate the findings from Chapters 3 to 7 in the 
wider literature, and consider the limitations of the studies presented throughout the 
thesis. It will then evaluate the educational neuroscience approach taken, and finally 







Chapter 8 Discussion 
 Science and maths reasoning are essential skills that children and adolescents 
develop through the school years. The ability to reason scientifically and mathematically 
remains important throughout life, allowing individuals to make informed decisions and 
contribute to society (The Royal Society, 2014). An understanding of the underlying 
skills that enable success in these disciplines may lead to improvements in teaching 
strategies, learning practices, and academic outcomes. This PhD aimed to take an 
educational neuroscience approach to investigate the cognitive and neural bases of 
science and maths reasoning in adolescence. 
 In Chapter 3, I showed that both response and semantic inhibition were 
associated with counterintuitive reasoning in a behavioural study. In Chapter 4, I 
presented the results of two classroom studies that were designed with the help of 
teachers, and showed that inhibitory control did not associate with misconception 
presence before or after a lesson on the counterintuitive concept. In Chapter 5, I showed 
that brain activations associated with both response and semantic inhibition overlapped 
with brain activations observed when adolescents reasoned about science and maths 
misconceptions. In Chapter 6, I showed that verbal analogical reasoning predicted 
unique variance in science performance and neural activation in maths, and non-verbal 
matrix reasoning associated with neural activation in science. These findings were for 
overall science and maths performance and brain activation, with no specific links to 
misconception performance or brain activation. Finally, in Chapter 7 I showed that 
verbal analogical reasoning and non-verbal relational reasoning were related to both 
general science and maths performance but also specifically to counterintuitive reasoning 
in a larger behavioural study. Overall, the results of the thesis show that inhibitory control 
(albeit weakly) and relational reasoning are two skills associated with success in school-
related science and maths performance. 
 In this discussion section I will first provide a summary and discussion of the 
findings presented across the chapters. I will then provide a reflection on the educational 
neuroscience approach adopted throughout the PhD. I will then consider how future 
research might take these findings forward. Next I will consider the educational 
implications of the findings and finally, I will provide an overall conclusion, highlighting 






8.1 Summary and discussion of findings 
8.1.1 Inhibitory control and science and maths 
 Inhibitory control is thought to have a specific role in counterintuitive science and 
maths reasoning, in enabling the suppression of incorrect, intuitive responses (Mareschal, 
2016). Intuitions may arise because of the way we experience the world. For instance, we 
see the Sun rise, move in the sky, and set, and it is therefore counterintuitive that the 
Earth goes around the Sun. Alternatively, perceptual cues or previously taught knowledge 
might interfere with our in-the-moment reasoning. Behavioural evidence has linked 
individual differences in inhibitory control to performance in both science (Zaitchik et al., 
2014) and maths (Cragg, Keeble, Richardson, Roome, & Gilmore, 2017) in children, and 
neuroimaging evidence from adults showed inhibitory control brain regions to be 
involved in counterintuitive reasoning (Brault Foisy et al., 2015; Masson et al., 2014). 
 Chapters 3 and 5 sought to extend the previous literature in three ways: first, by 
examining the unique contributions of response and semantic inhibition to 
counterintuitive reasoning; second, by using a broad range of problems related to the 
school curriculum, rather than using a repeated small set of problems; third, by comparing 
the brain regions recruited during inhibitory control to those specific to counterintuitive 
reasoning in adolescence. The studies had greater ecological validity than those reported 
previously, as they were the first to use problems that are related to the school curriculum. 
This is essential if links are to be made to learning and reasoning in real life. Chapter 3 
reported a behavioural study with 90 participants, and was the first study to use a novel 
science and maths misconceptions task designed to broadly cover misconceptions 
relevant to the Key Stage 3 curriculum for England. The results showed that the task 
worked as anticipated, with higher accuracy and shorter RTs in control trials compared to 
misconception trials. This indicated that the misconception trials, requiring 
counterintuitive reasoning, were indeed harder than control trials, even though the topic 
areas were matched, and in all cases these were problems covered in the school 
curriculum. The difference in performance between trial types was present even in the 
oldest participants, who had been taught all of these concepts in school. The key finding 
was that those with better inhibitory control were more accurate and took longer to 
respond on the misconception problems, when controlling for performance on the control 






 Specifically, better semantic inhibition, as measured by lower RT cost in the 
numerical Stroop task, was associated with higher accuracy on misconception trials. 
Response inhibition as measured by No-Go accuracy in the complex Go/No-Go task was 
associated with longer RTs on misconception trials. These novel findings indicated that 
both types of inhibitory control have a unique role in counterintuitive science and maths 
reasoning. Semantic inhibition may enable the suppression of intuitive theories, whereas 
response inhibition may allow for more time to reason about the problem.  
Chapter 5 reported a neuroimaging study of 34 participants, who completed 
adapted versions of the same tasks as in Chapter 3, while inside the fMRI scanner. The 
regression analyses on the behavioural data did not show the anticipated associations 
between inhibitory control and misconception performance, and therefore did not 
replicate the findings of Chapter 3, which is likely due to the reduced power in the 
neuroimaging study, since practical constraints led to a smaller sample size. Chapter 3 
used simple and complex No-Go accuracy as the key measures of response inhibition, 
while Chapter 5 used simple and complex Go RT cost. This change was made because 
the Go/No-Go was adapted for use in the scanner through an increase in the number of 
No-Go trials, which led to higher accuracy in No-Go trials. Decreasing the frequency of 
the dominant response is thought to reduce how difficult it is to inhibit this response, but 
this change reduces the oddball effect, whereby neural responses to No-Go trials are 
different because of their lower frequency as opposed to their inhibition requirements 
(Simmonds, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008). The Go RT cost measures therefore aimed to 
capture response inhibition through the impact on changing RTs of the introduction of 
No-Go trials compared to blocks where there were only Go trials. The lack of association 
between response inhibition and misconception performance may therefore be because 
these are less sensitive measures of response inhibition, as the increased proportion of 
No-Go trials makes a non-response easier. Although not significant, the correlations 
(reported in Chapter 6) tended to show that those with a higher RT cost in both the 
simple and complex Go/No-Go were more accurate and slower in the science and maths 
misconception task. While a large RT cost is typically considered to reflect poorer 
performance, this would support the idea that slowing down may in fact indicate taking 
more time to answer the problem, and thus reflect better performance.  
The semantic inhibition measures in Chapter 5 were the same as in Chapter 3: 






of congruent trials only, which again may have changed the pattern of performance, 
perhaps making it harder to focus on the number of items. Stroop accuracy cost was not a 
significant measure in Chapter 3, but Stroop RT cost was. In Chapter 5, the correlations 
between Stroop RT cost and performance were not significant, and the direction of 
association was such that a higher RT cost was associated with lower accuracy in 
misconception trials. This would fit with the findings in Chapter 3, but appears to 
contradict the argument above that a large RT cost reflects more careful and better 
performance. This may highlight the unique roles of semantic and response inhibition, 
which possibly behave differently in science and maths reasoning. It is possible that being 
slowed down in a response inhibition task by No-Go trials is linked to the ability to spend 
more time problem-solving before giving a response. Conversely, being slowed down in a 
semantic inhibition task by incongruent trials may be linked to being unable to suppress 
an incorrect theory, regardless of the time spent on the problem. Further research is 
needed to tease apart these possible associations. 
The neuroimaging results in Chapter 5 showed parietal (BA 40) and prefrontal 
(BA 8, 45) regions with increased BOLD signal specifically in response to misconception 
problems (compared to control problems). These regions showed overlap with those 
involved in both response and semantic inhibition, indicating that inhibitory control may 
indeed be a mechanism supporting performance. Given the potential issues with the 
behavioural measures, as described above (and the fact that these issues arose from 
optimising the tasks for the scanner), these neuroimaging results implicate inhibitory 
control more strongly. However, there was also activation unique to counterintuitive 
reasoning, indicating that other cognitive mechanisms are also likely at play. In addition, 
the investigations into individual differences in BOLD signal did not show any significant 
associations. There were no links between misconception-specific BOLD signal and 
activation in the inhibitory control tasks, nor between misconception-specific BOLD 
signal and behavioural measures of science and maths or inhibitory control. While the 
overlap is more convincing than previous studies that did not measure inhibitory control 
activation, the lack of correlations may be evidence that despite the overlap, these regions 
do not reflect the same processes. In addition, fMRI does not provide the granularity 
required to measure activity of specific neurons, and it is therefore possible that the 
overlapping regions may in fact not show overlapping neurons at all, with different 






misconceptions. It is also possible that some of the overlap between the Stroop and 
misconception BOLD signal is due to the numerical nature of the Stroop task. 
Nonetheless, congruent trials of the Stroop also present numbers, and it was therefore 
assumed that any number-specific processing arising from the Stroop would disappear 
through the subtraction of Congruent blocks. 
Finally, with regards to the fMRI data, it is possible that the regions that showed 
increased BOLD signal across tasks reflect engagement of the MD network. The MD 
system refers to common recruitment of certain brain areas in response to many different 
types of cognitive challenge (Duncan, 2010). The system extends over regions of the 
prefrontal and parietal cortex, and incorporates the IPS, inferior frontal sulcus (IFS), 
anterior insula and frontal operculum (AI/FO), rostral PFC, pre-SMA and ACC (Duncan, 
2010). From the regions that showed overlapping recruitment of misconception reasoning 
and inhibition, two were similarly located to those typically observed in the MD system: 
the IPS and the IFS. These regions showed activation across all three contrasts of interest 
(misconception, response inhibition, semantic inhibition), which further suggests that this 
increased BOLD signal may reflect the MD network and cognitive challenge, rather than 
showing inhibitory control processes. The regions that were specific to overlap in just one 
inhibitory control task did not match any areas of the MD system, which may indicate 
that these are more specific to response and semantic inhibition, while the IPS and IFS 
could be MD-related. Nonetheless, this argument rests on the assumption that 
misconception problems are more challenging than control problems, and this is only true 
where there is a conflict within a participant, and this is unlikely to be the case for all 
trials in all participants. For example, a participant might get a misconception problem 
wrong because they have no awareness of the correct concept, having not been taught it in 
school yet. For that participant, the problem is no more difficult that the accompanying 
control problem. Overall, it seems unlikely that the overlap is due to the MD network, and 
if the MD network is involved, this does not explain all of the overlap observed.  
Chapter 4 reported a study of 48 participants who were taught two new 
counterintuitive physics concepts by their class teacher, and a study of 69 participants 
who were taught a new counterintuitive maths concept by their class teacher, in a school 
where performance is above the national average. Inhibitory control did not associate 
with misconception performance at any time point, even when considering only those 






finding. The administration of the inhibitory control tasks as a whole class may have 
impacted performance. Participants were often sitting next to their friends, and were in 
some cases distracted, particularly the younger participants in the physics study who were 
a year younger than those in the maths study. Overall, it was a very different testing 
environment to the one-to-one testing session in Chapter 3. There sample size in both 
studies was based on the participants available in school rather than a power analysis, and 
this was compounded by the fact that many participants missed lessons due to 
extracurricular activities. It is also possible that this lack of association arose due to the 
increased salience of the newly learnt topics (since participants were aware they were part 
of a research project), particularly as ceiling performance was observed for one of the 
concepts following the lesson. There were just three misconceptions examined across 
these studies, and had a broader range of misconceptions been investigated, there may 
have been increased need for inhibitory control to answer the problems. In addition, the 
science study only looked at physics. Nonetheless, the results did align with other 
research showing no role for inhibitory control in the learning of new science concepts, 
albeit outside the context of misconceptions (Rhodes et al., 2014, 2016).  
Chapter 7 brought together inhibitory control and relational reasoning in science 
and maths in a behavioural study of 120 participants. This study did not replicate the 
findings from Chapter 3 that those with better inhibitory control also performed better on 
the science and maths misconceptions task. Complex No-Go accuracy was used as the 
measure of response inhibition, and contrary to Chapter 3, No-Go accuracy was 
negatively correlated with RT in the science and maths misconceptions task (although not 
reaching significance). This finding may have been due to the changes made to the 
inhibitory control tasks, since they were shortened for Chapter 7, which may have led to 
a different pattern of performance, for example, requiring less attention in a shorter task. 
The science and maths misconception task was also reduced by a time limit. This would 
have led to a reduction in average science and maths RTs, and a smaller range of values, 
which may have reduced associations with this measure. Verbal semantic inhibitory 
control, as measured by the Hayling sentence completion test, was related to faster RTs 
and higher accuracy in science and maths, and not specifically in the context of 
misconceptions. This task was chosen as a measure of inhibitory control that might more 
closely reflect the type of inhibition that is required during counterintuitive reasoning, but 






the sentence, and administration experience indicated that some participants may have 
used a strategy to aid performance that meant that the task did not necessarily reflect 
inhibition: it was observed that participants sometimes seemed to respond without 
listening to the sentence, having already decided upon the word they would say to 
complete the sentence. The observation that strategy-use played a role corroborates the 
explanation from Cipolotti and colleagues (2016) that the Hayling requires strategy 
implementation. This is in contrast to the Stroop, where there are a set number of 
responses, and the information which must be suppressed is visually available (Cipolotti 
et al., 2016). This difference likely led to the different associations between the two 
measures of semantic inhibition and science and maths. 
 One key possible reason for the inconsistencies in the results presented throughout 
the thesis is that changes were made to the tasks across studies. In addition to the changes 
already discussed above, participants received practice in the inhibitory control tasks 
before performing them in the scanner in Chapter 5. Although practices were given in all 
chapters, the practice was more comprehensive in Chapter 5, to ensure that participants 
knew what to expect inside the scanner. There was also a gap between the practice and 
performance of the task in Chapter 5, which may have allowed more time for 
consolidation of the task requirements, possibly with mental rehearsal. Overall, this 
would suggest that the inhibitory control tasks were easier in Chapter 5 due to those 
amendments. In addition, the scanner environment may have led participants to perform 
the task in a different way, since it was unusual. The science and maths misconceptions 
task had no time limit in Chapter 3, which may have led to a different pattern of 
performance, although participants were told to answer as quickly as possible. In all other 
chapters using this task, a 12 s time limit was given, with a red border prompt appearing 
at 9 s, which some participants may have found somewhat stressful, and thus they may 
have responded differently. In Chapter 3, there were only two response options in the 
science and maths misconceptions task, while in the other chapters there were four 
options so that participants could indicate their certainty. This aspect was introduced 
since the 50% accuracy in misconception trials observed in Chapter 3 may have 
corresponded to guesses. The presence of four different responses would likely have 
changed the nature of the task, since participants had to come up with their answer and 
consider how certain they were. An initial investigation into the use of the response keys 






others always choosing the probably option, with no link between certainty and 
performance. However, this was a cursory look and in order to better understand the 
responses, this should be investigated more formally in the future. Finally, the science and 
maths problems changed to different degrees between studies, and these tweaks may have 
inadvertently changed the extent to which inhibitory control was necessary to answer the 
problems. However, this was only relevant to a small sample of the problems. 
It is possible that the results are due to the specific tasks used throughout the 
course of the studies. The science and maths task was a new task that had not undergone 
extensive validation, and as such may not be the best way of capturing misconceptions in 
adolescents. While the task was adapted over time and tweaked in response to teacher 
feedback, it nonetheless does not match the kind of problems that adolescents face in the 
classroom or in exams. The true/false response may have encouraged a more impulsive 
response, whereas a problem that requires the writing down of a response may have 
elicited behaviour that better reflects typical classroom reasoning. In addition it is 
possible that the inhibitory control tasks did not accurately capture the type of inhibition 
that is required for overcoming misconceptions. While the Hayling sentence completion 
task attempted to better reflect the inhibition required in the classroom, the possible use of 
effective strategies that may require little inhibition, may explain the lack of effects.  
Finally, it is possible that the results are due in part to the socioeconomic 
backgrounds of the participants. While attempts were made across the studies to recruit 
participants from both state and independent schools, it is likely that those who 
volunteered to take part had a particular interest in science and maths, which might not 
reflect the adolescent population. The independent school samples likely have a higher 
socioeconomic background than state school samples, which may be one explanation for 
the minimal associations in Chapters 4, 5 and 7, as compared to Chapter 3, where all 
participants were from a state school. The findings across studies may therefore not be 
generalizable to the wider adolescent population, where performance may be lower and 
other factors like home environment may be particularly important.   
 Overall, the results of these studies provide some further support for the theory 
that inhibitory control enables the suppression of intuitive answers during reasoning about 
misconceptions (Dunbar et al., 2007; Mareschal, 2016), and that poor performance in 
these disciplines may be due to poor inhibition as opposed to poor knowledge or 






the replacement, reorganisation, or restructuring of previously held knowledge (Posner et 
al., 1982; Vosniadou, 2007). The studies reported here extend the behavioural research by 
investigating misconceptions in particular, where previous studies have linked inhibitory 
control to general performance in science and maths. The studies also extend the 
neuroimaging findings to a broad range of educationally-relevant stimuli, and explicitly 
compare brain activation during misconception reasoning and inhibitory control, going 
beyond the reverse inference used in previous investigations.  
 
8.1.2 Relational reasoning and science and maths 
 Prior research linking relational reasoning and science have typically used 
analogies as a tool to teach new science concepts. Studies have found that teaching by 
analogy can be effective compared to other modes of teaching (Jee et al., 2013; Matlen et 
al., 2009). Other work has shown that expert scientists use relational reasoning skills 
when reasoning about scientific concepts (Trickett et al., 2009). In maths, individual 
differences in relational reasoning ability have been shown to associate with better maths 
performance (Farrington-Flint et al., 2007; White et al., 1998). In addition, relational 
reasoning ability has been linked to executive functions (Grossnickle et al., 2016; 
Richland & Burchinal, 2013). It was therefore considered that executive functions should 
be controlled for in investigating the role of relational reasoning in science and maths. 
 Chapters 6 and 7 sought to extend the literature in three ways: first, by 
examining the behavioural associations between relational reasoning and science and 
maths while controlling for shared associations with executive functions; second, by 
specifically linking relational reasoning to counterintuitive reasoning in science and 
maths; and third, by relating individual differences in brain activation during science and 
maths to relational reasoning performance. Chapter 6 reported a neuroimaging study, 
analysing data from the same 34 participants in Chapter 5. The correlational data showed 
that better verbal analogical reasoning was associated with better science and maths 
performance (higher accuracy and faster RTs), and that better non-verbal matrix 
reasoning was associated with faster science RTs. When controlling for vocabulary and 
working memory, analogical reasoning remained a significant predictor of science 
performance. The lack of association with non-verbal matrix reasoning was attributed to 






measure of non-verbal relational reasoning. Experience administering the test suggested 
that there are some problems which most participants get right, some which most 
participants get wrong, and a few in the middle that lead to the bulk of variation in 
responses. It was this observation that led to the inclusion of a different test of relational 
reasoning in Chapter 7 that was considered to be more comprehensive through its 
inclusion of different subscales, and more sensitive due to the time limit. 
The brain analyses in Chapter 6 showed activation during science reasoning in 
the parahippocampal gyrus (BA 37, 18, 27), paracentral lobule (BA 4, 5, 23), and 
cerebellum (BA 18), to correlate with non-verbal matrix reasoning. In maths, activation in 
the temporal lobe (BA 21, 20, 38) correlated with analogical reasoning performance. In 
both cases, these associations held when other significant predictors of brain activation in 
those regions were controlled for. None of these regions are those typically observed in 
the MD system (Duncan, 2010), so the increased activation of these regions cannot 
simply be attributed to general increased cognitive challenge. This was the first study to 
link relational reasoning to science and maths reasoning brain and behaviour when 
controlling for the effects of age, vocabulary, and executive function. Chapter 6 also 
indicated a possible role for analogical reasoning in science misconception performance, 
although this was not supported by the neuroimaging data, which showed no links 
between misconception activation and relational reasoning individual differences. This is 
further support for the argument that misconception activation does not reflect the MD 
system, since MD networks tend to map well onto activation during relational reasoning 
tasks (Duncan, 2010). 
 Chapter 7 sought to extend these findings, and reported a behavioural study of 
120 participants, using a more comprehensive measure of non-verbal relational reasoning 
alongside the same verbal analogical reasoning task (which was altered slightly). The 
CCF relational reasoning test was chosen in place of the WASI Matrix Reasoning subtest 
used in Chapter 6. One advantage of this test is that it has a time limit for each subscale, 
and was thus suitable for use in schools with strict time requirements for testing. 
Experience observing participants complete this test indicated that there was greater 
variation in terms of which items were answered correctly, and as such it does seem to be 
a more comprehensive measure. Indeed the CCF showed greater links to science and 
maths performance than in Chapter 6, indicating increased sensitivity of this scale to 






disadvantage of using the CCF was that this scale does not correspond to the four 
categories of relational reasoning proposed by Alexander and colleagues (2016). The 
TORR, which does tap all four categories (see section 1.4), was initially considered as the 
measure to be used in Chapter 7, but the lack of time limit meant participants may not 
have had time to finish within the allocated testing session time. There is no clear link 
between the scales in the CCF and the TORR, and it appears that each scale in the CCF 
incorporates aspects of different types of relational reasoning measured in the TORR. 
Both verbal analogical reasoning and non-verbal relational reasoning were 
associated with higher accuracy in both science and maths when controlling for age, 
vocabulary, and working memory in Chapter 7. In addition, both measures were 
predictors of misconception accuracy when controlling for performance in control 
problems. This finding is particularly noteworthy because it suggests that relational 
reasoning has particular importance for counterintuitive reasoning, over and above 
vocabulary and executive functions. A final interesting finding was that analogical 
reasoning predicted misconception RTs, such that better analogical reasoning predicted 
slower RTs. This suggests that participants with better analogical reasoning took more 
time to answer the problems. This finding relates to the finding in Chapter 3 and 5 that 
better response inhibition was associated with slower RTs, and as such is further support 
for the idea that slowing down during the resolution of counterintuitive problems may be 
a marker of better performance, rather than worse performance.  
Since Go/No-Go and Stroop measures were not significant predictors of 
performance in Chapters 6 and 7, the interplay between inhibitory control, relational 
reasoning, and science and maths reasoning was hard to examine. In the reduced sample 
of participants who had data in VWM and the Hayling sentence completion test 
(measuring verbal semantic inhibition), the Hayling score was a significant predictor of 
science and maths accuracy. But when non-verbal reasoning was selected by the model, 
the Hayling score was no longer a significant predictor. This indicates that the CCF was 
able to explain the variance in science and maths accuracy better than the Hayling, and 
that relational reasoning ability may be contributing to performance in both. There were 
no other models that selected both the Hayling and relational reasoning measures, 
although the Hayling score did predict RT in overall science and maths, where no 
relational reasoning measures were significant. The latter finding may indicate that those 






verbal nature of the task. However, it is also possible that this association merely reflects 
the time requirements of the Hayling sentence completion test. The time taken to give an 
answer in the Hayling is a key part of the overall score used, and as such it may simply be 
that those who are faster on the Hayling (and thus get a better score) are also faster on the 
science and maths task. 
 Overall, these studies show that both verbal analogical and non-verbal relational 
reasoning are associated with performance in science and maths, even when controlling 
for age, vocabulary, and executive function. They extend the previous findings in linking 
individual differences in relational reasoning to science and maths in terms of both brain 
and behaviour, and in particular to misconceptions. 
 
8.2 Reflection on educational neuroscience approach 
Throughout the PhD I aimed to take an educational neuroscience approach, with 
five particular dimensions. I will first briefly consider the extent to which I was able to 
integrate each planned dimension into the PhD, and then consider further the debate 
around educational neuroscience, reflecting on my own experiences.  
a. Regularly meet with teachers to continually assess the educational relevance of 
the studies and findings. 
Throughout the course of my PhD I was partnered with a school where members 
of staff were interested in the research I was addressing. I met with school staff on 
a regular basis, and explained my research to them. I had informal talks with 
teachers across disciplines, who often asked me how my research related to their 
subject, so this provided opportunities for me to link my findings to secondary 
school education. 
b. Spend a substantial amount of time in school to ensure a rounded understanding 
of the typical science and maths classroom, and the school context more widely. 
I observed a total of 66 science and maths lessons at my partner school, which 
gave me a good understanding of typical lessons in these disciplines, which 
included taught material, group work, practical sessions, and independent work. 
Observing a wide range of teachers also highlighted the degree of freedom that 
teachers have in how they teach a lesson. This was useful in considering the kind 






c. Use stimuli that are relevant to science and maths content that 11- to 15-year-olds 
frequently encounter and need to understand for exam success. 
I met with groups of science and maths teachers and showed them the stimuli for 
the main science and maths misconceptions task. Changes were made to the 
stimuli on the basis of their feedback, to ensure the problems were relevant to the 
content students had to know. In addition, the classroom studies in Chapter 4 
were designed with help from the teachers, who chose topics that were relevant 
for the year groups being tested. 
d. Adopt a suite of methods to address reasoning and learning at different levels of 
scientific understanding. 
The PhD combines behavioural, fMRI and classroom-based studies. While a 
training study was initially planned for the PhD, this did not come to fruition as 
the interested school eventually dropped out. A training study would have helped 
to determine causal links between inhibitory control and counterintuitive 
reasoning, and as such may have enhanced the conclusions drawn from the PhD. 
e. Feed results back to teachers and pupils who took part in the research to ensure 
that their participation saw rewards and that the research had impact. 
Results were given to teachers in the form of three presentations across two 
schools. In addition, I gave two talks to pupils who had taken part in the research, 
and have two more talks planned for next academic year. In all cases, I present the 
theory behind the research, the methods used, the results, and the possible 
educational implications. I also provide the opportunity for teachers and pupils to 
think about how they might change their teaching or learning practices in light of 
what I have presented. Teachers in particular have told me that they have found 
the process interesting and useful, and that the research chimes with their own 
experiences in the classroom. 
As described in Chapter 1 section 1.1, there is debate concerning the extent to 
which educational neuroscience can impact positively on education. According to some 
critics, neuroscience cannot inform education, as the distance is too great (Bishop, 2014; 
Bowers, 2016). Others have argued that integrating psychological and neural levels of 
explanation can lead to a greater understanding of the processes involved education, and 
have pointed to examples of progress in the field (Howard-Jones et al., 2016). My 






support the view that neuroscience and education can inform one another. While my 
research has not led to specific recommendations for teaching and learning, there are 
nonetheless some promising avenues for future research which may eventually lead to 
more solid recommendations for education. Critics have pointed to the lack of useful 
educational neuroscience research so far (Bowers, 2016), but the field is young, and this 
thesis has shown that it is not simply the case that one study can seamlessly integrate 
neuroscience and education, resulting in clear educational recommendations. Each area of 
research is an ongoing endeavour, and will require many different studies, with theories 
changing over time. The collaboration with teachers in the work presented in this thesis 
has shown that research can be bolstered by taking into consideration the expertise of 
teachers. Stimuli were altered based on teacher recommendations, and this granted the 
research greater ecological validity. 
It has also been argued that simply finding out the neural underpinnings of an 
education-related cognitive process cannot reveal anything useful for education (Bishop, 
2014). The neuroimaging findings presented in this thesis have shown that this argument 
does not accurately characterise the nature of all neuroimaging research in this field. 
Rather than simply documenting the brain regions involved in misconceptions, the aim 
here was to establish the overlap with inhibitory control, in order to better understand the 
cognitive mechanisms. In addition, the research was concerned with individual 
differences, in reporting how individual differences in recruitment of certain brain regions 
related to performance in relational reasoning tasks. This type of research does not 
directly lead to educational recommendations, but can inform later study design, and 
potentially highlight cognitive mechanisms that may lead to educational 
recommendations in the future.  
Finally, working closely with teachers gave them the opportunity to shape the 
research in a small way according to their interests, and even enabled them to consider 
new approaches for the classroom. While the teachers are aware that the theories under 
examination in this project are being tested and thus not incontrovertible, teachers have 
told me that they have started to try out different techniques that draw on this research 
(for examples, see section 8.4). With the rise of teacher-led research (Dommett, 
Devonshire, & Churches, 2018), these kinds of collaborations between researchers and 






classrooms, contributing further to the scientific dialogue, without the need for external 
researchers to dictate the programme of investigation. 
Overall, I found the experience of taking an educational neuroscience approach to 
be a positive one. I believe that a commitment to educational relevance has made the 
conclusions drawn more useful for education. Conducting different types of studies, and 
considering more than one level of explanation has led to a better understanding of the 
possible associations between different skills. There is no doubt that there is still plenty of 
work to be done in order to fully address the cognitive and neural bases of science and 
maths reasoning in adolescence. But this approach has paved the way for further research, 
and in the future it is hoped that there will be firmer educational recommendations in this 
area. This can only be achieved if teachers are involved as expert collaborators, and the 
research focusses on educational recommendations as a specific aim throughout, as 
opposed to simply an afterthought. 
 
8.3 Future research 
Of particular interest for future research is the extent to which cognitive training 
might lead to improved performance in science and maths. Attempts at training inhibitory 
control have proven successful. For example training 30 adults on the stop signal task 
over 10 sessions led to improved performance alongside associated neural changes in the 
IFG, compared to 30 adults who did not receive training (Berkman, Kahn, & Merchant, 
2014). A study of 19 15- to 17-year-olds found improvement on the stop signal task, but 
with no transfer to a Go/No-Go task or risky behaviour (which was considered to reflect 
poor inhibitory control in the real world) as measured by a questionnaire (Beauchamp, 
Fisher, & Berkman, 2018). These examples follow a line of research aiming to improve 
executive functions, which have typically shown improvement in the task being practiced, 
and near but not far transfer (Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2013) despite early anticipation 
that academic-related skills such as science would improve in tandem (Klahr, 
Zimmerman, & Jirout, 2011). The proposed training would therefore not address 
inhibitory control or relational reasoning in isolation. Rather, training would occur within 
the context of science and maths, encouraging inhibitory control and relational reasoning 






approach would reveal more about the educational relevance of the findings, and further 
allow for testing of possible causal associations.  
To this end, I have been involved in the design and testing of an inhibitory control 
training programme in the context of primary school. The UnLocke programme 
(www.unlocke.org) aims to encourage inhibitory control during science and maths 
counterintuitive reasoning, through requiring pupils to ‘stop and think’ before giving their 
answer. This differs from the more traditional cognitive training approach which would 
have pupils practice inhibitory control in a separate programme, and examine any transfer 
to school-related performance. In addition, in the UnLocke programme, pupils are 
exposed to three types of reasoning about the counterintuitive concept: the correct 
reasoning, the incorrect reasoning that exemplifies the misconception, and different 
incorrect reasoning that is unrelated to the misconception. It is hoped that this approach 
will highlight to students both how to reason correctly, and the fact that incorrect 
reasoning can occur. The final data are still being collected for this study, and it relates to 
primary school rather than secondary school, but future research could test a similar 
approach in adolescents. Caution should be taken though, as it is possible that 
encouraging students to inhibit their initial responses may not always be beneficial; 
sometimes the first answer might be right, and students might change their answer 
erroneously. 
The training of relational reasoning within the context of science and maths would 
also be of interest. As described in the Introduction (see section 1.4.3.1), there are already 
examples of analogical reasoning as a learning tool in science, which have shown success 
(Jee et al., 2013; Matlen et al., 2009). However, these examples have not focussed on 
adolescents, nor have they attempted to improve analogical reasoning skills in science. It 
is unclear from these studies how individual differences in analogical reasoning relate to 
the ability to learn through analogies, and whether learning in this manner improves 
analogical reasoning in other areas of science. Therefore, a key focus for future research 
could be the extent to which relational reasoning within the domain of science and maths 
can improve science and maths performance. This might involve explicitly highlighting 
relations between taught material, or altering the presentation of content such that 
relational reasoning requirements are increased. There have been attempts at relational 
reasoning training outside of the context of discipline-learning. One study found that 11- 






training, but that this did not transfer to other tested tasks, which included VWM and face 
perception (Knoll et al., 2016). It is interesting to note that while all age groups improved 
with training, the biggest improvement in relational reasoning was in late-adolescence 
(age 16 to 18 years). This suggests that this period of adolescence may be a good target 
for future interventions, and would coincide with final school examinations.  
Other studies have similarly shown that performance on relational reasoning tests 
can be trained. One small-scale study of 28 7- to 10-year-olds examined the effect of 
eight weeks of training on different reasoning games (Mackey, Hill, Stone, & Bunge, 
2011). The training led to improvement on the trained games, as well improvement on an 
untrained test of non-verbal matrix reasoning. One study examined 50 adults, half of 
whom received training in the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) in the USA, which 
heavily relies on reasoning, and half of whom did not (Mackey, Whitaker, & Bunge, 
2012). Training was associated with higher performance on the LSAT, with 
accompanying decreased diffusivity in white matter connecting the frontal cortices to 
each other. A similar fMRI study of 51 adults found that training was associated with 
higher LSAT scores, and strengthened fronto-parietal functional connections (Mackey, 
Miller Singley, & Bunge, 2013). These neuroimaging studies provide convincing 
evidence that relational reasoning can be trained, with associated brain changes. 
Nonetheless, it is still unclear whether or not this transfers to improved aptitude with 
regards to school- and university-related outcomes. 
These findings are particularly interesting when considered in the context of 
school entrance exams that use relational reasoning tests. The 11 Plus is an exam in the 
UK that grammar schools and some independent schools require students to sit before 
entry. The 11 Plus contains a verbal reasoning test and a non-verbal reasoning test. If the 
skills required to perform well on these tests improve through practice, it seems that they 
do not measure an underlying fixed ability, which calls into question their claim to 
indicate natural academic ability. Similarly, tests in the UK (such as the Law National 
Aptitude Test, LNAT) and USA (LSAT) for entry to university or college for some 
courses rely on relational reasoning. Future research could therefore investigate the extent 
to which performance on these entrance exams relates to course performance, taking into 
account the extent of training that was undertaken, and the type of training. Given the 






performance, which would have important implications for the institutions that rely on 
these tests. 
Beyond training studies, there is also further work to be done in establishing links 
between individual differences in different types of skill. The work presented here could 
be extended to examine more specific links between types of misconceptions and types of 
inhibition or reasoning. For instance, it is possible that different types of inhibitory 
control specifically allow the suppression of misconceptions of different origins. 
Similarly, it may be that different types of relational reasoning specifically enable 
reasoning about certain types of counterintuitive concepts. The studies presented here did 
not categorise types of misconception, and contained a mixture of those due to misleading 
perceptual cues, previously held beliefs, and prior experiences with the world (and it may 
prove difficult to tease apart the origins of misconceptions). Nonetheless, I have 
suggested that semantic inhibition may be more important for suppressing intuitive 
theories, and that response inhibition may be more important for allowing time to reason 
about the problem. These hypotheses could be tested further by grouping counterintuitive 
concepts according to their proposed origins, and assessing associations with semantic 
and response inhibition. An alternative might be to ask participants why they thought the 
misconception was true, and to group the problems according to each participant’s 
reasoning. 
One possibility that was not considered in the research in this thesis is that 
inhibitory control does not have a linear association with misconception performance. For 
instance, it may be that when answering a misconception problem when it is first 
encountered requires no inhibitory control, because the individual holds only the 
misconception, and does not hold the correct concept. Thus, there is nothing to inhibit. 
Later, when the correct, counterintuitive concept has been learnt, the individual must 
inhibit their intuitive response to get the answer right. Later still, the correct concept may 
be fully automatized, and so again, inhibitory control is not necessary (or is necessary to a 
lesser extent), since the correct response has been successfully assimilated. It is possible 
that this non-linear association led to the weak inhibitory control effects observed in the 
studies within this thesis. In order to address this question, future research could assess 
the presence of specific misconceptions in individuals, ideally over time, and examine the 
link between inhibitory control and misconception performance once the correct answer 






into new territory, taking a more longitudinal approach and ideally with a wider range of 
participant performance to avoid ceiling effects, and a broader set of concepts to increase 
the ecological validity. 
In addition, different types of science and maths ability could be examined more 
closely. For example, although not focussing on counterintuitive reasoning, previous 
research found an association between inhibition and procedural maths, but not between 
inhibition and conceptual or factual maths (Gilmore et al., 2015). Maths could be 
measured by these three components, with control problems and misconception problems 
within each component. Science could be measured according to the three core skills 
proposed by Tolmie and colleagues (2016): prediction, description, and explanation, 
again with control problems and misconception problems in each. As in the studies 
reported in this thesis, both response and semantic inhibition could be measured. 
Relational reasoning could be measured according to the four components posited by 
Alexander and colleagues (2016): analogical, anomalous, antinomous, and antithetical. 
While these components are thought to be best combined to get an overall measure of 
relational reasoning ability, investigating the possibility that they show different patterns 
of association to science and maths may lead to important insights. In addition, working 
memory (visuospatial and verbal) and vocabulary could be measured, to establish shared 
associations and mediating relations. A large-scale, comprehensive investigation of this 
kind would lead to more specific conclusions than presented here, possibly with 
associated specific recommendations for education. 
 
8.4 Educational implications 
In order to support the development of counterintuitive reasoning, the challenge 
for teachers lies in recognising misconceptions, remedying them, and all the while 
building on correct prior knowledge (Klahr et al., 2011). While the results presented in 
this thesis do not themselves lead to concrete recommendations for teaching and learning, 
they do highlight some possible approaches that could be evaluated in the future or tried 
by teachers in their classrooms. The first suggestion is to encourage students not to give 
their first answer to a problem, but instead to spend more time reasoning about the 
problem presented. This approach would be consistent with the findings that better 






While quick answers are sometimes encouraged in lessons (particularly in maths, when 
fast mental calculations can be seen as important), taking time to ‘stop and think’ may be 
beneficial and lead to more time for considering the correct answer. This idea was 
suggested in the context of science education by Rowe (1986), alongside evidence from a 
range of studies that both comprehension and attitude improved through introducing ‘wait 
time’. Nonetheless, experience in school suggests that the wait time approach has not 
been widely adopted. This approach may have particular importance for individuals with 
deficits in inhibitory control, related to a developmental disorder such as ADHD. These 
students may require extra support in learning to suppress their first intuitive answer. 
The second suggestion is to raise awareness of misconceptions within students, 
telling them explicitly about incorrect answers and why they may be appealing but wrong. 
It may be that this can help students to apply their cognitive skills more effectively. For 
instance, if a student knows that they hold incorrect intuitions in science, they might more 
readily suppress their initial response in a science lesson and take more time to reason and 
consider other answers. This suggestion is consistent with recommendations to use 
refutation texts, which explicitly address misconceptions and explain why they are wrong 
in detail (Ecker, Swire, & Lewandowsky, 2014). Here, the idea is to go further than 
simply saying the information is untrue (a plain retraction) and to include supporting 
evidence explaining why it is wrong, and if possible, where the misconception came 
from. As long as the refutation text is clear, well-constructed, and the students engage 
fully in the material (as opposed to skim reading) this is more effective than a plain 
retraction (Ecker et al., 2014).  
Ryan and Williams (2007) also argued that simply correcting errors is 
unproductive, and suggested a ‘dialogic pedagogy’ approach in maths. The starting point 
for this approach is when there is some kind of disagreement between students about 
something mathematical, which is followed by the teacher encouraging argument in 
discussion. It is key that students are encouraged to listen to each other, and to be open to 
other points of view. Students first articulate their point of view, then ideally reformulate 
their ideas based on what others have said, then reflect on why their initial reasoning was 
incorrect, and finally reach a resolution. While this approach was proposed in the context 
of maths by Ryan and Williams (2007), the same strategy could be used in science too, 
when disagreements occur. Indeed, Driver and colleagues (2015) highlight the importance 






their own thoughts and to build on their collective understanding. Although not 
mentioned by the authors, as in maths, the presence of a teacher would help to ensure 
misconceptions are not propagated when discussions relate to counterintuitive concepts. 
Stavy and Tirosh (2000) suggested the ‘conflict teaching’ approach to help 
students overcome misconceptions. In this approach, students are presented with a 
problem known to elicit an incorrect (intuitive) response, triggering a misconception, 
followed by a second problem that contradicts their first response. There is some evidence 
that this approach is effective and that performance following this approach improves 
(Stavy & Tirosh, 2000). No mechanism is posited for conflict teaching, but it seems likely 
that it would highlight students’ own tendencies to answer intuitively, thus raising 
awareness of the need to go beyond initial responses. 
 Arguments have also been made for supporting relational reasoning in education. 
Analogical reasoning has been shown to help students learn in science (Jee et al., 2013; 
Matlen et al., 2009), and extending this to maths learning has been suggested as it may be 
especially helpful in the learning of abstract concepts (Richland et al., 2007). It has also 
been shown that explanations of analogies in learning must be made explicit by teachers, 
as relations may not always be obvious to the learner (Vendetti et al., 2015). Younger 
learners would need support in applying analogies since relational reasoning continues to 
develop through the school years (Richland & Burchinal, 2013). 
 Overall, the literature and this thesis indicate that cognitive skills play an 
important role in reasoning and learning in science and maths. Teachers are not always 
aware of the role of these factors in successful school performance (Gilmore & Cragg, 




The evidence presented in thesis suggests that inhibitory control and relational 
reasoning are two cognitive skills that enable adolescents to reason effectively in science 
and maths. In particular, these skills seem to have a specific role in reasoning about 
counterintuitive concepts, where misconceptions may be held. The studies presented here 
are novel in: assessing performance in a broad range of educationally-relevant science 






counterintuitive concepts in the classroom; explicitly examining overlapping neural 
activation in inhibitory control and counterintuitive reasoning; associating individual 
differences in neural activation during science and maths with relational reasoning 
behavioural performance; and finally, in considering the role of both relational reasoning 
and inhibitory control when controlling for the effects of age, vocabulary, and working 
memory. Overall, the results from this thesis indicate that success in science and maths 
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Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk) 
Ethics number: 141552 
 
I have had the details of the study explained to me and willingly consent for my child to take 
part.  
 
My questions have been answered to my satisfaction and I understand that I may ask further 
questions at any time. 
 
I understand that my child will remain anonymous and that all the information given will be used 
for this study only. 
 
I understand that I may withdraw my consent for the study at any time without giving any 
reason.  
 
I understand that all information given will remain confidential except in the highly unlikely 
event that the researcher has a serious concern regarding a child protection issue.  
 
I confirm that my child does not have a history of any developmental or neurological disorders 




Name of child:  ………………………………………………… Child date of birth:…………. 
Class: ………………  





Name of researcher: …………………………………………………   










Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Pupil Consent Form (ages 13-15) 
Study title: The development of science and maths reasoning in relation to inhibitory control 
Researcher: Annie Brookman (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk) 
Ethics number: 141552 
I have had the details of the study explained to me and I’m happy to take part.  
I’m happy that my questions have been answered and I understand I can ask more questions at 
any time. 
I understand that my name will not be linked to my scores on the different tests and that my 
results will only be used in this study and not given to anyone else. 
I understand that the information collected about me will not be given to anyone else, unless 
the researcher has serious worries about my safety. 
I understand that I can say ‘stop, I don’t want to do this anymore’, at any time, without having to 


















Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Parent/Guardian Information Sheet 
Study title: The development of science and maths reasoning in relation to inhibitory control 
Researcher: Annie Brookman (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk)  
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk) 
Ethics number: 141552 
Dear Parents/Guardians,  
We would like to invite your child to participate in a research project. Participation is totally 
voluntary; choosing not to let your child take part will not disadvantage you or them in any way. 
Before you decide whether or not you want your child to take part, it is important for you to 
read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please contact the 
researcher on this project, Annie Brookman (email: abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk, phone: 020 7079 
0703), if there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information. 
What is the study about? 
We are investigating the development of science and maths reasoning in pupils in years 7 to 10. 
We are interested in how understanding of maths and science relates to pupils’ abilities to 
inhibit behaviours. Research suggests that adults need to inhibit their prior beliefs when 
reasoning about science and maths, but this has not been investigated in younger age groups 
before. We are therefore interested in seeing how maths and science reasoning relates to 
inhibition throughout early secondary school. We intend to see pupils for this project before the 
summer holidays. 
Why has my child been chosen? 
Your child’s school has agreed to take part in our project, and information sheets have been sent 
to parents of all children in years 7 to 10. 
What will happen to my child if I agree to take part? 
We will be asking your child to complete several tasks. Most will be performed on a laptop. For 
example, your child will be asked to look at coloured squares on the screen and press a button 
corresponding to where on the screen the square is, but only when the square is a certain 
colour. Another task is a measure of language, and will require your child to tell the researcher 
the meaning of different words. 
If you agree for your child to participate, s/he will be tested in a quiet room at school by the 
trained researcher, Annie Brookman (a Masters student at Birkbeck, University of London). The 
tasks will be fully explained and any questions answered. Rest breaks will be provided and the 
researcher will be present throughout the whole experiment. Your child will be made aware that 






discontinued without them having to give a reason. The study session will take no longer than an 
hour and will be during the school day. We are working with the school to ensure that minimal 
disruption to your child’s school day will occur, and the timing of the study sessions do not 
interfere with any examination periods. Finally, we will ask your child’s science and maths 
teachers for their average grades in these subjects. 
Risks: There are not thought to be any risks associated with any of the tasks your child will be 
asked to take part in.  
Benefits: The study is not intended to give direct benefit to the participants themselves. 
However, it is hoped that any knowledge gained as a result of the study will be able to help 
inform further studies into maths and science reasoning and learning. Ultimately we are aiming 
to help inform educational practice in these areas. 
What will happen to the results? 
The results of the study will be used as part of Annie Brookman’s Masters dissertation and will 
not be shared with the school. Your son or daughter will not be identifiable in the dissertation or 
any publication that might ensue, which will report group averages. Your child’s involvement in 
the study will remain confidential except in the highly unlikely event that the researcher has a 
serious concern regarding a child protection issue. All data will be collected and stored in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Your child does not have to take part in this study if you do not want them to or if they do not 
want to. Participation is entirely voluntary. You/your child are free to decline to enter or to 
withdraw from the study at any time without having to give a reason. Participation in this study 
will in no way affect your/your child’s legal rights, or current or future medical treatment. The 
project has received ethical approval from the Department of Psychological Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee of Birkbeck, University of London. 
How do we take part? 
If you decide that your child can take part, we request that you sign the consent form that is 
enclosed with this information pack. Please return the signed consent form to your child’s tutor, 
who will pass it on to the researcher. Even after signing the consent form you are still free to 
withdraw your child from the study at any time and without giving a reason. If you give consent 
for your child to take part in the study the researcher will work with the school to book a 
convenient time for your child to take part in the study.  
Thank you very much for your interest in our research.  If you have any further questions please 
contact Annie Brookman. If you’d like to speak to the supervisor of this project directly, please 
contact Dr Iroise Dumontheil. 
Researcher: 
Annie Brookman 




Dr Iroise Dumontheil 
Tel: 020 3073 8008 
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• You can stop each task whenever you like, without being questioned.   
• The information collected about you will not be given to anyone else, unless the 
researcher has serious worries about your safety. 
• If you have any questions you can ask the researcher: Annie Brookman, Tel: 020 7079 












Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
Parent/Guardian Information Sheet 
 
Study title: The role of inhibitory control and working memory in learning new concepts in 
[science/maths]  
Researcher: Annie Brookman-Byrne (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk)  




[School name] is working with researchers at Birkbeck, University of London, to investigate how 
pupils learn and reason about [science/maths]. Your child’s class has been chosen to take part in 
a study that looks at the skills involved in learning new concepts in [science/maths]. 
 
What is the study about? 
We are interested in how learning new [science/maths] concepts relates to a cognitive skill 
called inhibitory control. This is the ability to withhold an automatic response, and is known to 
develop throughout adolescence. Research suggests that we need to inhibit prior beliefs when 
reasoning about science, but the relationship between inhibitory control and [science/maths] 
learning has not been investigated before. We also interested in learning how the role of 
working memory, the ability to hold and manipulate information in mind, is related to learning in 
[science/maths]. We are therefore researching this relationship in [School name] pupils. 
 
What will happen during the study? 
The whole class will take part in some online tasks in a school computer room during the 
lunchbreak on a normal school day. There will be two tasks and the session will take around 15-
20 minutes in total. Annie Brookman-Byrne, a PhD student at Birkbeck, will be there to explain 
the tasks and answer any questions. The tasks will be carried out individually by each pupil at the 
same time. In these tasks, your child will be asked to press a key as quickly as possible in 
response to colours, numbers and dots seen on the screen.  
 
During a [science/maths] lesson, the whole class will be given a short test of their understanding 
of different concepts in [science/maths] that will last around 10 minutes. Annie will then observe 
some of the [science/maths] lessons. Two weeks later they will be given another 
[science/maths] test in a lesson, to see what they have learnt. Finally, approximately three 
weeks later, they will be given another [science/maths] test during a lesson. This will allow us to 
see how well they have learnt the information given to them in their lessons. The study will take 
place after the Easter holidays. 
 
We will also ask the [science/maths] teacher for each member of the class’s [science/maths] 






decide that we would like to do more tasks with the class, to explore the skills involved in 
[science/maths] learning further. If this is the case, we will contact you again with another 
information sheet and consent form. 
 
What will happen to the results? 
The results of the study will be used as part of Annie Brookman-Byrne’s PhD thesis, published in 
scientific journals, and presented at conferences. Your child will not be identifiable in the thesis 
or any publication that might ensue, which will report group averages. Your child’s involvement 
in the study will remain confidential except in the highly unlikely event that the researcher has a 
serious concern regarding a child protection issue. All data will be collected and stored in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. You and your child are free to withdraw from the 
study at any time without having to give a reason, by getting in touch with Annie or her 
supervisor (see below). The project has received ethical approval from the Department of 
Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee of Birkbeck, University of London. 
 
How do we take part? 
Attached is an opt-out consent form.  
• If you agree for your child to take part, you do not have to do anything. 
• If you do not wish for your child to take part in this research, please complete the form 
and return it to the school. 
 





Annie Brookman-Byrne, Tel: 020 7079 0777, Email: abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: 
Dr Iroise Dumontheil, Tel: 020 3073 8008, Email: i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk 
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• You can stop each task whenever you like, without being questioned 
• The information collected about you will not be given to anyone else, unless the 
researcher has serious worries about your safety 
• If you have any questions you can ask the researcher:  










Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
Parent/Guardian opt-out consent form 
 
Study title: The role of inhibitory control and working memory in learning new concepts in 
[science/maths] 
Researcher: Annie Brookman-Byrne (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk)  
Ethics approval number: 151631 
 
I have had the details of the study explained to me. My questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time. 
I understand that my child will remain anonymous and that all the information given will be 
used for this study only. 
I understand that all information given will remain confidential except in the highly unlikely 
event that the researcher has a serious concern regarding a child protection issue. 
I understand that we may be contacted to take part in further research, and that if it is the 
case, I will receive further information and will be able to decide whether I would like my child 
to take part. 
I understand that I may withdraw my consent for the present study at any time and will not 
need to justify my decision. 
As the whole class is taking part in the study, we are using an opt-out consent approach for 
this research. This means that your child will be taking part in the research, EXCEPT if you 
OPT-OUT by filling in the form below and returning it to [School name].  
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
To be completed by a parent or guardian who DOES NOT AGREE to their child taking part in 
the research study: 
I DO NOT wish for my child to take part in the above study □ 
Please use BLOCK CAPITALS 
Parent/Guardian name ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Child full name ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 










Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
Pupil consent form 
 
Study title: The role of inhibitory control and working memory in learning new concepts in 
[science/maths] 
Researcher: Annie Brookman-Byrne (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk)  
Ethics approval number: 151631 
 
I have had the details of the study explained to me and I’m happy to take part.  
I’m happy that my questions have been answered and I understand I can ask more questions at 
any time. 
I understand that my name will not be linked to my scores on the different tests and that my 
results will only be used in this study and not given to anyone else. 
I understand that the information collected about me will not be given to anyone else, unless 
the researcher has serious worries about my safety. 
I understand that I can say ‘stop, I don’t want to do this anymore’, at any time, without having to 





















Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
Parent/Guardian Information Sheet – Follow up test 
 
Study title: The role of inhibitory control and working memory in learning new concepts in 
[science/maths]  
Researcher: Annie Brookman-Byrne (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk)  




You may remember that last academic year your child took part in a study with researchers at 
Birkbeck, University of London, to investigate how pupils learn and reason about 
[science/maths]. We would like to see your child for a further five minutes to complete one 
more computer test. 
 
What is the study about? 
We are interested in how learning new [science/maths] concepts relates to a cognitive skill 
called inhibitory control. This is the ability to withhold an automatic response, and is known to 
develop throughout adolescence. Research suggests that we need to inhibit prior beliefs when 
reasoning about science, but the relationship between inhibitory control and [science/maths] 
learning has not been investigated before. We are also interested in learning how the role of 
working memory, the ability to hold and manipulate information in mind, is related to learning in 
[science/maths]. We are therefore researching this relationship in [School name] pupils and 
would like to test this ability in pupils who have already taken part. 
 
What will happen during the study? 
There will be one task to complete for about 5 minutes. Annie Brookman-Byrne, a PhD student 
at Birkbeck, will explain the task and answer any questions. The task will take place either one-
to-one with Annie, or in a computer room as a class. Your child will be asked to click the mouse 
as quickly as possible in response to dots seen on the screen.  
 
What will happen to the results? 
The results of the study will be used as part of Annie Brookman-Byrne’s PhD thesis, published in 
a scientific journal, and presented at conferences. Your child will not be identifiable in the thesis 
or any publication that might ensue, which will report group averages. Your child’s involvement 
in the study will remain confidential except in the highly unlikely event that the researcher has a 
serious concern regarding a child protection issue. All data will be collected and stored in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. You and your child are free to withdraw from the 
study at any time without having to give a reason, by getting in touch with Annie or her 
supervisor (see below). The project has received ethical approval from the Department of 







How do we take part? 
Attached is an opt-out consent form.  
• If you agree for your child to take part, you do not have to do anything. 
• If you do not wish for your child to take part in this research, please complete the form 
and return it to the school. 
 





Annie Brookman-Byrne, Tel: 020 7079 0777, Email: abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: 
Dr Iroise Dumontheil, Tel: 020 3073 8008, Email: i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk 
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Last academic year you took part in a research project about learning new concepts in science. 
We would like to see you for another five minutes to complete one final test. 
 
We are interested in how pupils in secondary school learn new concepts in science. There are no 
more science tests to do, we are just inviting you to take part in a computer game where you 
have to respond to dots on a screen by clicking the mouse.  
 





• You can stop the task whenever you like, without being questioned 
• The information collected about you will not be given to anyone else, unless the 
researcher has serious worries about your safety 
• If you have any questions you can ask the researcher:  













Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Parent/Guardian Information Sheet 
 
Study title: Neuroimaging study of the role of executive functions in science and maths 
reasoning 
Researcher: Annie Brookman (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk), Jack White 
(jwhite18@mail.bbk.ac.uk) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk)  
Ethics approval number: 1602-005 
 
Dear Parent(s)/Guardian(s),  
We would like to invite your child to participate in a research project. Participation is totally 
voluntary; choosing not to let your child take part will not disadvantage you or them in any way. 
Before you decide whether or not you want your child to take part, it is important for you to 
read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please contact the 
researchers on this project, Annie Brookman (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk; 020 7079 0703), Jack 
White (jwhite18@mail.bbk.ac.uk), or Dr. Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk; 020 3073 
8008) if there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information. 
 
What is the study about? 
We are investigating the development of science and maths reasoning in pupils in Years 7 to 10. 
We are interested in how understanding maths and science relates to pupils’ executive 
functions, the set of mental mechanisms that allow us to keep important information in mind 
and use it to achieve our goals. Executive functions are still developing through adolescence, and 
are thought to have specific influence on science and maths reasoning. We are therefore 
interested in seeing how maths and science reasoning relates to executive functions throughout 
early secondary school using computerised tasks and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).  
 
Why study this with an MRI machine? 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allows us to view brain activity in real time while 
your child is carrying out some simple science, maths and executive function tasks. This will help 
us see if their brain uses similar brain regions for the different types of tasks. MRI scanners are 
basically a very large and strong magnet, which is completely harmless for your child. You can 
watch a video of someone being scanned at BUCNI here:  
http://www.drru-research.org/pages/what-its-like-to-have-a-brain-scan.html 
 
Why has my child been chosen? 
Your child’s school has agreed to take part in our project, and information sheets have been sent 
to parents of children in Years 7 to 10. 
 






We will be asking your child to complete several simple tasks. Some will be performed on a 
laptop and others will be performed while inside the MRI scanner. For example, they may be 
asked to view different scientific and mathematical pictures and sentences, and asked whether 
they are true or false. They will be asked to click on a button to make their choice. In other tasks 
they may be asked to remember numbers, or to press a button as quickly as possible if they see 
a green square, but not press any button if they see a red square on the screen. Some tasks will 
be completed by your child outside the scanner and may include telling us the meanings of 
words or choosing which picture completes a pattern. 
 
Where and when will this happen? 
If you agree for your child to participate, s/he will be tested at the Birkbeck and UCL Centre for 
Neuroimaging (BUCNI), in central London, by trained researchers, Annie Brookman (a PhD 
student at Birkbeck College, University of London), Jack White (a Master’s student at Birkbeck), 
and their supervisor, Dr. Iroise Dumontheil (Reader in Cognitive Neuroscience at Birkbeck). The 
tasks will be fully explained and any questions answered. Rest breaks will be provided and a 
researcher will be present throughout the whole experiment. Your child will be made aware that 
if they wish to stop the experiment for any reason at any point during the study, it will be 
discontinued without them having to give a reason. The study session will take no longer than 
two hours and will be during the day over the Easter holidays or on a weekend in April or May of 
this year.  
 
In some cases, we may like to see your child again, and ask them to complete some additional 
tasks at school. These will be done on a laptop or using pen and paper. If we would like to see 
your child in school, we will give you a separate consent form to sign. The researchers will agree 
a convenient time to see your child at the school, within normal school hours.  
 
Are there any risks involved in taking part? 
The MRI scanning procedure requires that your child be confined in a small partially enclosed 
space. Some individuals find this to be uncomfortable and may exhibit symptoms of 
claustrophobia including nervousness, sweating or other minor discomfort. For this reason we 
cannot scan children who are uncomfortable in small spaces, like elevators.  
 
The sound of the MRI scanner can be quite loud; your child will be given special earplugs to 
minimise the noise. In addition, the scanner is a very strong magnet, which means it attracts 
certain metals. Therefore, people with these metals within their bodies (such as dental braces, 
pacemakers, infusion pumps, aneurysm clips, metal prostheses, joints, rods, or plates) will be 
excluded from the study. The “metal” in dental fillings is less responsive to magnetism and is 
therefore allowed, but we cannot scan children who are wearing dental braces.  
 
There are no other known side effects resulting from exposure to the MRI scan. The project has 
received ethical approval from the Department of Psychological Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee of Birkbeck, University of London. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
The study is not intended to give direct benefit to the participants themselves. However, it is 
hoped that any knowledge gained as a result of the study will be able to help inform further 
studies into maths and science reasoning and learning. Ultimately we are aiming to help inform 







Participants will be compensated £10/hour of their time for taking part and will receive a picture 
of their brain. Travel cost for the participant and their parent/guardian will also be reimbursed. 
 
What will happen to the results? 
The results of the study will be used as part of Annie Brookman’s PhD dissertation, Jack White’s 
Master’s dissertation, and research publications. Individual children’s results will be anonymised 
and will not be shared with their school. Your child will not be identifiable in the dissertations or 
any publication that might ensue, which will report group averages. Your child’s involvement in 
the study will remain confidential except in the highly unlikely event that a researcher has a 
serious concern regarding a child protection issue. All data will be collected and stored in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Can we change our minds? 
Yes. Your child does not have to take part in this study if you do not want them to or if they do 
not want to. Participation is entirely voluntary. You and your child are free to decline to enter or 
to withdraw from the study at any time without having to give a reason. Participation in this 
study will in no way affect your legal rights or those of your child’s, or current or future medical 
treatment. 
 
How do we take part? 
If you decide that your child can take part, please contact Annie Brookman: 
abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk; 020 7079 0703, who is running this project. She will discuss the study 
further with you, and will ask you to go through an MRI pre-screening form to check that there is 
no reason (such as claustrophobia, or dental braces) for your child to not take part, and will book 
a date and time for your child to do the testing session at BUCNI.  
 
On the day we will ask you to sign a consent form stating that you understand what the study is 
about and that you agree for your child to take part. Even after signing the consent form you are 
still free to withdraw your child from the study at any time and without giving a reason. We will 
also ask you to complete and sign the MRI pre-screening form, and the operator running the MRI 
scanner will check that your child has removed all metal from around his or her body.  
 
Thank you very much for your interest in our research.  If you have any further questions please 
contact Annie Brookman or Jack White. If you’d like to speak to the supervisor of this project 
directly, please contact Dr Iroise Dumontheil. 
 
Researchers: 
Annie Brookman, Tel: 020 7079 0703, Email: abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk 
Jack White, Email: jwhite18@mail.bbk.ac.uk 
Supervisor: 
Dr Iroise Dumontheil, Tel: 020 3073 8008, Email: i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk,  
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Birkbeck, University of London 
Participant Information Sheet 

















• You can stop each task whenever you like, without being questioned 
• The information collected about you will not be given to anyone else, unless the 
researcher has serious worries about your safety 
• If you have any questions you can ask the researcher:  




















Get £10 per 












Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Parent/Guardian Consent Form (fMRI) 
 
Study title: Neuroimaging study of the role of executive functions in science and maths 
reasoning 
Researchers: Annie Brookman (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk), Jack White 
(jwhite18@mail.bbk.ac.uk)  
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk)  
Ethics approval number: 1602-005 
 
• I have had the details of the study explained to me and willingly consent for my child to 
take part.  
• My questions have been answered to my satisfaction and I understand that I may ask 
further questions at any time. 
• I understand that my child will remain anonymous and that all the information given will 
be used for this study only. 
• I understand that I may withdraw my consent for the study at any time without giving 
any reason.  
• I understand that all information given will remain confidential except in the highly 
unlikely event that the researcher has a serious concern regarding a child protection 
issue.  
• I confirm that my child does not have a history of any developmental or neurological 
disorders (such as dyspraxia, epilepsy, or ADHD). 
• I confirm that during the testing my child will not have any metal in or about their 
person. 
 
Signature and Acknowledgment 
 
______________________________________________   ____________ ___________ 
NAME OF CHILD (PLEASE PRINT)     DATE OF BIRTH SCHOOL YEAR 
 
_____________________________________________   ________________________________ 
NAME OF PARENT/CARER (PLEASE PRINT)  EMAIL 
_____________________________________________ ________________________________ 




I ………………………………………………………………………. confirm that I have carefully explained the 
purpose of the study to the participant and his/her parent/carer and outlined any reasonably 
foreseeable risks or benefits (where applicable). 
 











Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
Participant Consent Form (11-15y) (fMRI) 
 
Study title: Neuroimaging study of the role executive functions in science and maths reasoning 
Researcher: Annie Brookman (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk), Jack White 
(jwhite18@mail.bbk.ac.uk) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk)  
Ethics approval number: 1602-005 
 
• I have had the details of the study explained to me and I’m happy to take part.  
• I’m happy that my questions have been answered and I understand I can ask more 
questions at any time. 
• I understand that my name will not be linked to my scores on the different tests and that 
my results will only be used in this study and not given to anyone else. 
• I understand that the information collected about me will not be given to anyone else, 
unless the researcher has serious worries about my safety. 
• I understand that I can say ‘stop, I don’t want to do this anymore’, at any time, without 
having to give a reason. 
• I understand that I should not have any metal (jewellery, piercings or clothing) in or on 





Signature and Acknowledgment 
 
______________________________________________   ____________ ___________ 
NAME          DATE OF BIRTH SCHOOL YEAR 
_____________________________ ________________________________ 





I ………………………………………………………………………. confirm that I have carefully explained the 
purpose of the study to the participant and his/her parent/carer and outlined any reasonably 
foreseeable risks or benefits (where applicable). 
 








Please return this form to [School name] 
Information sheets and consent forms from the study described in Chapter 7. 
 
 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Parent/Guardian Consent Form 
Study title: Relational reasoning in science and maths 
Researchers: Annie Brookman-Byrne (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk), Adrian Woodley-Cooper 
(woodleycooper@btinternet.com), Sara Kapika (s.m.kapika@student.vu.nl) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk) 
Ethics number: 171807 
I have had the details of the study explained to me and willingly consent for my child to take 
part.  
My questions have been answered to my satisfaction and I understand that I may ask further 
questions at any time. 
I understand that the researchers will obtain my child’s average grades in science and maths for 
the year, and their [MidYIS OR CAT OR non-verbal and verbal reasoning] test scores from the 
school. 
I understand that my child’s data will remain confidential. I understand that anonymous average 
scores will be put online for other scientists to use, but no information that could allow my child 
to be identified will be shared. 
I understand that I may withdraw my consent for the study up to one year after the end of the 
project without giving any reason. After this date my child’s data will no longer be linked to their 
name. 
I understand that all information given will remain confidential except in the highly unlikely 
event that the researcher has a serious concern regarding a child protection issue.  
I confirm that my child does not have a history of any developmental or neurological disorders 
(such as dyspraxia, epilepsy, or ADHD). 
Participant 
Child’s name: …………………………………… Child’s date of birth: ……………… 
Sex: Female / Male  School year:  7  /  8  /  9  /  10 Class: …………… 
Parent/Guardian name: …………………………………………………             
Parent/Guardian signature: …………............................ Today’s date: ………………………… 
 
For researcher to fill in 
Name of researcher: …………………………………………………   









Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Pupil Consent Form (ages 13-15) 
Study title: Relational reasoning in science and maths 
Researchers: Annie Brookman-Byrne (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk), Adrian Woodley-Cooper 
(woodleycooper@btinternet.com), Sara Kapika (s.m.kapika@student.vu.nl) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk) 
Ethics number: 171807 
I have had the details of the study explained to me and I’m happy to take part.  
I’m happy that my questions have been answered and I understand I can ask more questions at 
any time. 
I understand that the researchers will obtain my average grades in science and maths for the 
year and [MidYIS OR CAT OR non-verbal and verbal reasoning] test scores from the school. 
I understand that my name will not be linked to my scores on the different tests. I understand 
that my scores will be stored online so that other scientists can do research on them but my my 
name or date of birth will not be shared. 
I understand that my personal information will not be given to anyone else, unless the 
researcher has serious worries about my safety. 
I understand that I can say ‘stop, I don’t want to do this anymore’, at any time, without having to 






For researcher to fill in 
Researcher name: …………………………………………………… 
Signature: ……………………………………… 









Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Parent/Guardian Information Sheet 
Study title: Relational reasoning in science and maths 
Researchers: Annie Brookman-Byrne (abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk), Adrian Woodley-Cooper 
(woodleycooper@btinternet.com), Sara Kapika (s.m.kapika@student.vu.nl) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil (i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk) 
Ethics number: 171807 
Dear Parents/Guardians,  
We would like to invite your child to participate in a research project. Participation is 
voluntary; choosing not to let your child take part will not disadvantage you or them in any way. 
Before you decide whether or not you want your child to take part, it is important for you to 
read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please contact the 
researcher on this project, Annie Brookman-Byrne (email: abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk, phone: 
020 7079 0777), if there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information. 
What is the study about? 
We are investigating the development of science and maths reasoning in pupils in years 
7 to 10. We are trying to find out how important relational reasoning is for science and maths. 
Research suggests that the ability to see relations between items is important when solving 
science and maths problems. The role of relational reasoning in science and maths has not been 
investigated before. We are therefore interested in discovering the associations between 
relational reasoning and science and maths throughout early secondary school. 
Why has my child been chosen? 
[School name] have agreed to take part in Annie’s PhD project, and information sheets 
have been sent to parents of all children in years 7 to 10.  
What will happen to my child if I agree to take part? 
We will ask your child to complete several tasks. Most will be performed on a laptop. For 
example, your child will be asked to look at science and maths statements and decide whether 
they are true or false. Another task requires pressing buttons as quickly as possible when 
coloured squares appear on the screen. 
If you agree for your child to participate, they will be tested in a quiet room at school by 
the trained researcher, Annie Brookman-Byrne (a PhD student at Birkbeck, University of London) 
or Adrian Woodley-Cooper or Sara Kapika (also from Birkbeck, University of London) who have 
been trained by Annie. The tasks will be fully explained and any questions answered. Rest breaks 
will be provided and the researcher will be present throughout the whole experiment. Your child 
will be made aware that if they wish to stop the experiment for any reason at any point during 
the study, it will be discontinued without them having to give a reason. The study session will 
take approximately 45 minutes during the school day. We are working with the school to ensure 
that minimal disruption to your child’s day will occur, and the timing of the study sessions do not 






researchers with your child’s science and maths average grade for the current year, and your 
child’s [MidYIS or CAT or verbal and non-verbal reasoning] scores. 
The study is not intended to give direct benefit to the participants themselves. However, 
it is hoped that any knowledge gained as a result of the study will be able to help inform further 
studies into science and maths reasoning and learning. Ultimately we are aiming to help inform 
educational practice in these areas. There are not thought to be any risks associated with any of 
the tasks your child will be asked to take part in. 
What will happen to the results? 
The results of the study will be used as part of Annie Brookman-Byrne’s PhD thesis and 
university students’ dissertations, and individual results will not be shared with the school. Your 
son or daughter will not be identifiable in the thesis or any publication that might ensue, which 
will report group averages and compare performance in the different tasks. Your child’s 
involvement in the study will remain confidential except in the highly unlikely event that the 
researcher has a serious concern regarding a child protection issue. All data will be collected and 
stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. All raw data and consent forms will be 
destroyed 10 years after the end of the study. Anonymised summary data (average scores on 
the different tests) will be stored online at the end of the study so that other scientists can check 
our work or perform their own analyses. 
Your child does not have to take part in this study if you do not want them to or if they 
do not want to. Participation is entirely voluntary. You and your child are free to decline to 
enter. If you decide that your child can take part, you are free to later withdraw their data from 
the study up to one year after the end of the project without having to give a reason. After this 
time, it will no longer be possible to link their name to their data. Participation in this study will 
in no way affect your or your child’s legal rights, or current or future medical treatment. The 
project has received ethical approval from the Department of Psychological Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee of Birkbeck, University of London. 
How do we take part? 
If you decide that your child can take part, please sign the consent form that is enclosed 
with this information pack. Please return the signed consent form to your child’s tutor, who will 
pass it on to Annie. Even after signing the consent form you are still free to withdraw your child 
from the study by contacting Annie or the school without giving a reason. If you give consent for 
your child to take part in the study Annie will work with the school to book a convenient time for 
your child to take part in the study. Your child’s participation will take place by the end of the 
current school year. Unfortunately, we are unable to include children who have any diagnosed 
developmental or neurological disorders (such as dyspraxia, epilepsy, or ADHD). 
Thank you very much for your interest in our research.  If you have any further questions 
please contact Annie Brookman-Byrne. If you’d like to speak to the supervisor of this project 
directly, please contact Dr Iroise Dumontheil. 
 
Researchers: Annie Brookman-Byrne, tel: 020 7079 0777, email: abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk 
Adrian Woodley-Cooper (woodleycooper@btinternet.com), Sara Kapika 
(s.m.kapika@student.vu.nl) 
Supervisor: Dr Iroise Dumontheil, tel: 020 3073 8008, email: i.dumontheil@bbk.ac.uk 











Department of Psychological Sciences 
Birkbeck, University of London 

















• You can stop each task whenever you like, without being questioned.   
• The information collected about you will not be given to anyone else, unless the 
researcher has serious worries about your safety. 
• If you have any questions you can ask the main researcher Annie Brookman-Byrne,  
telephone: 020 7079 0777, email: abrook07@mail.bbk.ac.uk 
  
You will take part 
in some tasks on a 
laptop and one 
using pen and 
paper.  
The study will take place 
in a quiet room at school.
We are interested in how 
pupils in secondary school 
think about science and 
maths. These tasks will 
help us to understand more 
about these skills.
If you want to take 
part, we may ask 
you to sign a form. 
If you want to stop 
at any time, just say 
that you don’t want 
to take part. You 
don’t have to give a 
reason and nobody 
will mind. 
Nobody will know 
what answers you 
gave, and the results 
will be confidential, 
so your name will 
not be stored with 
your answers.
You will do the tasks with 
Annie, Adrian, or Sara 
who are from Birkbeck, 
University of London.
The tasks will take about 
45 minutes during the 
school day at a convenient 
time.
Anonymous average 
data, without your 
name or date of 









Regression analyses for brain activation in Chapter 6. Age, vocabulary, and 
executive function measures were entered stepwise in block 1, and the relevant relational 
reasoning measure was entered stepwise in block 2. 
 
Table A.2.1. Regression models for activation in the cluster that has its peak in the 
parahippocampal gyrus for the Science > Arrows contrast covaried with WASI Matrix Reasoning. 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variable Independent variables β t p 
Activation in the parahippocampal gyrus cluster 
Model 1a 
F(1, 31) = 7.81, 
p = .009, R2 = 20% 
Constant  2.35 .025 
VWM .45 2.79 .009 
Model 1b 
F(2, 30) = 6.74, 
p = .004, R2 = 31% 
ΔR2 = 10.9% 
Constant  1.47 .151 
VWM .36 2.31 .028 
Simple Go RT cost .34 2.18 .037 
Model 1c 
F(3, 29) = 22.41, 
p < .001, R2 = 70% 
ΔR2 = 38.9% 
Constant  -5.06 < .001 
VWM .10 0.92 .368 
Simple Go RT cost .22 2.01 .054 













Table A.2.2. Regression models for activation in the cluster that has its peak in the paracentral 
lobule for the Science > Arrows contrast covaried with WASI Matrix Reasoning. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variable Independent variables β t p 
Activation in the paracentral lobule 
Model 2a 
F(1, 31) = 4.92, 
p = .034, R2 = 14% 
Constant  0.87 .389 
Complex Go RT cost .37 2.22 .034 
Model 2b 
F(2, 30) = 5.08, 
p = .013, R2 = 25% 
   
Constant  -0.82 .421 
Complex Go RT cost .39 2.44 .021 
VWM .34 2.16 .039 
Model 2c 
F(3, 29) = 12.09, 
p < .001, R2 = 56% 
ΔR2 = 30% 
Constant  -4.47 < .001 
Complex Go RT cost .30 2.43 .022 
VWM .08 0.62 .543 
WASI Matrix Reasoning .61 4.44 < .001 
 
Table A.2.3. Regression models for activation in the cluster that has its peak in crus I of the 
cerebellar hemisphere for the Science > Arrows contrast covaried with WASI Matrix Reasoning. 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variable Independent variables β t p 
Activation in crus I of cerebellar hemisphere 
Model 3a 
F(1, 31) = 10.26, 
p = .003, R2 = 25% 
Constant  -1.88 .069 
VS-WM .50 3.20 .003 
Model 3b 
F(2, 30) = 15.97, 
p < .001, R2 = 52% 
ΔR2 = 26.7% 
Constant  -4.58 < .001 
VS-WM .24 1.73 .095 







Table A.2.4. Regression models for activation in the cluster that has its peak in the middle 
temporal gyrus for the Maths > Arrows contrast covaried with analogical reasoning. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variable Independent variables β t p 
Activation in the middle temporal gyrus 
Model 4a 
F(1, 31) = 7.60, 
p = .010, R2 = 20% 
Constant  -0.96 .343 
Simple Go RT cost .44 2.76 .010 
Model 4b 
F(2, 30) = 17.33, 
p < .001, R2 = 54% 
ΔR2 = 33.9% 
Constant  -4.85 < .001 
Simple Go RT cost .19 1.44 .161 










Additional regression analyses for Chapter 7. These analyses were run on the 
subsample of participants who had data for all tasks, N = 73. 
 
Table A.3.1. Regression models for science and maths accuracy. Significant predictors (p < .05) 
are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variable Independent variables β t p 
Science and maths accuracy 
Model 11a 
F(2, 69) = 7.02, 
p = .002, R2 = 17% 
Constant  2.92 .005 
Age (months) .26 2.37 .021 
VWM total .30 2.69 .009 
Model 11b 
F(3, 68) = 6.84, 
p < .001, R2 = 23% 
ΔR2 = 6.3% 
Constant  2.20 .031 
Age (months) .22 2.03 .046 
VWM total .30 2.83 .006 
Hayling overall scaled score .25 2.36 .021 
Model 11c 
F(4, 67) = 19.34, 
p < .001, R2 = 54% 
ΔR2 = 30.4% 
Constant  2.84 .006 
Age (months) .12 1.34 .184 
VWM total .07 0.80 .425 
Hayling overall scaled score .05 0.51 .611 
CCF score .65 6.63 < .001 
Model 11d 
F(5, 66) = 19.77, 
p < .001, R2 = 60% 
ΔR2 = 6.4% 
Constant  1.54 .128 
Age (months) .16 1.90 .062 
VWM total .03 0.37 .715 
Hayling overall scaled score .03 0.31 .760 
CCF score .52 5.29 < .001 














Table A.3.2. Regression models for science and maths RT. Significant predictors (p < .05) are 
highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variable Independent variables β t p 
Science and maths RT 
Model 12a 
F(2, 69) = 2.12, 
p = .128, R2 = 5.8% 
Constant  7.35 < .001 
Age (months) -.23 -2.00 .050 
VWM total .08 0.66 .515 
Model 12b 
F(3, 68) = 4.42, 
p = .007, R2 = 16% 
ΔR2 = 10.5% 
Constant  8.26 < .001 
Age (months) -.18 -1.60 .115 
VWM total .07 0.62 .539 
Hayling overall scaled score -.33 -2.92 .005 
 
Table A.3.3. Regression models for science and maths accuracy by discipline. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science accuracy 
Model 13 
F(5, 66) = 13.21, 
p < .001, R2 = 50% 
Constant  0.98 .333 
Age (months) .22 2.44 .018 
VWM total .02 0.20 .840 
Hayling overall scaled score -.01 -0.13 .897 
CCF score .47 4.27 < .001 
Analogical reasoning total .25 2.47 .016 
Maths accuracy 
Model 14 
F(5, 66) = 14.88, 
p < .001, R2 = 53% 
Constant  1.60 .113 
Age (months) .07 0.74 .463 
VWM total .04 0.41 .683 
Hayling overall scaled score .06 0.65 .521 
CCF score .49 4.58 < .001 











Table A.3.4. Regression models for science and maths RT by discipline. Significant predictors (p 
< .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variables Independent variables β t p 
Science RT 
Model 15 
F(3, 68) = 3.80, 
p = .014, R2 = 14% 
Constant  7.00 < .001 
Age (months) -.16 -1.40 .167 
VWM total .06 0.52 .607 
Hayling overall scaled score -.32 -2.78 .007 
Maths RT 
Model 16 
F(3, 68) = 3.79, 
p = .014, R2 = 14% 
Constant  8.46 < .001 
Age (months) -.18 -1.58 .118 
VWM total .07 0.64 .552 
Hayling overall scaled score -.30 -2.63 .010 
 
 
Table A.3.5. Regression models for science and maths misconception accuracy. Significant 
predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variable Independent variables β t p 
Science and maths misconception accuracy 
Model 17a 
F(3, 68) = 21.22, 
p < .001, R2 = 48% 
Constant  -2.58 .012 
Age (months) .12 1.36 .178 
Science and maths control accuracy .63 6.66 < .001 
VWM total .08 0.89 .377 
Model 17b 
F(4, 67) = 23.21, 
p < .001, R2 = 58% 
ΔR2 = 9.7% 
Constant  -1.77 .081 
Age (months) .08 1.01 .318 
Science and maths control accuracy .40 3.91 < .001 
VWM total .00 .04 .970 
CCF score .41 3.94 < .001 
Model 17c 
F(5, 66) = 21.68, 
p < .001, R2 = 62% 
ΔR2 = 4.1% 
Constant  -2.43 .018 
Age (months) .12 1.50 .139 
Science and maths control accuracy .34 3.34 .001 
VWM total -.02 -0.27 .789 
CCF score .34 3.29 .002 










Table A.3.6. Regression models for science and maths misconception RT. Significant predictors 
(p < .05) are highlighted in bold. β = standardised coefficients. 
 Dependent variable Independent variables β t p 
Science and maths misconception RT 
Model 18a 
F(3, 68) = 50.31, 
p < .001, R2 = 69% 
Constant  4.37 < .001 
Age (months) -.17 -2.48 .016 
Science and maths control RT .79 11.48 < .001 
VWM total .03 .44 .661 
Model 18b 
F(4, 67) = 40.77, 
p < .001, R2 = 71% 
ΔR2 = 1.9% 
Constant  3.99 < .001 
Age (months) -.20 -2.91 .005 
Science and maths control RT .81 11.96 < .001 
VWM total -.03 -0.37 .717 
CCF score .16 2.11 .038 
 
 
